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Abstract
The following thesis accumulates four self-contained studies which analyse the
relationship between local financial development and economic growth in Vietnam.
Local financial development is measured at different levels including three distinct levels
(district, sub-district and village) for the first study and at the province level for the
other three studies. In order to measure local economic growth, we consider household
welfare (consumption, income and consumption smoothing) in the first study and firm
growth including sales, investment and firm productivity (returns on asset, equity and
employee) in three other studies. The identification strategy for the first three studies
is based on identification through heteroscedascity and the fourth study is based on
cross-sectional data and ordinary least square with accounting for growth opportunities.
The first study “Local financial development and household welfare in Vietnam:
Evidence from a panel survey” is based on the data from Thailand - Vietnam Social
Economics Panel. We employ a household-level panel data for the periods 2007,
2008, 2010 and 2013 covering three provinces and measure local financial development
at the district, sub-district and village levels. Our results show that local financial
development has a significantly positive effect on household annual income, consumption
and consumption smoothing.
The second study “Local financial development, corruption and firm growth in
Vietnam”further examines the effect of local financial development on Vietnamese
economic development. We use a nationally representative panel survey that covers
over 40,000 firms for the period 2009-2013. In this study, we examine the effects of
province-level financial development and corruption on the performance of Vietnamese
firms in terms of the growth rates of sales, investment and sales per worker. We find that
province-level financial development promotes firm growth while corruption hinders it.
Moreover, financial development and corruption control are complementary to each other
in their effects on firm growth. This suggests that while improving financial development
or reducing corruption at the province level promotes firm growth, the marginal effect
of financial development is stronger when the level of corruption is low, and vice versa.
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We also find evidence of the ‘too much finance’ effect after controlling for the level of
corruption. Our results are robust to the use of alternative measures of local financial
development.
In the third study “Does local financial development matter for the gender gap in
promoting Vietnamese firm growth?”, we investigate the differential effects of provincial
financial development on the growth of firms owned by female or male entrepreneurs
in Vietnam. Using the same data set as in the second study, our results show that
local financial development promotes firm growth in terms of the growth rates of sales,
investment, return on assets (ROA), and return on equity (ROE). The results also
suggest that the gender of the owner affects the growth rates of sales, investment, ROA
and ROE. Moreover, the joint effect of local financial development and male ownership
is significantly negative through all specifications. This implies that local financial
development could help female-owned firms reduce their constraints in promoting firm
growth.
The fourth study “Local financial development and firm growth: Evidence from
Vietnam” re-examines the relationship between local financial development and firm
growth based on an identification strategy that uses growth opportunities. We find that
local financial development promotes the growth rates of sales, investment and sales per
worker while reduces the growth rate of wage per sales of small firms. Our results imply
that, in sectors with growth opportunities, firms operating in a financially developed
locality grow faster than firms located in provinces with a lower level of financial
development. Moreover, the difference in growth rates of firms operating in sectors with
stronger growth opportunities and firms in sectors with lower growth opportunities is
larger if these firms are located in localities with higher financial development.
v
Kurzfassung
In der folgenden Arbeit werden vier in sich geschlossene Studien zusammengefasst, die
die Beziehung zwischen lokaler finanzieller Entwicklung und wirtschaftlichem Wachstum
in Vietnam analysieren. Die lokale finanzielle Entwicklung wird fu¨r die erste Studie
auf verschiedenen Ebenen gemessen, darunter drei unterschiedliche Ebenen (Bezirk,
Unterbezirk und Dorf) fu¨r die erste Studie und fu¨r die anderen drei Studien auf
Provinzebene. Um das lokale Wirtschaftswachstum zu messen, beru¨cksichtigen wir
in der ersten Studie das Wohlergehen der Haushalte (Konsum, Einkommen und
Konsumgla¨ttung) und das Unternehmenswachstum einschließlich Umsatz, Investitionen
und Unternehmensproduktivita¨t (Kapitalrendite, Eigenkapital und Mitarbeiter) in drei
weiteren Studien. Die Identifizierungsstrategie fu¨r die ersten drei Studien basiert
auf der Identifizierung durch Heteroskedastizita¨t, und die vierte Studie basiert auf
Querschnittsdaten und auf der gewo¨hnlichen Methode der kleinsten Quadrate unter
Beru¨cksichtigung von Wachstumschancen.
Die erste Studie
”
Lokale finanzielle Entwicklung und Haushalt in Vietnam: Evidenz
aus einer Panel-Umfrage“ basiert auf den Daten des Thailand - Vietnam Social
Economics Panel. Wir verwenden Paneldaten auf Haushaltsebene fu¨r die Zeitra¨ume
2007, 2008, 2010 und 2013, die sich auf drei Provinzen beziehen und messen die
lokale Finanzentwicklung auf Distrikt-, Unterdistrikt- und Dorfebene. Unsere Ergebnisse
zeigen, dass sich die lokale Finanzentwicklung deutlich positiv auf das Jahreseinkommen,
den Konsum und die Konsumgla¨ttung der Haushalte auswirkt.
In der zweiten Studie
”
Lokale finanzielle Entwicklung, Korruption und Unter-
nehmenswachstum in Vietnam“ werden die Auswirkungen der lokalen finanziellen
Entwicklung auf die vietnamesische Wirtschaftsentwicklung weiter untersucht. Wir
verwenden eine national repra¨sentative Panel-Umfrage, die fu¨r den Zeitraum 2009-
2013 u¨ber 40.000 Unternehmen erfasst. In dieser Studie untersuchen wir die
Auswirkungen der finanziellen Entwicklung und der Korruption auf Provinzebene
auf die Leistung vietnamesischer Unternehmen in Bezug auf die Wachstumsraten
von Umsatz, Investitionen und Verka¨ufen pro Arbeitnehmer. Wir stellen fest, dass
vi
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die finanzielle Entwicklung auf Provinzebene ein festes Wachstum fo¨rdert, wa¨hrend
Korruption dies behindert. Daru¨ber hinaus erga¨nzen sich Finanzentwicklung und
Korruptionsbeka¨mpfung in ihren Auswirkungen auf das Unternehmenswachstum. Dies
deutet darauf hin, dass die Verbesserung der finanziellen Entwicklung oder die
Verringerung der Korruption auf Provinzebene zwar ein festes Wachstum fo¨rdert,
der marginale Effekt der finanziellen Entwicklung jedoch sta¨rker ist, wenn das
Korruptionsniveau niedrig ist, und umgekehrt. Wir finden auch Hinweise auf den Effekt
ßu viel Finanzennach der Kontrolle des Korruptionsgrades. Unsere Ergebnisse sind
robust gegenu¨ber alternativen Maßnahmen der lokalen finanziellen Entwicklung.
In der dritten Studie
”
Ist die lokale finanzielle Entwicklung fu¨r die Kluft
zwischen den Geschlechtern bei der Fo¨rderung des Unternehmenswachstums in Vietnam
von Bedeutung?“ Untersuchen wir die Auswirkungen der finanziellen Entwicklung
der Provinzen und des Gender-Verantwortungsbewusstseins auf das Wachstum von
Unternehmen in Vietnam. Unter Verwendung des gleichen Datensatzes wie in der zweiten
Studie zeigen unsere Ergebnisse, dass die lokale Finanzentwicklung ein festes Wachstum
in Bezug auf die Wachstumsraten von Umsatz, Investitionen, Gesamtkapitalrentabilita¨t
(GKR) und Eigenkapitalrentabilita¨t (EKR) fo¨rdert. Die Ergebnisse deuten auch auf
die unterschiedlichen Geschlechterverha¨ltnisse hin, die sich auf die Wachstumsraten von
Umsatz, Investitionen, GKR und EKR auswirken. Daru¨ber hinaus ist die gemeinsame
Wirkung von lokaler finanzieller Entwicklung und ma¨nnlichem Eigentum in allen
Spezifikationen erheblich negativ. Dies impliziert, dass die lokale finanzielle Entwicklung
dazu beitragen kann, dass Unternehmen in weiblichem Besitz ihre Einschra¨nkungen bei
der Fo¨rderung des Wachstums festigen.
In der vierten Studie
”
Lokale finanzielle Entwicklung und festes Wachstum:
Evidenz aus Vietnam“ wird die Beziehung zwischen lokaler finanzieller Entwicklung
und festem Wachstum anhand einer Identifizierungsstrategie, die Wachstumschancen
nutzt, erneut untersucht. Wir stellen fest, dass die lokale Finanzentwicklung die
Wachstumsraten von Umsatz, Investitionen und Verka¨ufen pro Arbeitnehmer fo¨rdert,
wa¨hrend sie die Wachstumsrate der Lo¨hne pro Umsatz kleiner Unternehmen verringert.
Unsere Ergebnisse deuten darauf hin, dass in Sektoren mit Wachstumschancen
vii
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Unternehmen, die in einem finanziell entwickelten Gebiet ta¨tig sind, schneller wachsen
als Unternehmen in Provinzen mit geringerer finanzieller Entwicklung. Daru¨ber hinaus
ist der Unterschied der Wachstumsraten von Unternehmen, die in Sektoren mit
sta¨rkeren Wachstumschancen ta¨tig sind, und Unternehmen in Sektoren mit geringeren
Wachstumschancen, gro¨ßer, wenn diese Unternehmen in Gebieten mit einer ho¨heren
finanziellen Entwicklung ansa¨ssig sind.
viii
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1 Introduction
During the last three decades, a large number of studies have shown controversial
evidence on the role of the financial sector in economic development, either that finance
enhances economic development or economic development causes financial growth, at
both the macro and micro-level. The pioneering work is from Bagehot (1873) who
argues that financial system helps mobilize effectively and efficiently capital that played
a critical role in igniting the England’s industrialization. Similarly, Schumpeter (1911)
asserts that there is a positive influence of the financial sector on the level and growth
rate of a country’s per capita income. Similar findings are in the works of Gurley and
Shaw (1955), Goldsmith (1969), McKinnon (1973), and Shaw (1973). More recently, a
large body of empirical studies have documented a positive effect of financial sector
on economic development (e.g., King and Levine, 1993; Levine et al., 2000; Herwartz
and Walle, 2014b; Arcand et al., 2015). Nobel Laureate Miller (1998) even stresses
that “the idea that financial markets contribute to economic growth is a proposition
too obvious for serious discussion”. However, still a sizable number of studies suggest
that either financial development is caused by economic development or there is a weak
or fragile relationship between financial development and economic growth (e.g., Ang
and McKibbin, 2007; Andersen and Tarp, 2003). Moreover, Robinson (1952) delivers a
strong statement that economic development leads to the growth of financial sector in
a famous argument “where enterprise leads finance follows”. Likewise, Nobel Laureate
Robert Lucas (1988) even dismisses the role of finance as an “over-stressed” determinant
of economic growth.
While most empirical studies focus on the finance-growth nexus with emphasizing
on cross-country heterogeneity in financial sector, fewer works examine the effects of
within-country variations in financial sector on economic development. Taking into
account the regional heterogeneity in financial development, Jayaratne and Strahan
(1996) investigate the relationship between reform in banking sector at the intrastate
level and per capita growth in the US in the 1970s and 1980s. They find that improvement
in the banking system (e.g, the quality of bank’s lending) is accountable for faster growth
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of GDP per capita. Focusing at the regional level, Guiso et al. (2004) analyze the effect
of regional financial development on firm performance in Italy. Their results show that
regional financial development promotes firm growth, enhances competition and supports
the entry of new firms. Using the US data from 1900 to 1940, Dehejia and Lleras-
Muney (2007) examine the effect of the state-level banking regulation and financial
development on the state-level economic growth. They reveal that financial expansion
improves mechanization in agriculture and fosters growth in the manufacturing sector.
Exploring at a more aggregate level, Kendall (2012) examines the effects of district-
level banking sector development and human capital on district-level economic growth
in India. He finds that district-level financial development, which is measured by the
percentage of bank credit to net domestic products, has a positive and non-linear impact
on district-level economic growth. Similarly, Gloede and Rungruxsirivorn (2013) study
the effect of district-level financial development on household welfare in Thailand in
2007. Their results show that district-level financial development promotes productive
investment, agricultural revenue and household consumption. Moreover, using the firm-
level data in Morocco from 1998 to 2003, Fafchamps and Schu¨ndeln (2013) study the
effect of financial development, which is measured by bank availability at the commune
level, on firm performance. They find that, in sectors with growth opportunities, bank
availability robustly facilitates growth rates of small and medium-sized firms, reduces
the likelihood of exiting firms and enhances entry of new firms and investments.
However, due to the uniqueness of financial sector across countries, we need more
country-specific studies to generalize whether local financial development matters for
local economic development. This thesis focuses on Vietnam. There appears to be
only a few studies that investigate this relationship in Vietnam. Using panel data
over the period 1997 to 2006, Anwar and Nguyen (2011) examine the relationship
between financial development and economic growth at the province level in Vietnam.
They document that provincial financial development, which is measured by the ratio
of credit to the private sector over gross provincial products, promotes provincial
economic growth. Similarly, O’Toole and Newman (2017) investigate the effect of
provincial financial development on reducing external financial constraints faced by firms.
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Employing an extensive firm-level data in Vietnam, they reveal that provincial financial
development mitigates the constraints on firms’ finance and facilitates investment
activity. Our studies are different from Anwar and Nguyen (2011), which investigates the
relationship at the province level, in the way that our studies examine the local finance
and economic growth in Vietnam at more aggregated levels. In particular, we measure
local financial development at different levels and consider local economic growth at
household and firm level. Furthermore, while O’Toole and Newman (2017) focus on
showing the channel through which local financial development promotes investment
(i.e., by alleviating financial constraints), we examine the overall impact of local financial
development on firm growth in terms of sales, investment and productivity. The other
difference between the present studies and that of O’Toole and Newman (2017) is that
while O’Toole and Newman (2017) drop firms with negative growth opportunities, our
approach fully accounts for sectoral differences in growth opportunities.
This thesis consists of four self-contained articles that focus on the relationship
between local financial development and economic growth in Vietnam. In Chapter
2, we investigate the impact of local financial development on household welfare in
Vietnam. The local financial development indicators are measured at three distinct
levels (district, sub-district and village) by using regional effects on credit rationing
following the method suggested by Guiso et al. (2004). In this study, we exploit the
panel data survey from Thailand-Vietnam Social Economic Panel (TVSEP) in 2007,
2008, 2010 and 2013. In Chapters 3, 4 and 5, we further examine the effect of local
financial development on economic growth in Vietnam by using different firm growth
indicators such as the growth rates of sales, investment, and firm productivity. For these
self-contained studies, we use firm-level panel data from Vietnam Enterprise Survey
(VES) spanning the period 2009-2013, which includes more than 40,000 firms per year.
In order to address the endogeneity issue, which would arise from the fact that economic
development would cause local financial development, we employed a recently suggested
method of identification through heteroscedasticity in Chapter 2, 3 and 4. In Chapter 5,
we follow the strategy suggested by Fisman and Love (2007), Rajan and Zingales (1998)
and Fafchamps and Schu¨ndeln (2013) to identify the effect of local financial development
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on growth by controlling for growth opportunity in each sector. To enhance readability
and make each chapter as self-contained article, in each chapter we provide relevant
discussion on literature as well as considered models separately. In the following, we will
sequentially discuss in details each issue, summarize the main findings and highlight the
contributions of this thesis.
The potential reverse causality from economic growth to financial development has
been considered as a serious challenge in the finance-growth literature when investigating
the impact of financial development on economic growth. Similarly, studies on the effect
of local financial development on economic growth at different levels may be suffered
from endogeneity issues as local economic growth may also cause the development of local
finance. To address the endogeneity in this relationship, the literature proposes to use
the dynamic panel data estimators forwarded by Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell
and Bond (1998). These methods are not appropriate for our study, however, as our
panel data covers only few time points. Moreover, a widely-used alternative to identify
the causality is the use of external instruments. Nevertheless, finding an appropriate
instrument in practice is often challenging due to strict conditions. In this thesis, we
employ a recently suggested method of dealing with the endogeneity problem, which has
been proposed by Lewbel (2012). This method is built upon earlier works by Rigobon
(2003) and Lewbel (2012) suggests an instrumental variable estimation, which is so-
called identification through heteroscedasticity. With this strategy, one can generate
instruments for endogenous variables by exploiting the correlation between exogenous
variables and heteroscedasticity of model disturbances in order to achieve identification
without using external instruments. As we have panel data in Chapters 2, 3 and 4, we
apply the Stata package ivreg2h proposed by Baum and Schaffer (2012).
Chapter 2 corresponds to the article by Tran et al. (2018) as published in the
Journal of Development Studies. In this chapter, we examine the impact of local financial
development on household welfare in three provinces in Vietnam including Thua Thien
Hue, Ha Tinh and Dak Lak. Using household level data from the TVSEP in 4 waves
in 2007, 2008, 2010 and 2013, we created a local financial development indicator at
three distinct levels by using regional effects from a regression of determinants of
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the household’s credit rationing, as proposed by Guiso et al. (2004). Employing the
identification through heteroscedasticity proposed by Lewbel (2012), we investigate
the effects of district, sub-district and village-level financial development on household
welfare in terms of annual income, consumption and consumption smoothing. In order
to get more efficiency by using identification through heteroscedasticity, we additionally
use time to travel to reach the district center as an external instrument for local financial
development. Therefore, for each three levels of locality, results are reported using the
Ordinary Least Squares (equivalent to fixed effects as we use centered data or within
estimator on the non-transformed data), the heteroscedasticity-based instruments, as
well as IV estimation using both standard and heteroscedasticity-based instruments.
Our results reveal that district, sub-district and village-level financial development has
a significantly positive impact on household annual income and consumption. Moreover,
the results from investigating the effects of local financial development on consumption
smoothing suggest that local financial development helps households that suffer from
shocks by reducing the effects of shocks on their consumption. In order to check for the
relevance of our instruments generated by using identification through heteroscedasticity,
we provide the diagnostic tests for the validation of the instruments. The tests for
over-identification, under-identification and weak-identification are supportive for the
relevance of our instruments. Furthermore, our results are robust to the use of different
indicators of local financial development by using the availability of a bank branch at
district, sub-district and village levels. Consequently, our results suggest that policy-
makers should enhance the access to finance at the local levels as an important policy
for promoting household welfare in rural Vietnam.
In Chapter 3, using a rich data set of Vietnamese Enterprise Survey for a panel from
2009 to 2013 and province-level data from Province Competitiveness Index (PCI), we
further investigate the effects of local financial development on economic development
in Vietnam by accounting for the effect of provincial corruption. Local economic growth
is measured at the firm-level and based on the growth rates of investment, sales and
sales per worker. Local financial development is measured by using the availability of
credit suppliers per 1000 people at the province level and corruption is measured by
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the prevalence of informal charges as rated by firms at the province level. Employing
the heteroscedasticity-based identification strategy, we examine the first hypothesis
that local financial development has a positive impact on firm growth in Vietnam.
As firm growth at province level may be affected by corruption, which is known to
be a major obstacle for economic growth, we propose the second hypothesis that
corruption at province level has a negative impact on firm growth. Moreover, we also
examine the joint effects of province-level financial development and corruption on
firm growth, which is suggested in previous studies by Ahlin and Pang (2008), and
Wang and You (2012). To address the endogeneity that firm growth may affect local
financial development and corruption, we sequentially treat local financial development,
corruption and the interaction between the two as endogenous variables and using
heteroscedasticity based identification method to instrument for them. Furthermore,
we account for the nonlinearity of local financial development and corruption in the
models to address the potential effects on the interaction term. Our results reveal that
province-level financial development enhances firm growth while corruption hinders it.
Moreover, financial development and corruption control are complementary to each other
in their impacts on firm growth. This suggests that while facilitating province-level
financial development or enhancing corruption control at the provincial level promotes
firm growth, the marginal effect is stronger when the level of corruption is low, and
vice versa. In addition, we provide more evidence to support the ‘too much finance’
hypothesis proposed by Arcand et al. (2015) at the micro level after controlling the
level of corruption. Our results are also robust to the use of alternative measures of
province-level financial development.
In Chapter 4, using the same firm-level data set as in Chapter 3, we examine whether
local financial development reduces the gap between female-owned and male-owned
firms to promote firm growth in terms of the growth rates of sales, investment, return
on asset (ROA) and return on equity (ROE). Similar to previous studies, we account
for the endogeneity issue, which may arise in investigating the effect of local financial
development on firm growth, by using the heteroscedasticity-based identification and
complement the generated instruments for local financial development by using external
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instruments. The results show that local financial development enhances firm growth,
which is in line with previous studies. Moreover, this study significantly suggests that
there appears a gap between male-owned and female-owned firms where male-owned
firms are better off in terms of increasing the growth rates of investment, sales, ROA,
and ROE. However, the interaction term between local financial development and gender
is negative through all specifications, which implies that female-owned firms are less
constrained by exploiting the local financial development to improve firm growth.
In Chapter 5, we re-examine the finance-growth nexus using the method suggested
from Fisman and Love (2007), Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Fafchamps and Schu¨ndeln
(2013). In their studies, they argue that the appearance of financial suppliers may depend
on the firm growth in the region and endogeneity is a concern in estimating the impact
of local financial development on firm growth. They claim that growth opportunities
might cause both economic growth and financial development. Therefore, we take into
account the effect of growth opportunity in order to address the endogeneity issue on
the relationship between local finance and growth. Following Fafchamps and Schu¨ndeln
(2013), we assume that large firms should be less constrained by access to credit (Beck
et al., 2005). There are many reasons that large firms are less constrained from credit
access from both demand and supply sides. For example, large firms may operate in
a broader area and hence they could exploit larger network and availability of more
credit suppliers in larger operation area. Obviously, this would help them get more
opportunities to access finance than small firms. Furthermore, from supply side, it would
be easier for credit suppliers to consider the status of large firms than small firms and
they can better evaluate the loan applications of large firms than small firms (Petersen
and Rajan, 2002).
Employing this strategy, we measure growth opportunities based on sales growth in
each sector of large firms (with more than 50 or 100 employees in the paper), which
are considered to be less constrained by financial development. In this chapter, we
investigate the joint effect of local financial development and growth opportunity on
firm performance. The province-level financial development indicators are measured by
using the number of credit suppliers per 1000 capita and per square kilometer. Based
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on the fact that, more than 95% of Vietnamese firms are small, we focus on the effect of
province-level financial development and growth opportunity on the growth rates of small
firms in Vietnam. To measure firm growth, we use the growth rates of firm performance
(sales and investment) and firm productivity (sales per worker and wage per sales) for
the period of five years from 2009 to 2013. Using ordinary least squared (OLS) and
accounting for sector and local effects, our results reveal that province-level financial
development promotes the growth rates of sales, investment and sales per worker of small
firms, and reduces the growth rate of wage per sales. Moreover, the results imply that
in sectors with growth opportunities, firms operating in province with higher financial
development grow faster than firms located in provinces with a lower level of financial
development. In addition, the difference in growth rates of firms operating in sectors
with stronger growth opportunities and firms in sectors with lower growth opportunities
is larger if these firms are located in provinces with financial development.
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Viet T. Tran, Yabibal M. Walle and Helmut Herwartz
Abstract. We examine the impact of local financial development on household welfare
in Vietnam. We employ household-level panel data for the periods 2007, 2008, 2010 and
2013 covering three provinces and measure local financial development at the district,
sub-district and village levels. To account for potential endogeneity that could emanate
from the fact that local economic development could spur local financial development,
we employ a recently suggested method of identification through heteroscedasticity.
Our results show that local financial development has a significantly positive effect on
household annual income, consumption and consumption smoothing.
2.1 Introduction
The role of financial development in economic development has been extensively studied
in the last three decades. Notwithstanding the existence of a sizable number of studies
suggesting either financial development is caused by economic development and not
vice versa (e.g. Ang and McKibbin, 2007), or there is not a clear-cut finance-growth
relationship (e.g. Andersen and Tarp, 2003), a large body of empirical literature shows
that financial sector development fosters economic development (e.g. Goldsmith, 1969;
King and Levine, 1993; Levine et al., 2000; Herwartz and Walle, 2014a and Arcand et al.,
2015)1.
Unlike the macro level, research on the finance-growth nexus at the micro level is
relatively scant. Local financial and institutional differences within a country can exert
1For more details on the finance-growth debate, see Levine (2005) and Panizza (2014)
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an important effect on local economic development. For instance, Petersen and Rajan
(2002) document that, even in the US, the distance between small business borrowers
and their banks affects the chance to obtain credit. Specifically, over 75% of loans in the
US were distributed within a radius of less than 35km (Petersen and Rajan, 2002).
There are a few studies that examine the effects of financial development at the local
level on local GDP per capita, industry expansion, firm performance and household
welfare. For instance, Guiso et al. (2004) investigate the relationship between firm
performance and regional financial development in Italy. They find that local financial
development enhances firm growth, promotes competition and favors entry of new firms.
Kendall (2012) focuses on financial development and economic growth at the district level
in India and reports that banking depth impacts positively on district-level economic
growth. Fafchamps and Schu¨ndeln (2013) examine the relationship between commune-
level financial development and firm performance in Morocco. They find that bank
availability at the commune level has a positive impact on the performance of small
and medium-sized firms in sectors with growth opportunities. Taking the discussion to
the household level, Gloede and Rungruxsirivorn (2013) explore the role of district-level
financial development on household welfare in Thailand. The authors document that
district-level financial development promotes investment, revenue and consumption of
households with demand for external credit.
In this paper, we examine the relationship between local financial development and
household welfare in Vietnam, and contribute to the existing empirical literature in four
aspects. Firstly, in comparison with other emerging Southeast Asian economies, such as
Thailand and Malaysia, research on the link between financial development and economic
growth in Vietnam is scant. In particular, as to our knowledge, it is only Phan (2008)
who examines the effect of financial development on household welfare in Vietnam. As
his focus is not on local financial development, Phan (2008) uses the level and ratio
of household financial assets and liabilities to household income to measure financial
development at the household level. Given that this measure likely depends on several
household characteristics, it does not necessarily reflect local financial development. In
this study, we follow the literature on local financial development (e.g. Guiso et al., 2004
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and Gloede and Rungruxsirivorn, 2013) to measure local financial development using
regional effects from a regression of determinants of the households’ access to credit.
Secondly, while the study of Guiso et al. (2004) examines local financial development
and firm performance in Italy, where the financial sector is highly integrated with the
international financial system, our study focuses on Vietnam, whose financial sector
is at a much lower level of integration with the international financial market. As a
result, local financial development could likely have more pronounced effects on local
economic development in Vietnam than it has in Italy. Hence, our study could shed
light on the impact of local financial development on economic growth in relatively closed
financial systems. In addition, access to finance is at a much lower level in developing
countries than is the case in developed countries. For instance, financial institutions
are rarely available in Vietnamese rural areas and at lower administrative jurisdictions,
such as sub-districts and villages, while financial institutions are prevalent in the lowest
administrative levels in developed countries. Hence, this study could also highlight the
role of local financial development on household welfare in economies with a modest
degree of access to finance.
Thirdly, this paper relates to the work of Gloede and Rungruxsirivorn (2013) who
study the effect of district-level financial development on household welfare in Thailand
by means of cross-sectional data collected in 2007. Unlike Gloede and Rungruxsirivorn
(2013), however, we exploit panel data collected in 2007, 2008, 2010 and 2013, and
measure local financial development at three distinct levels of administrative hierarchies:
district, sub-district and village levels.
Fourthly, it is plausible to think that banks open new branches in localities with richer
households, making local financial development an endogenous variable in our household
welfare model. We address this endogeneity problem by means of heteroscedasticity-
based instrumental variable (IV) estimation (Lewbel, 2012). With this method, we
exploit the correlation between exogenous variables and variances of model disturbances
in order to achieve identification without imposing any exclusion restrictions.
Our results show that local financial development has a significantly positive impact
on household annual income and consumption. These results are robust to the use
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of the availability of a bank branch as an alternative measure of local financial
development. Moreover, households with demand for credit consume more in financially
more developed localities, perhaps reflecting the role of local financial development in
consumption smoothing. In relation to this, we also find that local financial development
significantly reduces the probability that a household cuts its consumption in the
aftermath of a negative income shock.
Section 2.2 provides a brief overview of the Vietnamese financial sector. We describe
the data and discuss ways of measuring local financial development in Section 2.3. In
Section 2.4, we outline the methodology of identification through heteroscedasticity.
Estimation results on the relationship between local financial development and household
welfare are analysed in Section 2.5. Section 2.6 concludes. Results using three further
indicators of local financial development are documented in the Appendix 2.7.
2.2 The Vietnamese financial sector
Currently, the Vietnamese financial system is characterized by a large banking sector but
relatively smaller non-bank financial institutions and a securities market. The financial
system is large for a low middle-income country with total assets of nearly 200% of GDP
at the end of 2011 (World Bank, 2014). The banking sector in Vietnam comprises four
state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs)2, 33 joint stock commercial banks (JSCBs),
five joint venture banks and five wholly foreign-owned banks (Tran et al., 2015). The
total asset of the banking sector is 183% of GDP and accounts for 92% of financial
institutions’ assets (World Bank, 2014). The significant increase in private, foreign and
mixed-ownership banks has enhanced financial services. Among SOCBs, Agribank has
the largest operating networks with around 2,400 branches and units nationwide. The
Industrial and Commercial Bank of Vietnam (Vietinbank), the Bank for Investment and
Development of Vietnam (BIDV), and the Bank of Foreign Trade of Vietnam (VCB)
2Formerly, there were five SOCBs including Vietnam Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development
(Agribank), the Industrial and Commercial Bank (Vietinbank), the Bank of Foreign Trade of Vietnam
(VCB), the Bank for Investment and Development of Vietnam (BIDV) and Housing Bank of Mekong
Delta (MHB, established in 1997 and merged to BIDV in May 2015). However, the new corporate law
which came into effect in January 2015 defines SOCBs as commercial banks that are 100% owned by
the SBV, thereby making Agribank the only SOCB in Vietnam.
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have, respectively, about 1123, 725 and 328 branches and units (Tran et al., 2015).
Vietnam’s equity market has grown in recent years, but capitalization is relatively
small at about 19% of GDP in 2011 (World Bank, 2014). Established in 2000 and 2005
respectively, the two stock exchanges, the Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange (HSX) and
Hanoi Stock Exchange (HNX) have more than 700 listed companies by the middle of
2016. About one-third of the listed companies are state-owned with a major proportion
of capital belonging to the state-owned enterprises.
Among non-bank financial institutions, finance companies are the largest, accounting
for 3% of all financial institutions’ asset and 6% of GDP. Insurance companies account
for 4% of GDP while the mutual funds constitute less than 1% of GDP (World Bank,
2014).
2.3 Data
2.3.1 Data Source
The dataset for this study originates from the project “Impact of Shocks on the
Vulnerability to Poverty: Consequences for Development of Emerging Southeast Asian
Economies” (DFG FOR 756). The surveys were carried out in Vietnam and Thailand in
2007, 2008, 2010 and 2013. Three of the poorest provinces in Vietnam were chosen for
the survey: Ha Tinh, Thua Thien Hue and Dak Lak.3 The surveyed areas are shown in
Figure 2.1.
Within the three provinces, 32 districts were randomly selected, and within these
districts, 110 sub-districts were chosen based on population size. Subsequently, two
villages were randomly selected in each sub-district. Covering 10 randomly selected
households in each of the 220 villages, the surveys finally consist of about 2197
households.
The surveys contain detailed information on household characteristics including
demographics, assets, income, expenditure, borrowing, lending, savings, household
3Vietnam’s per capita GDP in PPP was about 5300 USD in 2013 (World Bank, 2016), making it a
lower middle income economy. The provinces Ha Tinh and Thua Thien Hue are located in central
Vietnam with per capita income about 1800 USD and 1400 USD, respectively. Located in the highlands
of Vietnam, Daklak has a per capita income of about 1755 USD.
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Figure 2.1: Surveyed Vietnamese provinces.
Vietnam is located in Southeast Asia. It has 61 provinces and about 91 million people by the end of 2015.
The total area is about 333,000 square kilometers. The capital of Vietnam is Hanoi, which is indicated
by the (?) in the map. The three surveyed provinces are among the poorest provinces in Vietnam.
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business, occupation, agricultural activities, off-farm activities, education and health
status in each year of the survey. Moreover, regional characteristics, such as the number
of households and banks in the villages, are also provided.
2.3.2 Summary statistics
Table 2.1 provides descriptive statistics for the variables in our sample. Panel A
describes our indicators for household welfare, each measured in 2005 US dollars (USD)
using purchasing power parity (PPP) rates. Specifically, annual household income and
consumption are about 6100 USD and 4946 USD, respectively. Moreover, about 74.61
per cent of households report that they have to cut consumption when they suffer from
negative income shocks such as illness, flooding and theft.
Panel B of Table 2.1 documents details on household characteristics. With households
having an average of four members, the average per capita annual income is about 1,655
USD. Almost all of the households (91%) are involved in crop production. The average
size of agricultural production land is about 0.5 hectares. The rate of late repayment and
default is about 15.3 per cent. About 72.2 per cent of households have applied for credit,
of which about 11.3 per cent faced credit rationing in the form of either full rejection or
only partial acceptance of their credit applications.
The panel C of Table 2.1 provides information on household heads. For instance,
about 84 per cent of the households are headed by males. The average age of household
heads is 50 years, and 81 per cent of them are married. About 75 per cent of them belong
to the majority ethnic group (Kinh people). Regarding occupations, while about 65 per
cent of household heads are farmers, about 11 per cent of them are government officials
and business owners. The rate of literacy of household heads (who have ever been to
school) is about 88 per cent, while about 33.5 per cent of them suffered from serious
disease at the time of the survey. Figure 2.2 depicts the detailed main occupations
of the household heads in 2007 and 2013. In 2007, about 71.8 per cent of household
heads were involved in agricultural production such as agricultural cultivation, fishing,
hunting, and collecting. The remaining 7.2 per cent and 3.9 per cent of household heads
are business owners and government officials, respectively. The percentage of household
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Table 2.1: Summary statistics
Variable description Observations Mean Std.Dev Min Max
Panel A: Household Welfare (USD by PPP in 2005)
HH income 8377 6100 9026 -158191 312993
HH consumption 8002 4946 3648 243 87503
HH members reducing consumption
due to shocks
13532 0.746 0.435 0 1
Panel B: Household Characteristics
Per capita income 8375 1655 2672 -39548 78248
HH size 8451 4.231 1.766 0 14
Crop production 8360 0.911 0.285 0 1
Production area (ha) 7740 0.504 2.006 0 119.221
Late repayment and default 8788 0.153 0.659 0 13
Credit demand 8788 0.722 0.448 0 1
Credit rationing 6344 0.113 0.317 0 1
Panel C: Household head Characteristics
Male 8377 0.841 0.365 0 1
Age 8376 50.269 13.951 0 100
Married 8788 0.810 0.392 0 1
Kinh People 8788 0.753 0.432 0 1
Farmer 8788 0.654 0.476 0 1
Government official and
businessmen
8788 0.109 0.312 0 1
Literate 8139 0.884 0.320 0 1
Disease 8255 0.335 0.472 0 1
Panel D: Local Characteristics
Number of banks in district 128 1.617 1.469 0 4
Number of banks in sub-district 440 0.430 0.763 0 4
Number of banks in village 844 0.058 0.280 0 3
Bank availability in district 128 0.656 0.477 0 1
Bank availability in sub-district 440 0.300 0.459 0 1
Bank availability in village 880 0.047 0.211 0 1
Average hour from district to center 128 0.511 0.312 0.133 2.479
Average hour from sub-district to
center
440 0.511 0.419 0.059 4.667
Average hour from village to center 875 0.511 0.487 0.017 9.167
Library availability in district 128 0.141 0.349 0 1
Library availability in sub-district 440 0.045 0.209 0 1
Library availability in village 880 0.023 0.149 0 1
Nursery availability in district 128 0.641 0.482 0 1
Nursery availability in sub-district 440 0.441 0.497 0 1
Nursery availability in village 880 0.290 0.454 0 1
Notes: Mean, Std.Dev, Min and Max represent mean, standard deviation, minimum and
maximum, respectively.
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heads involved in agriculture decreased from 71.83 per cent in 2007 to 57.5 per cent in
2013. This shows that there is a shift in occupation of household heads in these provinces
from agriculture to other sectors.
Figure 2.2: Main occupation of household heads
Panel D of Table 2.1 displays certain local characteristics. In particular, each district,
sub-district and village has respectively 1.6, 0.4 and 0.06 bank branches on average.
Moreover, 65.6 per cent of the districts, 30 per cent of the sub-districts and 4.7 per cent
of the villages have at least one bank branch. In the survey, village heads were asked
how long it takes to travel from the village to the district center. Taking the average
across villages in the sub-districts and districts, we find that it takes nearly the same
average time of about half an hour to reach from districts, sub-districts and villages to
the district center. However, the maximum time needed to reach the district center is
2.5, 4.7 and 9.2 hours from a district, sub-district and village, respectively. With regard
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to local economic development, there is a library (nursery) in about 14.1 per cent, 4.5
per cent and 2.3 per cent (64.1%, 44.1% and 29%) of districts, sub-districts and villages,
respectively.
2.3.3 Local financial development indicators
There are a few ways of measuring local financial development suggested in existing
studies on the local finance-growth nexus. For example, Guiso et al. (2004) define a
region as financially more developed if, ceteris paribus, it is easier for a borrower to
obtain credit in this region compared with other regions. In other words, more denials of
credit applications indicate a less developed financial environment. For the case of Italy,
they consider the regional effects from a model of a household’s probability of being shut
off from the credit market as a measure of local financial (under)development. Gloede
and Rungruxsirivorn (2013) apply the same method to quantify financial development
in districts of Thailand.
In this paper, we measure local financial development following Guiso et al. (2004)
and Gloede and Rungruxsirivorn (2013). The baseline indicator is based on credit
rationing (CR). We consider a household to have been subjected to credit rationing
if, at a given year, its application for credit is either rejected or only partially accepted.
In the survey, respondents were asked which financial suppliers rejected their credit
application or allowed them partially. As shown in Table 2.2, the financial suppliers are
diverse, ranging from governmental banks to informal money lenders. It is worth noting
here that, among the households which reported to have been credit-rationed, about 30
per cent of them were credit-rationed by informal credit suppliers such as money lenders
and families in their localities. It is well-known that informal financial suppliers, such as
moneylenders, and traders, often obtain credit from banks to provide informal credit to
borrowers (e.g., Madestam, 2014). Thus, although being credit-rationed by such informal
lenders does not directly imply a lower level of financial development in those localities,
it indirectly indicates the shortage of financial resources in the formal financial sector in
those localities.4
4Our main results reported in this paper do not change when we narrow our definition of being credit-
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Table 2.2: Financial suppliers from which households were credit-rationed
Institutions for applying credit Frequency Percentage
Bank for social policy 144 18.65
Bank for agriculture and rural development 255 33.03
Credit organization (e.g. PCF) 13 1.68
Socio-political organizations 55 7.12
Business partner/trader 28 3.63
Money lender 136 17.62
Commercial bank 8 1.04
Family in village 52 6.74
Family outside village (same province) 14 1.81
Family from other province 3 0.39
Friends in village 53 6.87
Friends outside village (same province) 6 0.78
Credit group (Ho/Hui or Phuong) 1 0.13
Government Housing Bank 2 0.26
Others 2 0.26
Total 772 100
A region is said to have a relatively more developed financial environment if the
likelihood of rejection or not getting the full amount of a credit application is lower.
However, unlike previous studies, we measure local financial development at three
distinct levels: district, sub-district and village. For this purpose, we conduct year-specific
regressions5 of the following linear probability model:
CRhit = w
′
hitαt + Viβit + νhit, (2.1)
where CRhit is a dummy variable reflecting credit rationing of household h at locality i
in time t. It equals to 1 if a household’s credit application is rejected or only partially
accepted and equals to 0 otherwise. The vector whit stacks several household, household
head and local characteristics while Vi represents a dummy variable for locality i. The
rationed to include only those households which were credit-rationed by formal financial suppliers (i.e.,
excluding households which were credit-rationed by money lenders, families and friends). These results
are provided in the online Supplementary Materials to this paper.
5Alternatively, we perform a pooled regression of (2.1) including year dummies, and construct the local
financial development indicator as a function of local and year dummies. As results documented in
the online Supplementary Material to this paper show, using this indicator yields qualitatively similar
results on the impact of local financial development on household welfare.
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error term is denoted by νhit.
According to (1), credit rationing CRhit could be influenced by distinct household
and local characteristics. We include several household characteristics, such as income,
number of household members, land use ownership, credit history and occupation, which
could affect the likelihood that a household gets credit. For example, if a household has
a bad credit history, such as default or late repayments, its loan application would more
likely be rejected by credit suppliers. Furthermore, we add local features, such as the
number of households in the village and distance to the district center, which could affect
the household’s probability to obtain credit. Availability of a library, nursery and firms
is considered to account for local economic development. We use three distinct linear
probability model estimations for each year and take the estimates for the village, sub-
district and district dummy variables to create three financial development indicators at
the respective levels.
Table 2.3: Determinants of credit rationing
District Village
2007 2008 2010 2013 2007 2008 2010 2013
Late repayment and default 0.086∗∗∗ 0.022∗ 0.020∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗ 0.020 0.025∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.014) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011)
HH income −0.012 −0.025∗∗∗ −0.011 −0.023∗∗∗ −0.011 −0.028∗∗∗ −0.002 −0.023∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.012) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
Production area (ha) 0.005 −0.002 −0.002 0.002 0.071 −0.002 −0.002 0.004
(0.069) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.080) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005)
Male 0.008 −0.017 0.038 −0.045 0.020 −0.034 0.038 −0.049
(0.048) (0.028) (0.032) (0.033) (0.053) (0.030) (0.035) (0.037)
Age −0.001 −0.000 0.000 0.000 −0.001 −0.000 0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Disease 0.017 0.031∗∗ 0.023 −0.003 0.028 0.031∗ 0.019 −0.002
(0.024) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.027) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018)
Literate −0.021 0.000 −0.001 0.027 −0.033 0.006 0.019 0.033
(0.038) (0.024) (0.026) (0.026) (0.042) (0.026) (0.029) (0.029)
Married −0.048 −0.004 −0.001 0.039 −0.041 0.025 −0.011 0.050
(0.052) (0.030) (0.037) (0.037) (0.056) (0.033) (0.041) (0.041)
Kinh people 0.064 0.010 −0.017 0.009 0.041 0.022 −0.032 0.030
(0.039) (0.024) (0.026) (0.025) (0.087) (0.050) (0.055) (0.052)
HH nucleus size −0.011 −0.000 −0.004 0.011∗∗ −0.012 0.000 −0.007 0.009∗
(0.007) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Farmer 0.026 0.031∗ −0.007 0.008 −0.009 0.029 −0.018 0.005
(0.033) (0.019) (0.021) (0.020) (0.037) (0.020) (0.023) (0.023)
Government officials −0.061 0.042 0.004 0.043 −0.096∗ 0.034 −0.020 0.038
and businessmen (0.050) (0.027) (0.031) (0.031) (0.054) (0.029) (0.034) (0.035)
Local dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1341 1480 1288 1248 1341 1480 1288 1248
Adjusted R-squared 0.292 0.093 0.086 0.102 0.293 0.095 0.086 0.081
Notes: the values provided in parentheses are estimated robust standard errors. Significance at the 1 per cent, 5 per
cent and 10 per cent is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.
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The coefficients βit in (2.1) measure the relative degree of financial underdevelopment
in locality i in year t. Higher coefficient estimates βˆit indicate a higher probability of
rejection for loan applications in locality i in year t, and hence they imply that the
respective locality is characterized by a lower level of local financial development.
The results from estimating the model in (2.1) at the district and village levels
are documented in Table A3.1.6 It can be seen that most household, household head
and local characteristics are correlated with credit constraints with the expected signs.
However, only a few variables have a statistically significant impact on credit rationing.
In particular, similar to the results in Gloede and Rungruxsirivorn (2013), a bad credit
history negatively affects the probability that a household could get a loan. This result is
consistent at the village, sub-district and district levels. As expected, higher household
income reduces the probability of credit rationing while household head’s illness increases
it. Moreover, credit suppliers are more likely to extend credit to government officials and
businessmen than to farmers. Controlling for household income, larger household nucleus
size reduces a household’s credit worthiness and, hence, increases its probability of being
credit-rationed.
As the estimates for local dummies βˆit represent financial underdevelopment, we
follow Guiso et al. (2004) to transform them to a measure of local financial development
as
fd
(•)
it =
(
1− βˆit
βˆmax
)
, (2.2)
where βˆmax is the maximum of βˆ = (βˆ11, ..., βˆN(•)T ), with i = 1, ..., N
(•), t = 1, ..., T and
‘•′ refers to the level of jurisdiction: village v, sub-district s or district d, i.e • ∈ {v, s,
d}.7
Table A3.2 documents summary statistics for the local financial development
indicators. The indicator at the district level, fd
(d)
it has a mean of 0.623 and ranges
6Corresponding results at the sub-district level are quantitatively similar to district and village level
results and are available upon request.
7We use the superscript (•) in N (•) to indicate that the total number of local units depends on the
level of aggregation with N (d) < N (s) < N (v).
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from 0 to 0.905. At the sub-district level, the indicator fd
(s)
it has a mean of 0.758 and
takes values from 0 to 0.997. The village level indicator fd
(v)
it has a mean value of 0.813
and shows the largest variation, ranging from 0 to 1.040. Moreover, the correlations
between district, sub-district and village level financial development indicators are high
with a minimum correlation of 0.748.
Table 2.4: Local financial development indicators
Panel A: Summary Statistics
Variable Level Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
fd
(d)
it district 8788 0.623 0.189 0 0.905
fd
(s)
it sub-district 8788 0.758 0.170 0 0.997
fd
(v)
it village 8788 0.813 0.162 0 1.040
bank
(d)
it district 8788 0.685 0.465 0 1
bank
(s)
it sub-district 8788 0.274 0.446 0 1
bank
(v)
it village 8788 0.048 0.215 0 1
Panel B: Correlation between local financial development indicators
fd
(d)
it fd
(s)
it fd
(v)
it bank
(d)
it bank
(s)
it bank
(v)
it
fd
(d)
it 1
fd
(s)
it 0.867* 1
fd
(v)
it 0.748* 0.862* 1
bank
(d)
it 0.452* 0.428* 0.388* 1
bank
(s)
it 0.271* 0.252* 0.219* 0.417* 1
bank
(v)
it 0.081* 0.063* 0.049* 0.153* 0.367* 1
Notes: significance at the 1 per cent is indicated by *.
To check for the robustness of our results to the use of competing local financial
development indicators, we use the availability of bank branches at the district, sub-
district and village level bank
(•)
it as alternative indicators of local financial development
(Fafchamps and Schu¨ndeln, 2013). The dummy variables bank
(d)
it , bank
(s)
it and bank
(v)
it
take on a value of one if there is at least one bank branch at the district, sub-district and
village levels, respectively, and zero otherwise. As documented by Petersen and Rajan
(2002), and argued by Guiso et al. (2004) and Fafchamps and Schu¨ndeln (2013), the
availability of a credit supplier at a local area could affect the probability that a borrower
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could access credit. As shown in Panel A of Table A3.2, the ratio of districts, sub-district
and villages with at least one bank branch is about 0.685, 0.274, and 0.050, respectively.
Panel B of Table A3.2 documents the mostly positive and significant correlation between
our main local financial development indicators fd
(•)
it and the alternative measures
bank
(•)
it . Most importantly, the correlation between the two measures is the strongest
at the district level with a correlation coefficient of 0.452, and decreases to 0.252 and
0.049 at the sub-district and village levels.
2.4 Identification through heteroscedasticity
In order to identify the effect of local financial development on household welfare, we
estimate the following model:
Yhit = δ + x
′
hitθ + FDitγ + hit, (2.3)
where Yhit represents a measure of household welfare (income or consumption) of
household h at locality i in time t. FDit denotes local financial development (as measured
by fd
(•)
it or bank
(•)
it ) in locality i in time t at the district, sub-district and village levels,
i.e., • ∈ {v, s, d}. Other household and local characteristics are stacked in a vector of
explanatory variables, xhit.
In the finance-growth literature, potential reverse causality from economic growth to
financial development has been a serious challenge in consistently estimating the impact
of financial development on economic growth. Similarly, studies on the impact of local
financial development on household welfare may suffer from endogeneity as increases in
household welfare may also cause improvements in financial development at the local
level. To address this problem, the literature heavily relies on the use of dynamic panel
data estimators forwarded by Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998).
These methods are not appropriate for our study, however, as our panel data covers only
four time points. A widely-used alternative to identify causal relationships is the use of
external instruments. Finding appropriate instruments is often difficult in practice, since
such an instrument should affect household welfare through its effect on local financial
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development while it should not be affected by household welfare. Institutional factors,
such as legal origin, have been widely used as instruments in macro-level finance-growth
studies (e.g. Levine et al. (2000)). However, these instruments are not appropriate for
this study as all households live within one country where there are few institutional
differences among localities.
Another way of dealing with the endogeneity problems has been recently proposed by
Lewbel (2012). Building upon earlier works, e.g., Rigobon (2003), Lewbel (2012) suggests
an instrumental variable estimation called identification through heteroscedasticity.
With this method, one can exploit the correlation between exogenous variables and
heteroscedasticity of model disturbances in order to achieve identification without
imposing any exclusion restrictions. This method will be our main identification strategy,
as it does not rely on having a medium-sized time series dimension. In the following, we
briefly describe this procedure.
Assume that as a complement to (2.3) the reverse effect of household welfare on local
financial development could be modelled as
FDit = pi + x
′
hitφ+ Yhitλ+ ξhit, (2.4)
where the variables FDit, xhit and Yhit are as defined in (2.3) and ξhit is the error term.
Besides the usual regression assumptions that the structural error terms in models (2.3)
and (2.4) are independent from each other and from the explanatory variables xhit,
the heteroscedasticity-based identification strategy additionally assumes the existence
of heteroscedasticity in ξhit (and hence FDit). Specifically, while the usual assumptions
are
Cov(x′hit, hit) = Cov(x
′
hit, ξhit) = Cov(x
′
hit, hitξhit) = 0,
it is now additionally assumed that
Cov(x′hit, ξ
2
hit) 6= 0.
Lewbel (2012) suggests using [x′hit − E(x′hit)]ξˆhit as an instrument for FDit in
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estimating (2.3), where ξˆhit is the predicted residuals obtained by estimating equation
(2.4) excluding Yhit on the right-hand side. This is a promising instrument because [x
′
hit−
E(x′hit)]ξˆhit is uncorrelated with hit as it is already assumed that Cov(x
′
hit, hitξhit) = 0
and it is correlated with FDit through ξhit. Moreover, the condition Cov(x
′
hit, ξ
2
hit) 6= 0
need to hold only for a subset zhit of the vector xhit.
As we have panel data, we follow Baum and Schaffer (2012) to eliminate household-
specific fixed effects by means of the within transformation and apply the estimation
method of Lewbel (2012) discussed above on the transformed data. Lewbel (2012) argues
that using standard (external) instruments improves efficiency of heteroscedasticity
based IV estimation. Hence, while heteroscedasticity-based identification remains our
main estimation strategy, we additionally use time to travel to reach the district
center as an instrument for local financial development. We apply the Stata package
ivreg2h by Baum and Schaffer (2012), which reports estimation results using generated
(heteroscedasticity-based) instruments as well as a combination of both standard
and generated instruments. Each estimation result also includes diagnostic tests for
underidentification, overidentification and weak identification.8
2.5 Empirical results
In this section, we first document and discuss estimation results on the impact of
local financial development on household welfare as measured by household annual
income. Using consumption and consumption smoothing as alternative measures of
welfare, we subsequently examine the impact of local financial development on household
consumption and reduction in household consumption due to negative income shocks.
2.5.1 Financial development and household income
In our data set household annual income is defined as the total net income from all
activities of the household. The sources of household income include remittances, house
and homestead, land rent, crop production, livestock and aquaculture, hunting, off-
8See notes to Table 2.5 for details on these tests.
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farm employment, non-farm self-employment, lending, savings, transfer and indemnity
payments. Income is then defined as the amount of money left after deducting all costs
associated with these activities. As a result, it could be considered as disposable income
and could serve as a good indicator of household welfare.
Table 2.5 documents estimation results on the determinants of household income. Our
variables of interest are local financial development and the interaction term between
local financial development and household demand for credit. Credit demand of a
household is a dummy variable which takes on a value of one if the household has
applied for credit, and zero otherwise. The coefficient on local financial development
indicates the impact of local financial development for household income regardless of the
household’s demand for credit. This should reflect the importance for household welfare
of the functions of the financial system such as saving and facilitating the exchange of
goods and services. The interaction term, however, is meant to uncover the effects of
local financial development on households who actually take advantage of the lending
services of financial institutions.
For each of the three levels of locality, results are reported for specifications using the
Ordinary Least Squares estimation (OLS),9 the heteroscedasticity-based IV estimation
(hetero IV), as well as for IV estimation using both standard and heteroscedasticity-
based instruments (all IV). Results show that, in all of the nine specifications, local
financial development has a significantly positive impact on household annual income.
These results reveal the important role of local financial development in promoting
household welfare in Vietnam. It is worth noting here that our results do not rule out
the possibility that household annual income could affect local financial development.
Nevertheless, the use of IV estimation allows us to attribute the positive relationship
between local financial development and household annual income at least partly to the
exogenous component of local financial development (Levine et al., 2000).
Table 2.5 also shows that credit demand is negatively associated with household
income. This negative coefficient likely reflects the fact that households who applied for
9As we work on within transformed data, our use of OLS is equivalent to applying a fixed effects (within)
estimator on the non-transformed data.
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Table 2.5: The effect of local financial development on household income
District level sub-district level village level
OLS hetero IV all IV OLS hetero IV all IV OLS hetero IV all IV
FD 0.497∗∗∗ 1.111∗∗∗ 0.619∗∗∗ 0.559∗∗∗ 1.030∗∗∗ 1.020∗∗∗ 0.532∗∗∗ 0.522∗∗ 0.586∗∗
(0.139) (0.203) (0.154) (0.128) (0.194) (0.194) (0.131) (0.239) (0.236)
Credit demand −0.063 −0.066∗∗∗−0.067∗∗∗−0.061 −0.050∗∗ −0.042∗ −0.060 −0.041∗∗ −0.041∗∗
(0.042) (0.018) (0.020) (0.042) (0.023) (0.022) (0.043) (0.020) (0.020)
FD*Credit demand 0.008 −0.096 −0.037 −0.072 −0.144∗ −0.151∗ 0.098 0.066 0.066
(0.079) (0.059) (0.056) (0.094) (0.078) (0.078) (0.103) (0.085) (0.081)
Production area (ha) 0.006 0.000 0.005∗∗ 0.006 0.000 −0.000 0.007 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
Male −0.082 −0.097 −0.107 −0.108 −0.093 −0.063 −0.096 −0.168 −0.100
(0.240) (0.167) (0.185) (0.243) (0.173) (0.171) (0.258) (0.198) (0.182)
Age 0.057∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
Disease 0.027 0.028 0.012 0.028 0.011 0.010 0.029 0.008 0.006
(0.037) (0.027) (0.025) (0.038) (0.023) (0.023) (0.038) (0.024) (0.023)
Literate 0.172∗∗ 0.207∗∗∗ 0.214∗∗∗ 0.170∗∗ 0.214∗∗∗ 0.205∗∗∗ 0.164∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗
(0.073) (0.060) (0.057) (0.072) (0.057) (0.057) (0.071) (0.055) (0.043)
Married −0.092 −0.012 −0.046 −0.097 −0.038 −0.063∗ −0.099 −0.024 −0.026
(0.069) (0.046) (0.043) (0.068) (0.038) (0.033) (0.069) (0.034) (0.030)
Kinh people 0.064 −0.000 0.018 0.066 0.077 0.073 0.059 0.046 0.050
(0.089) (0.062) (0.051) (0.092) (0.074) (0.074) (0.093) (0.075) (0.074)
HH nucleus size 0.063∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.009) (0.008) (0.011) (0.009) (0.008)
Farmer −0.074 −0.051∗ −0.050∗ −0.067 −0.055∗∗ −0.044∗ −0.067 −0.064∗∗ −0.069∗∗
(0.045) (0.030) (0.030) (0.046) (0.027) (0.026) (0.046) (0.031) (0.032)
Government officials 0.281∗∗∗ 0.236∗∗∗ 0.244∗∗∗ 0.284∗∗∗ 0.233∗∗∗ 0.251∗∗∗ 0.284∗∗∗ 0.251∗∗∗ 0.243∗∗∗
and businessmen (0.060) (0.050) (0.050) (0.057) (0.042) (0.039) (0.058) (0.043) (0.046)
Library availability 0.184∗ 0.204∗∗∗ 0.167∗∗∗ 0.113 0.142∗∗ 0.129∗∗ 0.014 0.035 0.032
(0.095) (0.069) (0.063) (0.073) (0.056) (0.055) (0.085) (0.068) (0.068)
Nursery availability 0.018 0.147∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗ 0.025 0.058 0.066∗ −0.005 −0.012 −0.009
(0.051) (0.029) (0.028) (0.038) (0.037) (0.037) (0.038) (0.036) (0.036)
Constant −0.007∗∗ −0.004∗ −0.006∗∗∗−0.008∗∗ −0.007∗∗∗−0.008∗∗∗−0.007∗∗ −0.005∗∗ −0.005∗∗
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Observations 7022 7022 7022 7022 7022 7022 7022 7022 6986
R-squared 0.090 0.079 0.089 0.090 0.083 0.083 0.089 0.088 0.088
Underidentification 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.000 0.000
Overidentification 0.472 0.225 0.480 0.428 0.291 0.372
Weak identification
First stage F-stat. 13.93 19.27 15.59 14.6 24.63 28.37
Cragg-Donald 51.85 54.43 29.67 27.69 28.62 26.71
Kleibergen-Paap 10.437 10.975 9.736 9.121 12.285 11.307
Notes: robust standard errors, clustered at the district level, are given in parentheses. Significance at the 1 per cent,
5 per cent and 10 per cent is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. Household income is used in logarithmic
form. Local financial development (FD) is measured by fd
(•)
it . The underidentification test is an LM test based
on Kleibergen and Paap (2006) rk LM statistics with the null hypothesis that the model is unidentified. The
overidentification test is based on the Hansen J test with the null hypothesis being all instruments are valid.
Reported numbers for underidentification and overidentification are p−values. For the weak identification, three
alternative statistics are provided. The first one is an F statistic from the first stage regression. Staiger and Stock
(1997) suggests a rule of thumb that the F statistic should be at least 10 for weak identification not to be considered
a problem. The second is the Cragg–Donald F-statistics, which however requires an assumption of i.i.d. errors.
The third one is a Wald F statistic based on the Kleibergen–Paap rk statistic, which is a robust counterpart of
the Cragg–Donald F-statistics. The Stock-Yogo weak identification test critical values (Stock and Yogo (2005)),
computed for i.i.d. errors, are the following: 5 per cent maximal IV relative bias = 21.1; 10 per cent maximal IV
relative bias = 11.52; 10% maximal IV size = 50.39.
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credit are poorer than those who did not. The mostly statistically insignificant estimate
of the interaction between local financial development and credit demand implies that
local financial development does not benefit households that apply for credit more than
those that do not. This result is not unexpected given the fact that financial development
and credit demand have opposite effects on household income. In fact the interaction
effect is significantly negative at the sub-district level, implying that the impact of local
financial development on household income is smaller for households with demand for
credit than those without demand for credit.
With respect to other control variables, results confirm the significantly positive
effects on household annual income of household head age and literacy. Moreover,
household nucleus size positively affects household income. Households with government
employee or business owner household heads have higher annual incomes than other
households. Local economic development as proxied by the availability of libraries and
nurseries has a positive impact on household welfare at the district and sub-district
levels. The insignificance of this effect at the village levels could be explained by noting
that these facilities are available in substantially smaller numbers at these administrative
levels.
Model diagnostics for tests of underidentification, overidentification and weak
identification are provided in the bottom rows of Table 2.5. The overidentification and
underidentification tests support all the IV specifications. For the weak identification
test, three alternative statistics are provided. The problem in this case is getting
appropriate critical values for heteroscedastic data (Baum and Schaffer, 2012). In
particular, the Stock-Yogo weak identification test critical values (Stock and Yogo, 2005)
are valid only for i.i.d. errors, which is very unlikely to hold in our data as households
are chosen using three stage clustering at the district, sub-district and village levels.
As an alternative, one can use the Staiger and Stock (1997) rule of thumb that the F
statistic from the first step regression should be at least 10 for weak identification not
to be considered a problem. In both ways, the tests generally suggest the absence of a
weak instrument problem. Hence, all the three tests support our main result that local
financial development has a statistically significant impact on household annual income,
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and this effect is not driven by reverse causality from household income to local financial
development.
2.5.2 Financial development and household consumption
As an alternative measure of household welfare, we investigate the effect of local financial
development on household consumption. In our data set, consumption of households
consists of expenditures for food and non-food products, such as health care, education,
alcoholic beverages, tobacco products and housing (Povel, 2008).
Estimation results on the determinants of household consumption are documented in
Table 2.6. As in the case of household income, the impact of local financial development
on household consumption is positive and statistically significant in all specifications
at all administrative levels. Unlike the case of household income, credit demand has a
positive and statistically significant impact on household consumption, which implies
that, other things constant, households that apply for credit consume more than
those who do not. Moreover, the interaction term between financial development and
credit demand is positive and statistically significant in all specifications. This implies
that households with demand for credit consume more in localities with a relatively
more developed financial environment, perhaps reflecting the role of local financial
development in consumption smoothing.
The results documented in Table 2.6 also show significant effects of other local and
household characteristics on household consumption. Similar to the case of income,
household head’s age, literacy and being a government official and businessmen, size
of agricultural production area as well as availability of libraries and nurseries in the
locality have a significantly positive impact on household consumption. What is different
from measuring welfare by means of annual income is that illness of the household
head positively affects household consumption, but does not have significant effects on
household income. This could be explained by noting that expenditures for medical
treatment are considered as consumption.
Model diagnostics documented in the bottom rows of Table 2.6 show that results
are supported by all underidentification, overidentification and weak identification tests.
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Table 2.6: The effect of local financial development on household consumption
District level sub-district level village level
OLS hetero IV all IV OLS hetero IV all IV OLS hetero IV all IV
FD 0.331∗∗∗ 0.736∗∗∗ 0.491∗∗∗ 0.248∗∗∗ 0.488∗∗∗ 0.494∗∗∗ 0.169∗∗ 0.273∗∗ 0.242∗∗∗
(0.083) (0.095) (0.062) (0.082) (0.103) (0.103) (0.070) (0.111) (0.084)
Credit demand 0.048∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.009) (0.008) (0.013) (0.009) (0.009) (0.013) (0.008) (0.008)
FD*Credit demand 0.165∗∗ 0.173∗∗∗ 0.176∗∗∗ 0.130∗ 0.175∗∗∗ 0.161∗∗∗ 0.186∗∗∗ 0.170∗∗∗ 0.164∗∗∗
(0.062) (0.043) (0.038) (0.065) (0.049) (0.046) (0.066) (0.044) (0.042)
Production area (ha) 0.008∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.007∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.007∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001)
Male −0.142 −0.088 −0.075 −0.170 −0.182∗ −0.165∗ −0.174 −0.292∗∗ −0.303∗∗∗
(0.131) (0.089) (0.098) (0.142) (0.096) (0.093) (0.153) (0.114) (0.117)
Age 0.025∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Disease 0.039∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗ 0.022∗ 0.023∗
(0.017) (0.010) (0.009) (0.018) (0.010) (0.010) (0.018) (0.013) (0.013)
Literate 0.074∗ 0.025 0.038 0.075∗ 0.062∗∗ 0.062∗∗ 0.072 0.083∗∗∗ 0.085∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.027) (0.026) (0.042) (0.025) (0.025) (0.043) (0.027) (0.026)
Married 0.025 0.006 0.001 0.025 0.036 0.025 0.020 0.059 0.047
(0.060) (0.035) (0.034) (0.061) (0.036) (0.033) (0.063) (0.041) (0.038)
Kinh people −0.047 −0.053 −0.063∗ −0.047 −0.023 −0.025 −0.056 −0.041 −0.031
(0.048) (0.036) (0.034) (0.052) (0.029) (0.029) (0.054) (0.039) (0.038)
HH nucleus size 0.098∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Farmer −0.039 −0.021 −0.022 −0.036 −0.033∗ −0.026 −0.038 −0.046∗∗∗−0.040∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.017) (0.014) (0.025) (0.019) (0.017) (0.024) (0.014) (0.013)
Government officials 0.034 0.056∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗ 0.035 0.027 0.029 0.037 0.034 0.034
and businessmen (0.026) (0.017) (0.016) (0.028) (0.020) (0.020) (0.028) (0.022) (0.021)
Library availability 0.076∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗∗ 0.090∗ 0.092∗∗ 0.087∗∗ 0.022 0.034 0.027
(0.025) (0.024) (0.017) (0.046) (0.042) (0.041) (0.046) (0.032) (0.032)
Nursery availability 0.112∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.023) (0.014) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.016) (0.011) (0.010)
Constant 0.002 0.003∗ 0.002∗ 0.002 0.002∗ 0.003∗∗ 0.002 0.002∗∗ 0.002∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 7072 7072 7072 7072 7072 7072 7072 7072 7072
R-squared 0.155 0.129 0.150 0.144 0.134 0.134 0.134 0.132 0.133
Underidentification 0.007 0.008 0.053 0.072 0.001 0.002
Overidentification 0.430 0.359 0.247 0.276 0.085 0.129
Weak identification
First stage F-stat. 15.10 17.45 16.18 15.2 22.94 22.25
Cragg-Donald 49.21 52.13 23.45 21.9 22.33 20.85
Kleibergen-Paap 8.881 9.483 6.304 5.900 6.935 6.401
Notes: robust standard errors, clustered at the district level, are given in parentheses. Significance at the 1 per cent,
5 per cent and 10 per cent is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. Household consumption is used in logarithmic
form. Local financial development (FD) is measured by fd
(•)
it . For more details see notes to Table 2.5.
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Hence, they confirm the robustness of our main result that local financial development
promotes household consumption and the effect is even higher for households with
demand for credit.
Table 2.7: The effect of local financial development on consumption smoothing
District level sub-district level village level
OLS hetero IV all IV OLS hetero IV all IV OLS hetero IV all IV
FD −0.317∗∗∗−0.308∗∗∗−0.335∗∗∗−0.363∗∗∗−0.100 −0.106∗ −0.370∗∗∗−0.351∗∗∗−0.393∗∗∗
(0.100) (0.077) (0.081) (0.098) (0.062) (0.063) (0.074) (0.085) (0.096)
Credit demand 0.053∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.051∗ 0.065∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.015) (0.015) (0.025) (0.013) (0.013) (0.025) (0.014) (0.013)
FD*Credit demand 0.041 0.082∗ 0.083∗ 0.039 0.046 0.024 −0.051 −0.026 −0.038
(0.058) (0.049) (0.049) (0.063) (0.047) (0.044) (0.067) (0.039) (0.040)
Production area(ha) 0.002∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Male −0.065 −0.112 −0.125 −0.053 0.007 0.011 −0.066 −0.060 −0.214∗∗
(0.156) (0.103) (0.098) (0.160) (0.116) (0.115) (0.164) (0.122) (0.086)
Age 0.002 −0.000 0.001 0.001 −0.006∗∗∗−0.005∗∗∗−0.001 −0.002 −0.002
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Disease 0.030∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗ 0.021∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.007) (0.007) (0.014) (0.009) (0.009) (0.014) (0.010) (0.010)
Literate 0.019 0.035 0.037 0.024 0.034 0.042∗ 0.025 0.025 0.042∗
(0.035) (0.026) (0.026) (0.034) (0.024) (0.023) (0.034) (0.028) (0.025)
Married 0.021 0.072∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗ 0.034 0.035 0.025 0.027 0.054∗∗ 0.055∗∗
(0.040) (0.027) (0.026) (0.038) (0.021) (0.020) (0.039) (0.026) (0.026)
Kinh people 0.071 0.036 0.036 0.060 0.055 0.053 0.068 0.034 0.035
(0.051) (0.034) (0.034) (0.050) (0.035) (0.035) (0.056) (0.033) (0.033)
HH nucleus size −0.003 −0.002 −0.002 −0.003 0.001 0.002 −0.003 −0.001 −0.001
(0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Farmer 0.025 0.003 0.004 0.022 0.014 0.024∗ 0.024 0.002 −0.001
(0.024) (0.014) (0.014) (0.024) (0.016) (0.014) (0.023) (0.017) (0.016)
Government officials −0.049 −0.055∗∗ −0.054∗∗ −0.049 −0.087∗∗∗−0.062∗∗∗−0.051 −0.084∗∗∗−0.082∗∗∗
and businessmen (0.035) (0.023) (0.023) (0.034) (0.026) (0.022) (0.035) (0.023) (0.025)
Library availability −0.026 −0.010 −0.011 −0.088∗∗ −0.050 −0.041 −0.048 −0.003 −0.012
(0.034) (0.016) (0.015) (0.040) (0.034) (0.033) (0.043) (0.036) (0.035)
Nursery availability −0.005 0.002 −0.006 0.007 0.025 0.018 −0.008 −0.009 −0.013
(0.029) (0.020) (0.019) (0.022) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.012) (0.013)
Constant −0.000 −0.001 −0.001 −0.000 0.000 0.001 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Observations 12325 12325 12325 12325 12325 12325 12325 12325 12236
R-squared 0.022 0.021 0.021 0.026 0.016 0.017 0.023 0.023 0.023
Underidentification 0.012 0.014 0.184 0.222 0.018 0.044
Overidentification 0.559 0.644 0.378 0.258 0.259 0.231
Weak identification
First stage F-stat. 50.95 64.38 49.16 50.25 37.99 44.94
Cragg-Donald 109.54 114.61 60.23 56.29 50.34 47.11
Kleibergen-Paap 6.341 7.557 12.917 12.114 9.861 8.774
Notes: robust standard errors, clustered at the district level, are given in parentheses. Significance at the 1 per cent,
5 per cent and 10 per cent is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. Local financial development (FD) is measured
by fd
(•)
it . For more details see notes to Table 2.5.
As an alternative measure of household welfare, we examine the effect of local
financial development on consumption smoothing. We consider a household to have
smoothened its consumption if it has not reduced consumption following a negative
income shock. We construct a dummy variable which takes on a value of one if
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a household says it had to reduce consumption following a negative income shock,
and zero otherwise. Table 2.7 documents estimation results on the effect of local
financial development and other determinants on the probability of a household cutting
consumption after suffering from a negative income shock. The negative effect of local
financial development on this variable implies that local financial development enables
households to keep their level of consumption during periods in which household income
suddenly falls. This corroborates our results in Table 2.6 that local financial development
promotes household consumption for those with demand for credit.
2.5.3 Robustness checks
To check for the robustness of results documented in the previous section, we consider the
availability of a bank branch at each locality as an alternative local financial development
indicator (Fafchamps and Schu¨ndeln, 2013). As in the baseline estimations, we employ
the heteroscedasticity-based IV estimation (Lewbel, 2012), and use time to the district
center as a standard instrument for augmenting heteroscedasticity-based instruments.
Robustness check results documented in Appendix 2.7.1 are largely similar to our
baseline results documented in Tables 2.5 and 2.6. In particular, except for the two IV
estimations at the sub-district level, the remaining specifications show a statistically
significant positive impact of local financial development on household income. At the
village level, even the interaction term between bank availability and credit demand is
positive, implying a stronger positive effect of bank availability on household income than
the negative effect of credit demand on household income. For household consumption,
however, the significant impact of local financial development is limited to all the three
district level specifications and the OLS results at the sub-district level. Moreover,
the interaction between bank availability and credit demand is significantly positive
in sub-district level specifications only. Bank availability also reduces the probability
that a household cuts consumption following a negative income shock. In general, the
robustness check estimations are in line with the baseline results in showing that local
financial development promotes household welfare.
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2.6 Conclusions
In this paper we examined whether local financial development promotes household
welfare using household-level panel data collected from three Vietnamese provinces in
2007, 2008, 2010 and 2013. Following Guiso et al. (2004), we created a local financial
development indicator using regional effects from a regression of determinants of the
households’ access to credit. Moreover, local financial development is measured at the
district, sub-district and village levels. Using the method of identification through
heteroscedasticity proposed by Lewbel (2012) and the implementation procedure
suggested by Baum and Schaffer (2012), we investigated the effects of local financial
development on household welfare.
Our results show that district, sub-district and village-level financial development
has a significantly positive impact on household annual income, consumption and
consumption smoothing. Moreover, households with demand for credit benefit in terms
of consumption smoothing if they live in more financially developed localities. These
results are robust to measuring local financial development by means of the presence of
a bank branch. Therefore, policy makers should consider enhancing access to finance at
the local level as an important policy option for promoting household welfare in rural
Vietnam.
To further investigate the impact of local financial development on local economic
development in Vietnam, it is of immediate interest to extend this study by examining
the role of financial development on firm growth in Vietnam.
33
2.7 Appendix for study 1
2.7.1 Appendix A1: Bank availability as a local financial development
Table A1.1: The effect of local financial development on household annual income
District level sub-district level village level
OLS hetero IV all IV OLS hetero IV all IV OLS hetero IV all IV
FD 0.318∗∗∗ 0.601∗∗∗ 0.550∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗ 0.035 0.094 0.124∗ 0.154∗∗ 0.152∗∗
(0.063) (0.070) (0.066) (0.054) (0.090) (0.085) (0.068) (0.062) (0.059)
Credit demand −0.080∗ −0.102∗∗∗−0.062∗∗ −0.060 −0.056∗ −0.042 −0.057 −0.063∗∗ −0.063∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.033) (0.026) (0.042) (0.031) (0.029) (0.041) (0.028) (0.023)
FD*Credit demand 0.002 −0.017 −0.022 0.019 0.002 −0.013 0.143 0.189∗∗ 0.159∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.033) (0.033) (0.083) (0.054) (0.053) (0.179) (0.096) (0.060)
Production area (ha) 0.008∗∗ 0.003 0.004 0.010∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗ 0.011∗∗ 0.010∗∗ 0.010∗∗
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Male −0.150 −0.171 −0.134 −0.105 −0.027 0.013 −0.128 0.033 0.088
(0.230) (0.136) (0.135) (0.273) (0.213) (0.209) (0.285) (0.192) (0.154)
Age 0.053∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.007) (0.006)
Disease 0.037 0.053∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗ 0.029 0.017 0.021 0.031 0.014 0.010
(0.036) (0.020) (0.019) (0.038) (0.017) (0.017) (0.039) (0.025) (0.024)
Literate 0.166∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗ 0.171∗∗∗ 0.168∗∗ 0.159∗∗∗ 0.167∗∗∗ 0.179∗∗ 0.136∗∗ 0.136∗∗
(0.071) (0.057) (0.055) (0.068) (0.056) (0.055) (0.070) (0.058) (0.056)
Married −0.117 −0.060 −0.095∗∗ −0.116 −0.055 −0.079∗∗ −0.121 −0.027 −0.030
(0.069) (0.045) (0.041) (0.071) (0.037) (0.034) (0.073) (0.051) (0.051)
Kinh people −0.066 −0.197∗∗ −0.173∗∗ 0.014 0.054 0.046 0.015 −0.027 −0.017
(0.086) (0.077) (0.076) (0.087) (0.061) (0.060) (0.088) (0.067) (0.062)
HH nucleus size 0.061∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.010) (0.008) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.006) (0.006)
Farmer −0.085∗ −0.085∗∗∗−0.083∗∗∗−0.080∗ −0.071∗∗ −0.058∗∗ −0.075 −0.050 −0.047
(0.044) (0.030) (0.029) (0.044) (0.028) (0.026) (0.045) (0.031) (0.032)
Government officials 0.272∗∗∗ 0.249∗∗∗ 0.250∗∗∗ 0.279∗∗∗ 0.264∗∗∗ 0.282∗∗∗ 0.285∗∗∗ 0.282∗∗∗ 0.293∗∗∗
and businessmen (0.059) (0.036) (0.036) (0.058) (0.034) (0.032) (0.058) (0.043) (0.040)
Library availability 0.133 0.121∗ 0.193∗∗∗ 0.075 0.100∗ 0.094∗ −0.003 −0.020 −0.029
(0.094) (0.072) (0.060) (0.076) (0.051) (0.050) (0.083) (0.056) (0.052)
Nursery availability 0.018 0.094∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗−0.007 −0.033 −0.027 −0.032 −0.015 −0.020
(0.041) (0.025) (0.024) (0.038) (0.025) (0.025) (0.038) (0.026) (0.026)
Constant −0.010∗∗∗−0.011∗∗∗−0.012∗∗∗−0.007∗∗ −0.008∗∗∗−0.010∗∗∗−0.007∗∗ −0.006∗∗∗−0.006∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Observations 7022 7022 7022 7022 7022 7022 7022 7022 6986
R-squared 0.104 0.087 0.092 0.084 0.082 0.083 0.082 0.081 0.081
Underidentification 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Overidentification 0.457 0.282 0.905 0.786 0.487 0.565
Weak identification
First stage F-stat. 19.73 18.45 22.51 23.49 18.63 20.4
Cragg-Donald 130.27 121.85 42.17 39.62 242.25 226.12
Kleibergen-Paap 25.049 23.470 17.313 16.224 28.444 26.532
Notes: robust standard errors, clustered at the district level, are given in parentheses. Significance at the 1 per cent,
5 per cent and 10 per cent is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. Household income is used in logarithmic
form. Local financial development (FD) is measured by bank
(•)
it . For more details see notes to Table 2.5.
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Table A1.2: The effect of local financial development on household consumption
District level sub-district level village level
OLS hetero IV all IV OLS hetero IV all IV OLS hetero IV all IV
FD 0.150∗∗∗ 0.253∗∗∗ 0.253∗∗∗ 0.032∗ −0.022 −0.019 −0.032 −0.015 −0.028
(0.026) (0.023) (0.023) (0.016) (0.040) (0.037) (0.021) (0.028) (0.027)
Credit demand 0.044∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.009) (0.008) (0.012) (0.008) (0.008) (0.012) (0.008) (0.008)
FD*Credit demand 0.013 0.031 0.025 0.042 0.051∗∗ 0.051∗∗ 0.001 0.011 0.003
(0.034) (0.019) (0.018) (0.038) (0.022) (0.022) (0.074) (0.048) (0.048)
Production area (ha) 0.009∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.009 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.009 0.005 0.006∗
(0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003)
Male −0.185 −0.185 −0.147 −0.176 −0.200 −0.199 −0.180 −0.245∗∗∗−0.253∗∗∗
(0.151) (0.126) (0.121) (0.157) (0.130) (0.129) (0.163) (0.084) (0.087)
Age 0.026∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Disease 0.044∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗ 0.026 0.024
(0.016) (0.011) (0.010) (0.018) (0.010) (0.009) (0.018) (0.016) (0.016)
Literate 0.076∗ 0.043 0.039 0.080∗ 0.045 0.044 0.079∗ 0.084∗∗ 0.077∗∗
(0.043) (0.033) (0.033) (0.042) (0.036) (0.036) (0.042) (0.033) (0.034)
Married 0.031 0.055 0.037 0.023 0.002 0.002 0.019 0.027 0.038
(0.062) (0.044) (0.040) (0.064) (0.030) (0.030) (0.065) (0.054) (0.055)
Kinh people −0.065 −0.072∗ −0.081∗∗ −0.058 −0.017 −0.018 −0.064 −0.071 −0.070∗
(0.058) (0.041) (0.040) (0.057) (0.041) (0.041) (0.055) (0.044) (0.042)
HH nucleus size 0.096∗∗∗ 0.099∗∗∗ 0.099∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Farmer −0.041∗ −0.025∗ −0.019 −0.041∗ −0.043∗∗ −0.043∗∗ −0.041 −0.025 −0.027
(0.023) (0.014) (0.013) (0.024) (0.019) (0.018) (0.024) (0.018) (0.017)
Government officials 0.034 0.028 0.031 0.035 0.037 0.037 0.038 0.038∗ 0.040∗
and businessmen (0.028) (0.019) (0.019) (0.027) (0.024) (0.023) (0.027) (0.020) (0.020)
Library availability 0.045∗ 0.027 0.042∗∗∗ 0.074∗ 0.081∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗ 0.018 −0.045 −0.039
(0.027) (0.021) (0.016) (0.043) (0.020) (0.019) (0.045) (0.028) (0.027)
Nursery availability 0.099∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.022 0.034∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.017) (0.015) (0.019) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.009) (0.009)
Constant 0.001 0.002 0.002∗ 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.003∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 7072 7072 7072 7072 7072 7072 7072 7072 7027
R-squared 0.163 0.149 0.150 0.136 0.132 0.132 0.130 0.128 0.128
Underidentification 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Overidentification 0.216 0.209 0.528 0.608 0.459 0.555
Weak identification
First stage F-stat. 15.81 15.78 14.19 15.62 18.33 17.16
Cragg-Donald 128.42 119.91 17.39 16.49 79.26 74.06
Kleibergen-Paap 17.044 15.925 6.002 5.775 17.988 16.833
Notes: robust standard errors, clustered at the district level, are given in parentheses. Significance at the 1 per cent,
5 per cent and 10 per cent is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. Household consumption is used in logarithmic
form. Local financial development (FD) is measured by bank
(•)
it . For more details see notes to Table 2.5.
2.7.2 Appendix A2: Panel based estimates of regional effects as a local
financial development indicator
In the main text of the paper, we employed a local financial development indicator
fdit generated from regional effects in the regression of a households’ probability of
being credit rationed. Given the panel nature of our data, we allowed local financial
development to vary over time by using year-specific regressions for the model of
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Table A1.3: The effect of local financial development on consumption smoothing
District level sub-district level village level
OLS hetero IV all IV OLS hetero IV all IV OLS hetero IV all IV
FD −0.127∗∗∗−0.124∗∗∗−0.126∗∗∗−0.044∗ −0.166∗∗∗−0.154∗∗∗−0.102 −0.192∗∗∗−0.209∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.022) (0.059) (0.058) (0.063) (0.040) (0.035)
Credit demand 0.055∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗ 0.044∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.014) (0.014) (0.023) (0.013) (0.012) (0.022) (0.016) (0.016)
FD*Credit demand 0.023 0.021 0.023 0.034 −0.012 0.009 0.049 0.021 −0.000
(0.032) (0.024) (0.024) (0.036) (0.025) (0.018) (0.106) (0.069) (0.062)
Production area(ha) 0.001 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗−0.001 −0.001 −0.002 −0.002 −0.002 −0.002
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
Male −0.051 −0.021 −0.036 −0.052 −0.107 −0.041 −0.037 −0.107 −0.086
(0.154) (0.099) (0.096) (0.167) (0.142) (0.135) (0.160) (0.119) (0.097)
Age −0.000 −0.002 −0.001 −0.006∗∗ −0.003 −0.003 −0.008∗∗∗−0.009∗∗∗−0.009∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Disease 0.025∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.028∗ 0.021∗∗ 0.016∗ 0.028∗ 0.026∗∗ 0.022∗∗
(0.015) (0.011) (0.011) (0.015) (0.010) (0.010) (0.015) (0.012) (0.011)
Literate 0.019 0.018 0.020 0.016 0.053∗ 0.057∗∗ 0.011 0.033 0.020
(0.034) (0.022) (0.022) (0.035) (0.028) (0.028) (0.035) (0.023) (0.023)
Married 0.013 0.017 0.013 0.036 0.074∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗ 0.032 0.034 0.015
(0.042) (0.029) (0.028) (0.040) (0.028) (0.026) (0.043) (0.026) (0.023)
Kinh people 0.091 0.052 0.057 0.074 0.010 0.019 0.088 0.069∗∗ 0.073∗∗
(0.060) (0.037) (0.036) (0.057) (0.026) (0.025) (0.064) (0.031) (0.030)
HH nucleus size −0.001 0.000 0.001 −0.002 0.003 0.004 −0.002 0.001 0.002
(0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Farmer 0.027 0.032∗ 0.031∗ 0.027 0.011 0.010 0.028 0.016 0.014
(0.023) (0.018) (0.018) (0.023) (0.010) (0.010) (0.023) (0.013) (0.014)
Government officials −0.048 −0.043∗∗ −0.044∗∗ −0.055 −0.084∗∗∗−0.064∗∗∗−0.056 −0.088∗∗∗−0.088∗∗∗
and businessmen (0.035) (0.021) (0.021) (0.035) (0.021) (0.016) (0.037) (0.024) (0.025)
Library availability 0.007 0.017 0.025 −0.066 −0.039 −0.053∗ −0.034 −0.013 −0.001
(0.043) (0.027) (0.023) (0.043) (0.033) (0.031) (0.053) (0.034) (0.033)
Nursery availability 0.018 0.015 0.012 0.035∗ 0.004 0.004 0.011 0.016 0.019
(0.025) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.021) (0.020) (0.016) (0.013) (0.013)
Constant −0.000 0.000 0.000 −0.000 −0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 12325 12325 12325 12325 12325 12325 12325 12325 12236
R-squared 0.023 0.022 0.022 0.011 −0.003 −0.000 0.009 0.007 0.006
Underidentification 0.000 0.000 0.013 0.017 0.000 0.001
Overidentification 0.280 0.325 0.546 0.566 0.236 0.214
Weak identification
First stage F-stat. 36.45 35.82 2.67 2.72 29.9 28
Cragg-Donald 170.65 161.28 11.58 11.09 64.54 60.38
Kleibergen-Paap 26.396 25.919 2.118 1.993 12.743 10.922
Notes: robust standard errors, clustered at the district level, are given in parentheses. Significance at the 1 per cent,
5 per cent and 10 per cent is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. Local financial development (FD) is measured
by bank
(•)
it . For more details see notes to Table 2.5.
determinants of credit rationing in Table 3. The resulting local financial development
indicator fd2
(•)
it is used to obtain results reported in Tables 5, 6 and 7 in the main body
of the paper.
In this supplement, we do a robustness check by alternatively performing a pooled
regression of Table 3 including year dummies, and construct the local financial
development indicator as a function of local and year dummies. Namely, we estimate
36
Chapter 2 Appendix A
the following linear pooled OLS model
CRhit = w
′
hitαt + Viβi + Y eartµt + νhit, (2.5)
where Y eart is a year dummy and the remaining variables are as defined in (2.1).
Results documented in Table A2.1 are qualitatively similar to year-specific results
documented in Table 3. In particular, while credit rationing CRhit is positively affected
by a bad credit history and illness of the household head, it is negatively affected by
household annual income. Unlike results in Table 3, however, household nucleus size
is not statistically significant in the pooled estimation results reported in Table A2.1.
Moreover, year dummies have negative signs whose magnitudes increase from year to
year. This indicates that financial development was generally growing over time in the
three Vietnamese provinces in the period 2007-2013.
Based on pooled regression estimates of locality and year dummies in (2.5), we
construct the alternative time-varying local financial development indicator as
fd2
(•)
it =
(
1− βˆi + µˆt
βˆmax + µˆmax
)
. (2.6)
where βˆmax is the maximum of βˆ = (βˆ1, ..., βˆN(•)) and µˆmax is the maximum of
µˆ = (µˆ1, ..., µˆT ), with i = 1, ..., N
(•) and t = 1, ..., T .
In (2.6), a higher fd2
(•)
it indicates a more financially developed locality i in year t.
The locality index could refer to a village v, a sub-district s or a district d, i.e • ∈ {v,
s, d}. Table A2.2 documents the summary statistics of the local financial development
indicator fd2
(•)
it . The indicator fd2
(•)
it has a strong, positive correlation with our main
indicator fd
(•)
it and the other alternative bank
(•)
it .
Results on the impact on household income, annual consumption and consumption
smoothing of local financial development as measured by fd2
(•)
it are documented in Tables
A2.3, A2.4 and A2.5 and are largely similar to those of using fd
(•)
it and bank
(s)
it as
financial development indicators documented in the paper. Specifically, local financial
development as measured by fd2
(•)
it positively impacts on household annual income and
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consumption. Moreover, local financial development increases household consumption for
households with demand for credit more than it increases the consumption of households
with no demand for credit. With regard to specification tests, all IV results are supported
by the underidentification, overidentification and weak identification tests.
Table A2.1: Determinants of credit rationing (Pooled OLS)
District Sub-district Village
Late repayment and default 0.050∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
HH income −0.015∗∗∗ −0.016∗∗∗ −0.015∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Production area (ha) −0.004 −0.002 −0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Male −0.007 −0.008 −0.006
(0.018) (0.019) (0.019)
Age −0.000 −0.000 −0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Disease 0.017∗ 0.017∗ 0.017∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Literate 0.002 −0.001 −0.005
(0.015) (0.015) (0.016)
Married −0.009 −0.005 −0.002
(0.020) (0.020) (0.021)
Kinh people 0.013 0.024 0.024
(0.015) (0.019) (0.030)
HH nucleus size −0.001 −0.001 −0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Farmer 0.017 0.015 0.015
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Government officials and businessmen 0.011 0.007 −0.004
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
2007 0.318∗∗∗ 0.299∗∗∗ 0.263∗∗
(0.065) (0.078) (0.125)
2008 0.175∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗ 0.117
(0.065) (0.078) (0.125)
2010 0.175∗∗∗ 0.154∗ 0.118
(0.066) (0.079) (0.126)
2013 0.180∗∗∗ 0.159∗∗ 0.122
(0.067) (0.080) (0.126)
Local dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5357 5357 5357
Adjusted R-squared 0.174 0.175 0.177
Notes: the values provided in parentheses are estimated robust standard errors.
Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.
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Table A2.2: Local financial development indicators
Panel A: Summary Statistics
Variable Level Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
fd2
(d)
it district 8788 0.490 0.170 0 0.824
fd2
(s)
it sub-district 8788 0.516 0.178 0 0.831
fd2
(v)
it village 8788 0.566 0.192 0 0.921
Panel B: Correlation between LFD
fd2
(d)
it fd2
(s)
it fd2
(v)
it fd
(d)
it fd
(s)
it fd
(v)
it
fd2
(d)
it 1
fd2
(s)
it 0.895* 1
fd2
(v)
it 0.775* 0.871* 1
fd
(d)
it 0.728* 0.650* 0.562* 1
fd
(s)
it 0.668* 0.702* 0.611* 0.867* 1
fd
(v)
it 0.590* 0.618* 0.657* 0.748* 0.862* 1
Panel C: Correlation between LFD and Bank
fd2
(d)
it fd2
(s)
it fd2
(v)
it bank
(d)
it bank
(s)
it bank
(v)
it
bank
(d)
it 0.498* 0.443* 0.384* 1
bank
(s)
it 0.264* 0.228* 0.191* 0.417* 1
bank
(v)
it 0.089* 0.058* 0.043* 0.153* 0.367* 1
Notes: significance at the 1% is indicated by *.
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Table A2.3: The effect of local financial development on household annual income
District level sub-district level village level
OLS hetero IV all IV OLS hetero IV all IV OLS hetero IV all IV
FD 1.397∗∗∗ 1.687∗∗∗ 1.579∗∗∗ 1.427∗∗∗ 1.651∗∗∗ 1.581∗∗∗ 1.490∗∗∗ 1.770∗∗∗ 1.560∗∗∗
(0.209) (0.134) (0.128) (0.231) (0.225) (0.221) (0.244) (0.304) (0.284)
Credit demand −0.061 −0.083∗∗∗−0.068∗∗ −0.060 −0.039 −0.039 −0.059 −0.052∗ −0.053∗
(0.041) (0.029) (0.028) (0.040) (0.026) (0.026) (0.040) (0.027) (0.027)
FD*Credit demand 0.155 0.066 0.163∗ 0.177 0.099 0.177 0.190 0.107 0.214
(0.151) (0.101) (0.094) (0.167) (0.129) (0.122) (0.178) (0.135) (0.135)
Production area (ha) 0.008∗∗ 0.004 0.005∗∗ 0.006 0.005∗∗ 0.005∗∗ 0.006 0.005∗ 0.006∗∗
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Male 0.025 0.073 0.146 −0.001 −0.025 0.038 −0.004 −0.013 0.093
(0.210) (0.142) (0.139) (0.209) (0.134) (0.129) (0.213) (0.138) (0.130)
Age 0.039∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Disease 0.048 0.070∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.049 0.068∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗ 0.051 0.063∗∗ 0.051∗∗
(0.037) (0.023) (0.023) (0.038) (0.024) (0.024) (0.038) (0.025) (0.024)
Literate 0.149∗ 0.151∗∗∗ 0.164∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗ 0.151∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗ 0.136∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗
(0.073) (0.051) (0.051) (0.072) (0.054) (0.054) (0.072) (0.053) (0.051)
Married −0.051 0.022 −0.021 −0.044 0.019 −0.018 −0.045 0.026 −0.016
(0.071) (0.041) (0.038) (0.070) (0.044) (0.039) (0.070) (0.048) (0.042)
Kinh people 0.145 0.115 0.136∗ 0.134 0.086 0.106 0.134 0.132 0.180∗∗
(0.097) (0.079) (0.079) (0.097) (0.079) (0.079) (0.098) (0.082) (0.079)
HH nucleus size 0.063∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.008) (0.007) (0.011) (0.007) (0.007)
Farmer −0.051 −0.034 −0.022 −0.049 −0.057 −0.039 −0.049 −0.051 −0.050
(0.046) (0.028) (0.028) (0.048) (0.037) (0.037) (0.047) (0.037) (0.037)
Government officials 0.295∗∗∗ 0.265∗∗∗ 0.265∗∗∗ 0.297∗∗∗ 0.242∗∗∗ 0.265∗∗∗ 0.298∗∗∗ 0.271∗∗∗ 0.277∗∗∗
and businessmen (0.063) (0.038) (0.038) (0.061) (0.035) (0.034) (0.062) (0.038) (0.038)
Library availability 0.192∗∗ 0.197∗∗∗ 0.214∗∗∗ 0.120∗ 0.165∗∗∗ 0.160∗∗∗ 0.021 0.018 0.076
(0.085) (0.045) (0.044) (0.067) (0.041) (0.040) (0.086) (0.062) (0.056)
Nursery availability 0.057 0.078∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗ 0.058 0.071∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗ 0.027 0.031 0.014
(0.039) (0.028) (0.028) (0.038) (0.029) (0.029) (0.039) (0.029) (0.029)
Constant −0.012∗∗∗−0.010∗∗∗−0.012∗∗∗−0.012∗∗∗−0.012∗∗∗−0.013∗∗∗−0.012∗∗∗−0.012∗∗∗−0.012∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Observations 7022 7022 7022 7022 7022 7022 7022 7022 6986
R-squared 0.127 0.125 0.126 0.123 0.121 0.122 0.122 0.120 0.123
Underidentification 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Overidentification 0.730 0.270 0.526 0.295 0.787 0.499
Weak identification
First stage F-stat. 47.5 59.96 54.85 51.83 22.65 21.28
Cragg-Donald 871.58 813.38 135.9 128.06 97.26 91.46
Kleibergen-Paap 63.737 65.432 45.656 42.695 27.415 25.683
Notes: robust standard errors, clustered at the district level, are given in parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5%
and 10% is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. Household income is used in logarithmic form. Local financial
development (FD) is measured by fd2
(•)
it . The Stock-Yogo weak identification test critical values (Stock and Yogo
(2005)), computed for i.i.d. errors, are the following: 5% maximal IV relative bias = 21; 10% maximal IV relative
bias = 11.52; 10% maximal IV size = 43.27 for hetero IV results and 45.64 for all IV results.
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Table A2.4: The effect of local financial development on household annual consumption
District level sub-district level village level
OLS hetero IV all IV OLS hetero IV all IV OLS hetero IV all IV
FD 0.656∗∗∗ 0.595∗∗∗ 0.590∗∗∗ 0.624∗∗∗ 0.807∗∗∗ 0.833∗∗∗ 0.616∗∗∗ 0.892∗∗∗ 0.890∗∗∗
(0.072) (0.060) (0.060) (0.076) (0.091) (0.088) (0.081) (0.100) (0.100)
Credit demand 0.049∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.008) (0.008) (0.012) (0.009) (0.008) (0.012) (0.009) (0.008)
FD*Credit demand 0.158 0.213∗∗∗ 0.207∗∗∗ 0.179 0.251∗∗∗ 0.236∗∗∗ 0.182 0.236∗∗∗ 0.231∗∗∗
(0.123) (0.067) (0.067) (0.135) (0.082) (0.081) (0.143) (0.087) (0.084)
Production area (ha) 0.009∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.007 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.006∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001)
Male −0.099 0.019 0.033 −0.121 −0.070 −0.040 −0.130 −0.008 0.013
(0.131) (0.083) (0.082) (0.129) (0.086) (0.080) (0.129) (0.091) (0.082)
Age 0.019∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Disease 0.049∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.011) (0.011) (0.016) (0.010) (0.010) (0.016) (0.009) (0.009)
Literate 0.069 0.046∗ 0.046∗ 0.070 0.048∗∗ 0.051∗∗ 0.067 0.056∗∗ 0.057∗∗
(0.044) (0.024) (0.024) (0.042) (0.023) (0.023) (0.042) (0.026) (0.025)
Married 0.034 −0.006 −0.025 0.039 0.029 0.020 0.034 −0.013 −0.018
(0.058) (0.037) (0.031) (0.058) (0.027) (0.026) (0.060) (0.037) (0.032)
Kinh people −0.030 −0.037 −0.028 −0.034 −0.054 −0.037 −0.038 −0.044 −0.028
(0.053) (0.038) (0.037) (0.054) (0.039) (0.036) (0.054) (0.043) (0.039)
HH nucleus size 0.098∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Farmer −0.032 −0.013 −0.011 −0.030 −0.007 −0.004 −0.032 −0.007 −0.006
(0.023) (0.013) (0.013) (0.024) (0.015) (0.014) (0.024) (0.015) (0.014)
Government officials 0.039 0.062∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗ 0.037 0.056∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.039 0.060∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗
and businessmen (0.027) (0.018) (0.017) (0.029) (0.019) (0.019) (0.028) (0.018) (0.017)
Library availability 0.073∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗ 0.041 0.043 0.030 −0.038 −0.043
(0.022) (0.011) (0.011) (0.046) (0.034) (0.034) (0.049) (0.037) (0.037)
Nursery availability 0.117∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.013) (0.012) (0.018) (0.011) (0.011) (0.016) (0.012) (0.012)
Constant 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 7072 7072 7072 7072 7072 7072 7072 7072 7027
R-squared 0.189 0.188 0.187 0.177 0.172 0.171 0.167 0.158 0.159
Underidentification 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Overidentification 0.483 0.493 0.341 0.341 0.657 0.723
Weak identification
First stage F-stat. 38.54 52.73 48.79 47.45 16.97 16.63
Cragg-Donald 854.65 797.62 145.99 137.85 100.07 94.18
Kleibergen-Paap 57.268 61.786 32.196 30.480 16.909 15.831
Notes: robust standard errors, clustered at the district level, are given in parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5%
and 10% is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. Household consumption is used in logarithmic form. Local
financial development (FD) is measured by fd2
(•)
it .
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Table A2.5: The effect of local financial development on consumption smoothing
District level sub-district level village level
OLS hetero IV all IV OLS hetero IV all IV OLS hetero IV all IV
FD −0.506∗∗∗−0.347∗∗∗−0.336∗∗∗−0.544∗∗∗−0.294∗∗∗−0.207∗∗∗−0.586∗∗∗−0.316∗∗∗−0.271∗∗∗
(0.101) (0.068) (0.066) (0.096) (0.069) (0.062) (0.102) (0.071) (0.067)
Credit demand 0.055∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.015) (0.013) (0.022) (0.014) (0.014) (0.022) (0.016) (0.015)
FD*Credit demand 0.084 0.153∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗∗ 0.097 0.133∗∗ 0.134∗∗ 0.102 0.161∗∗ 0.171∗∗
(0.089) (0.057) (0.057) (0.094) (0.064) (0.065) (0.100) (0.069) (0.070)
Production area(ha) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 −0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Male −0.089 0.015 0.010 −0.086 0.003 0.046 −0.086 −0.051 −0.184∗∗
(0.165) (0.110) (0.109) (0.167) (0.103) (0.102) (0.165) (0.107) (0.078)
Age 0.004 −0.001 −0.001 0.004 −0.004∗∗ −0.005∗∗∗ 0.004 −0.004∗∗∗−0.005∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
Disease 0.023 0.016∗ 0.018∗∗ 0.024 0.018∗ 0.022∗∗ 0.023 0.024∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.008) (0.008) (0.016) (0.009) (0.009) (0.016) (0.009) (0.009)
Literate 0.031 0.048 0.055∗ 0.031 0.040 0.045 0.030 0.034 0.042
(0.038) (0.032) (0.031) (0.038) (0.033) (0.033) (0.039) (0.032) (0.031)
Married 0.013 0.067∗∗ 0.059∗∗ 0.018 0.041∗ 0.052∗∗ 0.014 0.031 0.029
(0.040) (0.028) (0.026) (0.037) (0.023) (0.022) (0.039) (0.024) (0.022)
Kinh people 0.063 0.009 0.021 0.061 0.031 0.014 0.062 0.008 0.001
(0.058) (0.044) (0.041) (0.054) (0.042) (0.041) (0.057) (0.038) (0.038)
HH nucleus size −0.004 −0.001 −0.001 −0.003 −0.001 0.000 −0.003 −0.001 0.000
(0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003)
Farmer 0.021 −0.000 0.004 0.020 0.011 0.012 0.021 0.015 0.013
(0.023) (0.017) (0.017) (0.023) (0.017) (0.017) (0.023) (0.017) (0.017)
Government officials −0.047 −0.076∗∗∗−0.074∗∗∗−0.048 −0.106∗∗∗−0.083∗∗∗−0.048 −0.102∗∗∗−0.100∗∗∗
and businessmen (0.033) (0.022) (0.022) (0.033) (0.022) (0.020) (0.034) (0.025) (0.023)
Library availability −0.016 −0.018 −0.012 −0.084∗∗ −0.069∗∗ −0.044 −0.057 −0.050∗ −0.052∗
(0.037) (0.019) (0.018) (0.040) (0.029) (0.028) (0.043) (0.029) (0.030)
Nursery availability 0.006 0.030 0.024 0.010 0.026∗ 0.020 −0.006 0.006 0.005
(0.024) (0.019) (0.017) (0.018) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.012) (0.012)
Constant −0.000 −0.000 0.000 −0.000 0.000 0.000 −0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 12326 12326 12326 12326 12326 12326 12326 12326 12236
R-squared 0.031 0.028 0.028 0.032 0.027 0.023 0.032 0.026 0.024
Underidentification 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Overidentification 0.553 0.565 0.644 0.220 0.511 0.443
Weak identification
First stage F-stat. 59.61 56.92 247.78 235.21 70.24 65.57
Cragg-Donald 459.26 431.63 167.08 156.09 128.2 119.64
Kleibergen-Paap 76.783 71.278 31.458 29.497 22.883 21.692
Notes: robust standard errors, clustered at the district level, are given in parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5%
and 10% is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. Local financial development (FD) is measured by fd2
(•)
it .
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2.7.3 Appendix A3: Local financial development indicators based on
households’ credit-rationed by formal credit suppliers only
In this section, we provide results obtained by using new local financial development
indicators, which are created from regional effects based on HHs credit-rationed by
formal credit suppliers, such as government banks, commercial banks, but excluding
informal credit suppliers such as money lenders, families and friends.
Table A3.1: Determinants of credit rationing
District Village
2007 2008 2010 2013 2007 2008 2010 2013
Late repayment and default 0.090∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.001 0.021∗ 0.090∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗ −0.000 0.028∗∗
(0.015) (0.010) (0.009) (0.012) (0.017) (0.011) (0.010) (0.014)
HH income −0.005 −0.007 −0.009 −0.008 −0.006 −0.010 −0.005 −0.005
(0.010) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.012) (0.007) (0.008) (0.011)
Production area(ha) 0.188∗ −0.001 −0.001 0.003 0.246∗ 0.001 −0.001 0.005
(0.108) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004) (0.127) (0.007) (0.004) (0.005)
Male 0.013 −0.020 0.030 −0.047 −0.004 −0.044 0.028 −0.038
(0.048) (0.024) (0.030) (0.038) (0.056) (0.027) (0.032) (0.046)
Age −0.000 −0.001 0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.001 0.000 −0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Disease 0.034 0.003 0.002 0.005 0.048 −0.007 −0.009 −0.003
(0.025) (0.014) (0.015) (0.018) (0.030) (0.015) (0.016) (0.021)
Literate 0.004 0.023 0.037 −0.004 0.004 0.038 0.052∗ −0.008
(0.042) (0.022) (0.025) (0.033) (0.049) (0.026) (0.028) (0.040)
Married −0.073 0.000 −0.004 0.020 −0.042 0.029 −0.011 −0.004
(0.052) (0.026) (0.034) (0.043) (0.061) (0.030) (0.037) (0.051)
Kinh people 0.016 −0.013 −0.029 −0.032 0.007 0.029 −0.059 −0.017
(0.044) (0.022) (0.025) (0.038) (0.128) (0.052) (0.050) (0.093)
HH nucleus size −0.002 0.001 0.001 0.010∗ −0.003 0.002 −0.002 0.010
(0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.008) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
Farmer 0.034 0.022 −0.008 0.017 −0.011 0.027 −0.023 0.006
(0.034) (0.016) (0.019) (0.023) (0.040) (0.018) (0.020) (0.026)
Government officials −0.001 0.011 −0.021 −0.008 −0.017 0.019 −0.054∗ −0.009
and businessmen (0.047) (0.023) (0.028) (0.034) (0.056) (0.026) (0.030) (0.039)
Local dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 885 1115 1047 695 885 1115 1047 695
Adjusted R-squared 0.173 0.047 0.047 0.048 0.137 0.020 0.123 0.042
Notes: the values provided in parentheses are estimated robust standard errors. Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%
is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.
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Table A3.2: Local financial development indicators
Panel A: Summary Statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
fd
(d)
it 8788 0.589 0.219 0 1.003
fd
(s)
it 8788 0.911 0.111 0 1.111
fd
(v)
it 8788 0.900 0.139 0 1.353
bank
(d)
it 8788 0.685 0.465 0 1
bank
(s)
it 8788 0.274 0.446 0 1
bank
(v)
it 8788 0.048 0.215 0 1
Panel B: Correlation between local financial development indicators and bank availability
fd
(d)
it fd
(s)
it fd
(v)
it bank
(d)
it bank
(s)
it bank
(v)
it
fd
(d)
it 1
fd
(s)
it 0.5482* 1
fd
(v)
it 0.4777* 0.6651* 1
bank
(d)
it 0.3035* 0.1179* 0.2075* 1
bank
(s)
it 0.1402* 0.0332* 0.0691* 0.4169* 1
bank
(v)
it 0.0365* -0.0004 -0.0012 0.1530* 0.3669* 1
Notes: significance at the 1% is indicated by *.
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Table A3.3: The effect of local financial development on household income
District level sub-district level village level
OLS hetero IV all IV OLS hetero IV all IV OLS hetero IV all IV
FD 0.314∗∗ 0.669∗∗∗ 0.577∗∗∗ 0.187 0.683∗∗∗ 0.338∗∗ 0.575∗∗∗ 0.657∗∗∗ 0.641∗∗∗
(0.148) (0.124) (0.114) (0.185) (0.140) (0.140) (0.145) (0.123) (0.120)
Credit demand −0.060 −0.050∗ −0.051∗ −0.059 −0.095∗∗∗−0.083∗∗∗−0.060 −0.042∗∗ −0.047∗∗
(0.042) (0.026) (0.026) (0.043) (0.023) (0.021) (0.045) (0.021) (0.020)
FD*Credit demand −0.037 −0.279∗∗∗−0.251∗∗∗−0.493∗∗ −0.321∗∗ −0.415∗∗∗−0.115 −0.173 −0.195
(0.125) (0.087) (0.087) (0.202) (0.140) (0.114) (0.204) (0.133) (0.134)
Production area (ha) 0.009∗ 0.005∗ 0.006∗∗ 0.011∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Male −0.101 −0.165 −0.158 −0.125 −0.339 −0.119 −0.120 −0.137 0.008
(0.264) (0.195) (0.197) (0.285) (0.241) (0.226) (0.278) (0.219) (0.202)
Age 0.066∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006)
Disease 0.028 0.005 0.003 0.030 0.025 0.007 0.035 0.051∗ 0.035
(0.037) (0.025) (0.024) (0.038) (0.020) (0.019) (0.039) (0.030) (0.025)
Literate 0.177∗∗ 0.264∗∗∗ 0.256∗∗∗ 0.179∗∗ 0.217∗∗∗ 0.207∗∗∗ 0.172∗∗ 0.185∗∗∗ 0.197∗∗∗
(0.072) (0.049) (0.048) (0.070) (0.051) (0.050) (0.069) (0.044) (0.042)
Married −0.115 −0.047 −0.059 −0.123∗ −0.080 −0.089∗ −0.114 −0.053 −0.061
(0.071) (0.056) (0.054) (0.072) (0.051) (0.051) (0.072) (0.047) (0.047)
Kinh people 0.035 −0.083 −0.064 0.020 −0.015 0.023 0.028 −0.013 −0.007
(0.089) (0.070) (0.066) (0.088) (0.068) (0.066) (0.093) (0.061) (0.060)
HH nucleus size 0.062∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011) (0.008) (0.007) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008)
Farmer −0.076 −0.081∗∗∗−0.076∗∗∗−0.079∗ −0.072∗∗∗−0.066∗∗ −0.071 −0.072∗∗∗−0.071∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.023) (0.023) (0.045) (0.028) (0.028) (0.046) (0.026) (0.027)
Government officials 0.282∗∗∗ 0.213∗∗∗ 0.207∗∗∗ 0.282∗∗∗ 0.220∗∗∗ 0.235∗∗∗ 0.282∗∗∗ 0.227∗∗∗ 0.236∗∗∗
and businessman (0.059) (0.047) (0.046) (0.058) (0.040) (0.040) (0.057) (0.035) (0.035)
Library availability 0.167∗ 0.138∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗ 0.078 0.050 0.032 −0.014 −0.039 −0.045
(0.091) (0.063) (0.058) (0.076) (0.048) (0.045) (0.084) (0.051) (0.050)
Nursery availability −0.028 0.050 0.035 −0.027 −0.004 −0.013 −0.044 −0.064∗∗ −0.065∗∗
(0.048) (0.038) (0.036) (0.035) (0.030) (0.029) (0.038) (0.032) (0.031)
Constant −0.008∗∗ −0.006∗∗ −0.007∗∗∗−0.007∗∗ −0.007∗∗∗−0.008∗∗∗−0.008∗∗ −0.008∗∗∗−0.008∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Observations 7022 7022 7022 7022 7022 7022 7022 7022 6986
R-squared 0.088 0.080 0.083 0.082 0.078 0.081 0.089 0.087 0.088
Underidentification 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
Overidentification 0.203 0.227 0.173 0.108 0.227 0.226
Weak identification 17.141 16.490 5.137 5.393 9.066 8.665
Notes: robust standard errors, clustered at the district level, are given in parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5%
and 10% is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. Household consumption is used in logarithmic form. Local
financial development (FD) is measured by fd
(•)
it .
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Table A3.4: The effect of local financial development on household consumption
District level sub-district level village level
OLS hetero IV all IV OLS hetero IV all IV OLS hetero IV all IV
FD 0.141∗∗ 0.832∗∗∗ 0.810∗∗∗ 0.127 0.213∗∗ 0.145 0.254∗∗∗ 0.705∗∗∗ 0.691∗∗∗
(0.067) (0.165) (0.141) (0.085) (0.089) (0.089) (0.069) (0.148) (0.136)
Credit demand 0.051∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.008) (0.008) (0.013) (0.009) (0.007)
FD*Credit demand 0.088 0.015 0.006 0.084 0.141∗ 0.147∗∗ 0.099 0.085∗ 0.099∗∗
(0.084) (0.061) (0.056) (0.126) (0.072) (0.073) (0.084) (0.051) (0.045)
Production area (ha) 0.010∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.009 0.008∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.008 0.009∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002)
Male −0.163 −0.136∗∗ −0.160∗∗∗−0.182 −0.270∗∗∗−0.261∗∗∗−0.181 −0.284∗∗ −0.302∗∗
(0.149) (0.060) (0.055) (0.159) (0.092) (0.091) (0.154) (0.124) (0.125)
Age 0.032∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Disease 0.040∗∗ 0.028∗∗ 0.029∗∗ 0.039∗∗ 0.033∗∗ 0.030∗∗ 0.042∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.013) (0.012) (0.018) (0.014) (0.013) (0.018) (0.012) (0.012)
Literate 0.078∗ 0.038 0.046 0.080∗ 0.102∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗ 0.074∗ 0.075∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.035) (0.033) (0.042) (0.029) (0.029) (0.042) (0.028) (0.024)
Married 0.017 0.018 0.017 0.021 0.017 0.022 0.020 0.025 0.023
(0.063) (0.040) (0.040) (0.064) (0.040) (0.040) (0.065) (0.049) (0.047)
Kinh people −0.061 −0.088∗∗∗−0.099∗∗∗−0.063 −0.097∗∗∗−0.097∗∗∗−0.062 −0.101∗∗∗−0.088∗∗∗
(0.051) (0.027) (0.024) (0.055) (0.026) (0.026) (0.054) (0.032) (0.030)
HH nucleus size 0.097∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Farmer −0.040∗ −0.013 −0.012 −0.040 −0.038∗∗ −0.040∗∗ −0.037 −0.042∗∗∗−0.039∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.016) (0.016) (0.024) (0.016) (0.016) (0.024) (0.014) (0.013)
Government officials 0.037 0.047∗∗ 0.045∗∗ 0.036 0.031∗ 0.031∗ 0.038 0.033 0.033∗
and businessman (0.026) (0.020) (0.019) (0.028) (0.019) (0.019) (0.028) (0.020) (0.018)
Library availability 0.061∗∗ 0.040 0.048 0.073 0.047∗ 0.046 0.012 −0.009 −0.008
(0.024) (0.068) (0.061) (0.043) (0.028) (0.028) (0.044) (0.032) (0.029)
Nursery availability 0.075∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗ 0.166∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗ 0.024 0.039∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.039) (0.035) (0.018) (0.013) (0.013) (0.016) (0.014) (0.014)
Constant 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002∗∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.002 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 7072 7072 7072 7072 7072 7072 7072 7072 7027
R-squared 0.143 0.007 0.016 0.135 0.134 0.135 0.138 0.111 0.113
Underidentification 0.015 0.022 0.012 0.013 0.245 0.195
Overidentification 0.598 0.591 0.293 0.292 0.131 0.194
Weak identification 4.051 3.968 15.792 14.957 3.636 5.071
Notes: robust standard errors, clustered at the district level, are given in parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5%
and 10% is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. Household consumption is used in logarithmic form. Local
financial development (FD) is measured by fd
(•)
it .
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Table A3.5: The effect of local financial development on consumption smoothing
District level sub-district level village level
OLS hetero IV all IV OLS hetero IV all IV OLS hetero IV all IV
FD −0.232∗∗∗−0.495∗∗∗−0.504∗∗∗−0.315∗∗∗−0.339∗∗∗−0.380∗∗∗−0.308∗∗∗−0.358∗∗∗−0.390∗∗∗
(0.071) (0.112) (0.108) (0.095) (0.079) (0.084) (0.080) (0.089) (0.087)
Credit demand 0.054∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.050∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.047∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.017) (0.017) (0.025) (0.015) (0.014) (0.025) (0.015) (0.015)
FD*Credit demand 0.032 0.060∗ 0.060 −0.055 −0.047 −0.099 −0.133 −0.200∗∗∗−0.207∗∗∗
(0.066) (0.037) (0.036) (0.120) (0.079) (0.067) (0.107) (0.047) (0.050)
Production area(ha) 0.000 0.001∗ 0.002∗∗ −0.001 −0.002∗∗∗−0.002∗∗∗−0.002 −0.002∗∗∗−0.002∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
Male −0.043 −0.021 −0.036 −0.037 0.137 0.142 −0.049 −0.098 −0.166∗
(0.160) (0.089) (0.087) (0.167) (0.108) (0.106) (0.167) (0.145) (0.090)
Age −0.004∗ 0.001 0.001 −0.008∗∗∗−0.009∗∗∗−0.009∗∗∗−0.007∗∗∗−0.007∗∗∗−0.006∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Disease 0.025 0.023∗∗ 0.022∗ 0.025 0.017 0.015 0.023 0.017∗∗ 0.021∗∗
(0.015) (0.011) (0.011) (0.015) (0.011) (0.011) (0.015) (0.008) (0.009)
Literate 0.016 0.034 0.043 0.019 0.040 0.041 0.018 0.065∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.029) (0.027) (0.035) (0.026) (0.026) (0.035) (0.027) (0.025)
Married 0.024 0.066∗∗ 0.055∗∗ 0.034 0.031 0.036 0.021 0.041∗∗ 0.038∗
(0.040) (0.027) (0.024) (0.037) (0.030) (0.030) (0.038) (0.020) (0.020)
Kinh people 0.088 0.080∗∗ 0.093∗∗∗ 0.082 0.078∗ 0.072∗ 0.083 0.064∗ 0.075∗∗
(0.055) (0.034) (0.031) (0.055) (0.043) (0.042) (0.059) (0.036) (0.038)
HH nucleus size −0.002 −0.000 0.001 −0.002 0.000 0.001 −0.003 −0.001 −0.002
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Farmer 0.025 −0.008 −0.003 0.027 0.008 0.004 0.025 0.015 0.017
(0.025) (0.017) (0.016) (0.023) (0.017) (0.016) (0.023) (0.012) (0.011)
Government officials −0.058 −0.070∗∗∗−0.067∗∗∗−0.056 −0.083∗∗∗−0.078∗∗∗−0.054 −0.068∗∗ −0.074∗∗∗
and businessmen (0.035) (0.024) (0.024) (0.034) (0.024) (0.022) (0.035) (0.027) (0.028)
Library availability −0.016 −0.033∗∗∗−0.031∗∗∗−0.068∗ −0.098∗∗∗−0.095∗∗∗−0.050 −0.062∗ −0.067∗∗
(0.035) (0.011) (0.010) (0.037) (0.023) (0.021) (0.043) (0.033) (0.031)
Nursery availability 0.025 0.011 −0.003 0.039∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 0.020 0.022∗ 0.021∗
(0.031) (0.026) (0.023) (0.019) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.012) (0.011)
Constant 0.000 0.000 0.001∗ 0.000 0.001 0.001∗ 0.000 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 12321 12321 12321 12321 12321 12321 12321 12321 12231
R-squared 0.021 0.006 0.005 0.015 0.014 0.014 0.017 0.016 0.016
Underidentification 0.001 0.000 0.068 0.063 0.040 0.022
Overidentification 0.238 0.259 0.409 0.503 0.476 0.608
Weak identification 6.606 6.914 9.562 9.296 7.063 7.010
Notes: robust standard errors, clustered at the district level, are given in parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5%
and 10% is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. Local financial development (FD) is measured by fd
(•)
it .
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3 Local financial development, corruption and firm
growth in Vietnam
Viet T. Tran, Yabibal M. Walle and Helmut Herwartz
Abstract. We examine the effects of province-level financial development and corruption
on the performance of Vietnamese firms in terms of the growth rates of sales, investment
and sales per worker. Employing a large firm level dataset of more than 40,000 firms
spanning the period 2009—2013 and applying a heteroscedasticity-based identification
strategy, we find that province-level financial development promotes firm growth while
corruption hinders it. Moreover, financial development and corruption control are
complementary to each other in their effects on firm growth. This suggests that while
improving financial development or reducing corruption at the province level increases
firm growth, the marginal effect of financial development is stronger when the level
of corruption is low, and vice versa. We also find evidence of the ‘too much finance’
effect after controlling for the level of corruption. Our results are robust to the use of
alternative measures of local financial development.
3.1 Introduction
The past three decades have witnessed extensive empirical research on the relationship
between financial development and economic growth. Most studies document that
financial development fosters economic growth (e.g., King and Levine, 1993; Rajan and
Zingales, 1998 and Levine et al., 2000). However, there are also studies reporting that
either causality runs from economic growth to financial development only (Ang and
McKibbin, 2007), or the link between financial development and economic growth is
weak and fragile (Andersen and Tarp, 2003). Similarly, Arcand et al. (2015) suggest
that an intermediate level of financial depth promotes economic growth but the effect
becomes negative if credit to the private sector exceeds 100% of GDP. Other studies
document that the finance-growth nexus depends on other economic and institutional
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factors such as the level of economic development, institutional quality, inflation, trade
openness and financial globalization (e.g., Law et al., 2013; Herwartz and Walle, 2014a).
One of the institutional factors that are considered to affect the finance-growth
relationship is corruption (Ahlin and Pang, 2008; Law et al., 2013). For instance, Law
et al. (2013) construct an index of institutional quality based on corruption, rule of
law and bureaucratic quality. Employing this index, they find that economies should
reach a certain threshold level of institutional development before the impact of finance
on growth becomes positive and significant. This evidence is also confirmed by Arcand
et al. (2015) and corroborates the view that corruption in the financial system may
redirect credit to unproductive or even wasteful projects (Ghirmay, 2004).
Unlike Law et al. (2013), Ahlin and Pang (2008) consider corruption as a factor
affecting the finance-growth nexus in its own right, and not just as a proxy for
institutional quality. They conjecture that financial development and corruption control
are substitutes in their roles in promoting economic growth. This substitutability arises
from the fact that corruption drives up the need for liquidity, thereby raising the
importance of financial development while a lower level of financial development makes
corruption more costly and hence increases the benefits from controlling corruption.
Estimating a cross-country growth model, Ahlin and Pang (2008) find empirical support
to their hypothesis that both financial development and corruption control have positive
impacts on growth, and these factors act as substitutes in affecting economic growth.
Examining Ahlin and Pang (2008)’s hypothesis at the micro level, Wang and You (2012)
document that a high level of corruption promotes the growth of Chinese firms, and
financial development and (high) corruption are substitutes. These results are in contrast
to the cross-country results documented in Ahlin and Pang (2008) but support those
of Law et al. (2013). Therefore, it remains unclear if the results in Wang and You
(2012) are specific to Chinese firms, or if they represent a general micro-level relationship
among corruption, financial development and firm growth in emerging economies or even
worldwide.
In this study, we examine the joint effects of province-level financial development and
corruption on firm growth in Vietnam. Three main reasons make Vietnam an interesting
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country for conducting such a micro-level study. First, Vietnam as an emerging economy
has exhibited rapid growth both in the real and financial sectors during the last three
decades. In the 2000s, the GDP per capita increased at an average rate of 6.4 percent a
year, which was among the fastest in the world (World Bank, 2016). Moreover, despite
the uncertainties in the global economy such as financial crises, Vietnam has kept growing
at a rate of more than 6 percent over the past decades and transformed itself from one
of the poorest economies to a lower middle-income economy. Similarly, the financial
sector has grown steadily since the government launched the renovation policy in the
1980s. Currently, the financial system is considered to be large for a lower middle-income
country with total assets of nearly 200 per cent of GDP at the end of 2011 (World Bank,
2014).10 Second, despite these achievements, the Vietnamese economy continues to be
challenged by widespread corruption in all levels of the administrative structure. For
instance, according to the Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index
for the period 2009–2013, Vietnam was ranked between 112nd (in 2011) and 123rd
(in 2012) out of 168 countries. The Vietnam Provincial Competitiveness Index (PCI)
from 2009 to 2013 documents that petty corruption has become less frequent but
macro corruption has worsened.11 Third, while existing empirical studies on Vietnamese
firms (e.g., O’Toole and Newman, 2017; Anwar and Nguyen, 2011; Rand and Tarp,
2012; Nguyen and Van Dijk, 2012) examine the finance-growth and corruption-growth
relationships separately, none of them has considered the joint impacts of these factors
10In the 1980s, Vietnam implemented a renovation period and made the transition from a centrally
planned economy to a market-oriented economy by launching the so-called Doi moi policy. This
renovation has led to major reforms in the economic and financial sectors. Together with the
establishment of state-owned commercial banks, the government allowed the operation of People’s
Credit Funds and foreign-owned banks. Moreover, Vietnam’s equity market has grown with the setting
up of the Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange (in 2000) and the Hanoi Stock Exchange (2005) as well as the
privatisation of many state-owned enterprises. These improvements are believed to have been crucial
for the rapid economic growth the country has been witnessing since the 1990s (World Bank, 2014).
11From the 7th plenum of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) in 1994, the General Secretary
repeatedly considers corruption as a threat to the survival of the regime (Nguyen, 2016). For decades, the
Vietnamese government has considered corruption as a national problem and the fight against corruption
has received increasing public attention. Following the issuance of a new law on corruption in 2005,
the National Anti-Corruption Committee was established in 2006 to monitor and handle corruption
issues. However, progress in fighting corruption has remained modest and by international standards
the state of corruption in Vietnam has not improved. Given the prevalence of corruption in Vietnam
and the modest achievements in fighting it, the CPV and the government have repeatedly expressed
their commitment to prevent and fight corruption at all levels of the administration.
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on firm growth.
We employ a large firm-level panel data from the Vietnam Enterprise Survey covering
more than 40,000 firms from 2009 to 2013. We measure financial development and
corruption at the province level. Our main empirical strategy to identify the causal
impacts of financial development and corruption on firm growth is the heteroscedasticity-
based identification of Lewbel (2012). We find that province-level financial development
has significant and positive effects on firm growth in terms of the growth rates of sales,
investment and sales per worker. On the contrary, corruption negatively affects firm
growth. Moreover, financial development and corruption control are complementary
in their effects on firm growth. This suggests that while improving either financial
development or corruption control at the province level could increase firm growth, the
marginal effect of financial development is stronger when the degree of corruption is low,
and vice versa. Our results also show that the effect of local financial development on
firm growth is non-linear even after controlling for the level of corruption, which could
be considered as a micro-level evidence in favor of the ‘too much finance’ hypothesis
suggested by Arcand et al. (2015).
To put our results in the context of existing literature, it is noteworthy, on the one
hand, that our results on the negative effect of corruption on firm growth are consistent
with other firm-level studies for Vietnam (e.g., Tromme, 2016) and the cross-country
evidence in Ahlin and Pang (2008) and Law et al. (2013). Yet, these results are contrary
to Wang and You (2012), which document a positive impact of corruption on firm growth
in China. On the other hand, our results on the complementarity between financial
development and corruption control do not support the hypothesis of Ahlin and Pang
(2008) and are rather in line with the macro-level evidence in Law et al. (2013) and the
firm-level evidence in Wang and You (2012).
In Section 3.2, we briefly review studies on the finance-growth relationship, on the
corruption-growth nexus and on the joint effect of financial development and corruption
on economic growth. We provide descriptive statistics of the data in Section 3.3, and
outline the estimation methodology in Section 3.4. In Section 3.5 we discuss the empirical
results and provide robustness checks. Section 3.6 concludes. Further discussions on
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methodology and robustness results are provided in Appendix 3.7.1 and 3.7.2.
3.2 Literature and hypotheses
In this section, we first briefly review the literature on the finance-growth nexus at the
macro and micro levels. Next, we provide a review of the literature on the relationship
between corruption control and economic growth. Subsequently, we review empirical
studies on the joint impact of financial development and corruption on economic growth.
We conclude this section by introducing three hypotheses that we will later subject to
empirical testing.
3.2.1 The finance-growth nexus
The literature on the finance-growth relationship dates back to Schumpeter (1911),
who emphasized that getting credit is an important prerequisite to becoming an
entrepreneur. Several economists, such as McKinnon (1973), Shaw (1973), and Levine
(2005), conjecture that financial development induces economic growth. They argue that
the financial system provides several crucial growth-promoting functions. For instance,
a developed financial sector mobilizes larger volumes of savings and more efficiently
identifies high-return projects. It also allows economic agents to diversify intertemporal
and cross-sectional risks. Furthermore, it facilitates the exchange of goods and services,
thereby reducing transaction costs. Improvements in the way these functions are provided
are expected to generate economic growth by raising the volume of financial resources
available for investment and, most importantly, by enhancing the efficiency of resource
allocation. However, there are some economists who argue that finance does not matter
to economic growth. According to these economists, the financial system responds to
the demand arising from the real sector, but not vice versa (Robinson, 1952). Some of
them even question the very existence of a meaningful relationship between financial and
economic development. For instance, Lucas (1988) argues, “the importance of financial
matters is very badly over-stressed.”
Empirically, most studies confirm that financial development fosters economic growth
(e.g., King and Levine, 1993; Rajan and Zingales, 1998 and Levine et al., 2000).
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However, studies such as Ang and McKibbin (2007) report that causality runs from
economic growth to financial development only. Some studies even document that the
link between financial development and economic growth is weak and fragile (Andersen
and Tarp, 2003). More recent empirical works focus on uncovering determinants of
the finance-growth relationhip. In particular, these studies document that the finance-
growth relationship depends on the level of economic development, institutional quality,
inflation, trade openness and financial globalization prevailing in an economy (e.g., Law
et al., 2013; Herwartz and Walle, 2014a and Herwartz and Walle, 2014b). Similarly,
Arcand et al. (2015) uncover a non-linear finance-growth relationship where the impact
of finance on growth could even be negative at very high levels of financial development.
Most of the aforementioned studies consider financial development at the country
level and investigate its relationship with economic growth using cross-country data.
However, relatively less attention has been given to investigating the effects of within-
country heterogeneity in financial development (e.g., at the province, district or commune
levels) on local economic development. Among the few extant studies, Guiso et al.
(2004) find that local financial development fosters firm growth in terms of increasing
competition, favoring entry of new firms and reducing the rate of exit of old firms in
Italy. Fafchamps and Schu¨ndeln (2013) explore the finance-growth relationship at a more
aggregated level and report a positive effect of commune-level financial development on
the performance of small and medium-sized firms in Morocco. Investigating the micro-
level finance-growth nexus in Vietnam, Tran et al. (2018) document positive effects
of local financial development (district-, sub-district- and village–level) on household’s
annual income, consumption and consumption smoothing.
3.2.2 The corruption–growth nexus
Corruption, which is defined as the sale by government officials of government property
for personal gain (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993), is one of the persistent characteristics of
human societies. Depending on their perspectives on the effect of corruption on economic
growth, economists are generally divided into ‘sanders’ and ‘greasers’. While ‘sanders’
argue that corruption (i.e., regulatory burden and delay) is a major obstacle to economic
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development, ‘greasers’ emphasize that corruption fosters economic growth by mitigating
distortions arising from inefficient institutions.
Among the ‘sanders’, Shleifer and Vishny (1993) illustrates that corruption impedes
economic development because it weakens central governments and creates economic
distortions. Based on a cross-country dataset, Mauro (1995) reports a negative impact
of corruption on economic growth. Similarly, using three worldwide firm-level surveys,
Kaufmann and Wei (1999) confirm that bribe payment and wasting time with
bureaucrats increase the cost of capital. Similar evidence is documented in Ehrlich and
Lui (1999) and Clarke (2011). While most of the above studies consider corruption at
the country level, a few studies have also examined the effects of paying bribes on firm
performance. For instance, Fisman and Svensson (2007) find that bribe payments reduces
firm growth in Uganda. Focusing on Vietnamese firms, Rand and Tarp (2012) find that
bribe payments have a negative impact on firm growth. Recently, the Journal of Crime,
Law, and Social Change published a Special Issue on the state and consequences of
corruption in Vietnam (Tromme, 2016). These papers document that corruption has a
generally adverse effect on economic growth in Vietnam.
However, there are other economists (‘greasers’) who believe that corruption fosters
economic growth. For instance, Leff (1964), Leys (1965) and Huntington (1968) suggest
that corruption may foster growth by alleviating the distortions of inefficient governance
institutions. Lui (1985) shows that paying for corruption may help to reduce the time cost
of delay. The ‘grease the wheels’ argument implies that an inefficient governance would
be a major obstacle to economic growth and corruption could help to overcome the delay.
Using a general equilibrium approach, Acemoglu and Verdier (1998) find that it may be
optimal to allow some level of corruption and lower levels of property rights, especially for
less developed economies. In support of this hypothesis, Wang and You (2012) document
that a high level of corruption promotes the growth of Chinese firms. However, Me´on
and Weill (2010) report that the effects of corruption on efficiency depend on the level of
effectiveness of institutions. For instance, corruption is less detrimental to efficiency in
countries with deficient institutional frameworks and could even be positively associated
with efficiency in countries with extremely ineffective institutions.
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3.2.3 Financial development, corruption and economic growth
While most of the aforementioned studies provide empirical evidence on the separate
effects of financial development and corruption on economic growth, they do not examine
the joint effects of these two factors on economic growth. As an exception, Ahlin
and Pang (2008) thoroughly examine the relationship among financial development,
corruption and growth. In particular, they conjecture that financial development and
corruption control are substitutes in their effects on firm growth. This substitutability
arises from the fact that corruption drives up the need for liquidity, thereby raising the
importance of financial development. Similarly, a lower level of financial development
makes corruption more costly and hence increases the benefits from controlling
corruption. To empirically test this hypothesis of substitutability between financial
development and corruption control, they introduce the interaction between financial
development and corruption in a standard growth model. In support of their hypothesis,
they find that while both financial development and corruption control have positive
impacts on growth, these factors act as substitutes in affecting economic growth.
To examine if the finance-growth nexus depends on the level of a country’s
institutional setup, Law et al. (2013) also investigate, albeit indirectly, the joint impact
of financial development and corruption on economic growth. The authors construct an
index of institutional quality based on corruption, rule of law and bureaucratic quality.
Employing this index, they find that the impact of finance on growth is nonexistent when
institutional quality is low. Instead, economies should reach a certain threshold level of
institutional development so that the impact of finance on growth becomes positive and
significant. This evidence is also confirmed by Arcand et al. (2015) and corroborates the
view that corruption in the financial system may draw credit away from viable projects
and redirect it to unproductive or even wasteful activities (Ghirmay, 2004).
Examining Ahlin and Pang (2008)’s hypothesis at the micro level, Wang and You
(2012) document that a high level of corruption promotes the growth of Chinese firms,
and that financial development and (high) corruption are substitutes. These results are
in sharp contrast to the cross-country results documented in Ahlin and Pang (2008).
However, it remains unclear if the results in Wang and You (2012) are specific to Chinese
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firms, or if they represent the firm-level corruption-firm growth relationship in emerging
economies or even worldwide.
Focusing on the channels through which corruption affects economic growth,
Mo (2001) provides evidence that corruption impacts negatively on non-performing
loans. Similarly, Kunieda et al. (2016) report that corruption has both a direct
negative impact on economic growth and an indirect negative impact on financial
development. In contrast to the results in Ahlin and Pang (2008), Batabyal and
Chowdhury (2015) find that higher rates of corruption crowded out the return to
financial development in 30 Commonwealth countries over the period 1995–2008. This
suggests the complementary effects of policies that simultaneously reduce corruption
and promote financial development. Namely, reducing corruption and simultaneously
promoting financial development have a bigger impact in reducing income inequality
than implementing one of these two policies. With respect to the reverse causality from
firm growth to corruption, Bai et al. (2017) find that firm growth reduces bribes as a share
of revenue in Vietnam. The effects are higher for mobile firms, which have transferable
land rights and operate in multiple provinces.
3.2.4 Hypotheses
Existing macro- and micro-level empirical studies that examine if financial development
and corruption are substitutes or complements in their impacts on economic growth have
documented inconclusive results. In this paper, we re-examine the issue using a large
firm-level dataset from Vietnam spanning the period 2009–2013. Based on the above
literature review and the fact that more than 90% of the firms in our dataset are small
firms, which are likely to be highly affected by financial constraints and corruption, we
make the following three hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Local financial development promotes firm growth in Vietnam. This
hypothesis is in line with most of the empirical literature on the role of local financial
development on economic growth (e.g., Fafchamps and Schu¨ndeln, 2013; Guiso et al.,
2004; Tran et al., 2018).
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Firms in provinces with a higher level of corruption grow slower than
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firms in low-corruption provinces. Given that several studies have reported a generally
negative impact of corruption on Vietnamese economic growth (e.g., Tromme, 2016), we
expect the same relationship to exist in our dataset.
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Financial development and corruption control are complementary in
their effects on firm growth. That is, in contrast to Ahlin and Pang (2008)’s hypothesis,
but consistent with the evidence in Law et al. (2013), we conjecture that the impact of
financial development on firm growth is likely to be stronger in provinces with a lower
level of corruption.
Remark : Although H3 is in line with the firm-level evidence for China (Wang and
You, 2012), it is noteworthy that the latter’s results are against H2. However, given
that existing studies for Vietnam have consistently documented a negative impact of
corruption on growth, we expect our results to be in line with both H2 and H3.
3.3 Data
In this section, we provide summary statistics for variables used in this study, including
the indicators for firm growth and province-level financial development, indices for
province-level corruption, and firm-and province-level characteristics.
Panel A of Table 3.1 provides information on the firm level characteristics. The
firm-level data are obtained from the Vietnam Enterprise Survey (VES), which is
a nationally representative annual survey conducted by the General Statistics Office
(GSO) of Vietnam. Firm growth is measured by annual growth rates of sales per
worker, investment and sales from 2010 to 2013. On average, sales per worker grows
at 19.3% annually while investment and sales grow at 20.6% and 17.9%, respectively.
12 To minimize risks of endogeneity, all of our explanatory variables are lagged by one
period, and hence are measured for the years 2009 to 2012. Annually, firms have average
sales per worker of more than 1 billion VND; a representative firm invests about 6.8
12It is noteworthy that the data are not deflated. Hence, with an an average annual inflation rate of about
8.4% for the period under consideration, real growth rates in sales per worker, investment and sales are
around 2.3%, 2.5% and 2.1%, respectively. As scaling both the dependent and explanatory variables
by the consumer price index leaves results reported in this paper largely unaffected, we proceed with
nominal variables following the empirical literature using the VES data (e.g., Nguyen and Van Dijk,
2012, O’Toole and Newman, 2017). Results using price-deflated variables are available upon request.
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billion VND and receives sales revenue of about 7.6 billion VND. On average, firms have
about 8 employees, which is consistent with the fact that more than 90% of Vietnamese
firms are micro and small enterprises. Moreover, firms possess average assets worth about
11 billion VND. About 33.8% of the firms are purely private owned, and hence are not
even partially owned by foreigners or the government.
Panel B of Table 3.1 documents province-level characteristics. On average, each
province has about 2.5 financial suppliers per 100,000 people or per 100 square kilometre.
The province with the largest number of financial suppliers per capita has about 12.7
financial suppliers per 100,000 people and the province with the highest density of
financial suppliers has about 43 financial suppliers per 100 square kilometre. We will
use the number of financial suppliers per capita as our main measure of local financial
development and the number of financial suppliers per square kilometre for robustness
checks. The average province-level population density is about 567 people per square
kilometre. Moreover, the average per capita income is about 29 million VND.
Panel C documents information about informal charges and corruption at the
province level. This information is obtained from the Province Competitive Index (PCI)
survey, which is conducted annually by the Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry
(VCCI) and the US Agency of International Development (USAID). This survey is
based on a representative sample of enterprises and ranks the provinces in terms of
the prevailing business environment. In the following, we describe the so-called low
informal charges index of the VCCI together with the four sub-indices which make up
the composite index.
Regularly paying informal charges (Sub1): This index measures the ratio of
enterprises that believe that other enterprises in their sector have paid for informal
costs. On average, 54.9% of enterprises confirm this fact, with the highest and lowest
rates per province being 77.5% and 26%, respectively. A province with a higher rate of
firms reporting others in the same sector pay informal charges is considered to have a
higher level of corruption.
Paying more than 10% of income for informal charges (Sub2): This index measures
how many percent of the firms pay more than 10% of their income for informal costs. On
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average about 7% of enterprises have paid more than 10% of their income for informal
costs, with province-level ratios ranging from 1.2% to 18.8%. This ratio is expected to
be highly correlated with corruption and is seen as a burden for firm growth.
Prevalence of harassment (Sub3): This index reports the percentage of firms stating
that government officials use compliance with local regulations to extract informal
payments from businesses like theirs. It is expected that the higher this ratio is, the
more serious is the problem of corruption at the local level. In fact, 45.9% of the firms
confirm that they experienced harassment from local authorities and this ratio differs
widely among provinces, with the minimum and maximum ratios being 18% and 73.1%.
Better services after paying informal charges (Sub4): This index provides information
related to the behaviour of local officials after receiving informal charges from firms. As
documented in Panel C of Table 3.1, more than 56% of the firms state that they get
better services from local authorities after paying for informal charges. Among provinces,
the lowest rate is about 24.8% while the highest rate is 81%. This underscores the fact
that, although corruption is a cost to firms, it could also be considered as a lubricant
in facilitating business activities (i.e., a kind of ‘speed money’, Mauro, 1995; or ‘grease
money’, Kaufmann and Wei, 1999.)
Informal charges (IC): In order to rank the provinces according to prevailing business
environment, the VCCI have combined the above four indicators and constructed the
so-called low informal charges index.13 The low informal charges index is given on a
scale from 1 to 10, with 1 and 10 representing the least and most favourable business
environments, respectively. However, as our interest lies in the level of corruption, and
not the business environment, we reverse the low informal charges index by subtracting
it from 11. As a result, our informal charges (IC) index takes on values from 1 to 10,
with the larger numbers representing a higher level of corruption. It can be seen in Panel
C of Table 3.1 that the average IC per province is 4.5, and individual indices range from
2.38 to 6.43.
13For more details, see http://eng.pcivietnam.org/.
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Panel A: Firm-level characteristics
Growth of sales per worker 143,683 0.193 1.448 -9.585 12.751
Investment growth 140,561 0.206 1.506 -11.777 13.197
Sales growth 143,724 0.179 1.433 -10.303 13.260
Sales per worker(a) 148,527 1.038 3.785 0 284.381
Investment(a) 154,031 6.810 24.620 0 906.078
Sales(a) 152,322 7.618 26.614 0 906.078
Labour 154,276 7.934 6.962 1 335
Asset(a) 154,269 10.926 41.020 0 3,714.134
Private 154,277 0.338 0.473 0 1
Panel B: Provincial characteristics
Number of FS per 1000 capita (FD1) 162 0.025 0.025 0.001 0.127
Number of FS per km2 (FD2) 162 0.025 0.061 0.000 0.429
Population density at province (1000 per km2) 164 0.567 0.624 0.082 3.656
Provincial per capita income(b) 164 29.292 38.616 9.329 327.194
Panel C: Provincial informal charges and corruption
indices
Regularly paying informal charges (Sub1) 164 0.549 0.115 0.260 0.775
Paying more than 10% of income for informal charges (Sub2) 164 0.070 0.034 0.012 0.188
Prevalence of harassment (Sub3) 164 0.459 0.128 0.180 0.731
Better services after paying informal charges (Sub4) 164 0.562 0.101 0.248 0.810
Informal charges (IC) 164 4.503 0.924 2.380 6.431
Notes: All growth rates are computed as differences in natural logarithms of annual sales, sales per worker and investment
for the years 2010 to 2013. The remaining firm level and province level characteristics are lagged values, i.e., measured from
2009 to 2012. The superscripts (a) and (b) indicate variables that are measured in billion and million VND, respectively.
Table 3.2: Correlation of corruption indices
IC Sub1 Sub2 Sub3 Sub4
IC 1
Sub1 0.819* 1
Sub2 0.492* 0.321* 1
Sub3 0.851* 0.792* 0.398* 1
Sub4 -0.089 0.242* 0.095 0.169 1
Note: (*) indicates significance at the 1% level.
3.4 Identification strategy
In order to identify the effects of local financial development, corruption and their
interaction on firm growth, we estimate the following model:
∆Yfi,t = α0 + α1FDi,t−1 + α2Corruptioni,t−1 + α3FDi,t−1 ∗ Corruptioni,t−1+
+α4FD
2
i,t−1 + α5Corruption2i,t−1 + α6Yfi,t−1 +Xfi,t−1β + fi,t,
(3.1)
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where ∆Yfi,t represents a measure of growth (growth of sales per worker, investment
and sales) of firm f at province i from year t − 1 to year t; FDi,t and Corruptioni,t
represent indices of province-level financial development and corruption, respectively.
Yfi,t−1 is included to account for effects of initial conditions. The vector Xfi,t−1 stacks
all other firm and local characteristics and fi,t is the error term. As an indicator of
corruption, we employ the informal charges (IC) index, which is directly related to the
level of corruption in the province and is used in previous studies (Nguyen and Van Dijk,
2012; Rand and Tarp, 2012).
Following Ahlin and Pang (2008), who use cross-country data to examine the
complementarity in the effects of financial development and corruption on growth,
we investigate the effects of province-level financial development, corruption and their
interaction on the growth of Vietnamese firms in terms of the growth rates of sales,
sales per worker and investment from 2009 to 2013. We hypothesize that local financial
development affects firm growth positively (H1: α1 is positive) while corruption affects
it negatively (H2: α2 is negative). Moreover, we expect that financial development and
corruption control are complementary in their effects on firm growth (H3: α3 is negative)
such that financial development shows stronger effect on firm growth in province with
lower level of corruption.
Following Ahlin and Pang (2008), we include the squares of local financial
development and corruption indices in our regression model to account for the possibility
that the interaction effect may be due to some kind of non-linearity in the effects of
financial development or corruption indices. Interestingly, this also allows examining the
‘too much finance’ hypothesis (Arcand et al., 2015), which conjectures that financial
development could have a negative effect on growth once it reaches a certain threshold
level (α4 is negative).
Studies on the impact of local financial development on firm growth may suffer from
endogeneity issues as firm growth may cause financial development at the local level.
At both macro and micro levels, potential reverse causality from economic development
to financial development has been considered as a serious challenge in investigating the
finance-growth nexus. Obviously, this problem is less serious at the micro level since
61
Chapter 3 Local financial development, corruption and firm growth
growth of individual firms—unlike local economic development—is less likely to affect
financial development at a regional level. Still, to address any potential endogeneity
problem, one may rely on the use of Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) based
estimators for dynamic panel data, which have been suggested by Arellano and Bond
(1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998). However, these methods are not appropriate for
our study as our panel spans only four years. Alternatively, a widely used method to
identify causal relationships is to use external instruments, which unfortunately requires
strong conditions that make it often difficult to find appropriate instruments in practice.
For instance, at the macro level, Levine et al. (2000) introduce institutional variables
such as legal origin as instruments for financial development and they have been widely
used in several studies thereafter. However, these instruments are not applicable for our
analysis as there are few institutional differences among Vietnamese provinces.
To deal with any potential endogeneity problem in estimating the model in
(3.1), we employ the identification method proposed by Lewbel (2012), which is
built upon an earlier work by Rigobon (2003). Lewbel (2012) suggests identification
by means of internal instruments without imposing any exclusion restriction. This
method exploits the correlation between heteroscedastic disturbances of the model and
exogenous variables to generate internal instruments. Hence, we instrument financial
development, its squared term and its interaction with corruption indices by means of
heteroscedasticity-based instruments. A brief description of this procedure is provided
in Appendix 3.7.1.
To apply this method on our panel data, we follow the procedure suggested by Baum
and Schaffer (2012), which involves eliminating firm-specific fixed effects by means of the
within transformation and applying the estimation method suggested by Lewbel (2012)
on this transformed data.14
3.5 Model diagnostics and empirical results
In this section, we provide empirical results on the effects of province-level financial
development, corruption and their interaction on firm growth. We first present model
14In this study, we use the Stata package ivreg2h (Baum and Schaffer, 2012).
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diagnostics, which highlight the suitability of our model and estimation strategy to
test our three hypotheses that financial development promotes firm growth (H1),
corruption hinders firm growth (H2), and financial development and corruption control
are complementary in their effects on firm growth (H3). Subsequently, we discuss
empirical results regarding our three hypotheses. Finally, we provide some robustness
results to show that our main findings remain unchanged if we employ alternative
measures of local financial development or corruption. Throughout, the discussion of
empirical results refers to the 5% nominal significance level.
3.5.1 Model diagnostics
Tables 3.3 and 3.4 document our baseline results obtained from estimating equation
(3.1) using informal charges (IC) as a measure of corruption. The heteroscedasticity-
based identification relies on the assumption that there exist correlations between the
exogeneous variables of the model and variances of residuals obtained by regressing
endogeneous variables on the exogeneous variables of the model. While it is not
straightforward to test if this assumption holds, standard tests of instrument validity
could indicate indirectly the suitability of our heteroscedasticity-based instruments.
Model diagnostics for tests of overidentification and weak identification are provided
in the bottom rows of both tables. The reported test results show that both the
overidentification and the weak identification tests support all the IV specifications.
Hence, the specification tests support the heteroscedasticity-based identification
strategy.
With respect to the control variables, results show significant and positive impacts of
labour and assets of a firm on the growth rates of investment, sales and sales per worker.
Moreover, the statistically significant and negative coefficients of the initial levels of
investment, sales and sales per worker are consistent with the literature which documents
that smaller firms grow faster than large firms (e.g., Evans, 1987; Hall, 1987). The
results also document that private firms have lower rates of growth in terms of sales per
worker but higher rates of investment growth when compared with firms owned by the
government or foreigners. This effect, however, lacks significance when firm growth is
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measured by the growth rates of sales.
Provincial per capita income has a positive impact on the growth rate of sales
per worker, but it has a negative impact on the growth rate of sales and an
insignificant impact on investment growth. While the negative impact of regional
economic development on the growth rate of total sales might reflect the degree of
competition in richer provinces, the positive impact on sales per worker might indicate
the increased efficiency due to enhanced competition.
In general, the model diagnostics support our estimation strategy and control
variables have expected effects on firm growth. In the following, we discuss if our results
support the hypotheses H1 to H3.
3.5.2 Effects of local financial development and informal charges on firm
growth
Table 3.3 shows the effects of province-level financial development, informal charges
and their interaction on the growth rate of sales per worker. Specifications (1), (2) and
(3) provide results obtained without controlling for the non-linear effects of financial
development and corruption while specifications (4) and (5) control for these impacts.
While all specifications report results obtained by using the heteroscedasticity-based IV
estimation, they differ in the variable which is assumed to be endogeneous: financial
development in (1) and (4), corruption in (2) and (5), and both financial development
and corruption in (3).
The results documented in Table 3.3 reveal that province-level financial development
has a positive impact on the growth rate of sales per worker in all specifications, which
is consistent with our first hypothesis (H1). This result is also in line with most of the
empirical literature on the role of local financial development on economic growth (e.g.,
Fafchamps and Schu¨ndeln, 2013; Guiso et al., 2004; Tran et al., 2018).
Paying for informal charges shows a significantly negative impact on the growth rate
of sales per worker in all the specifications. These IV-based results support the second
hypothesis (H2) and are in agreement with the literature on the effects of corruption on
economic growth in Vietnam (e.g., Tromme, 2016). However, our results are in contrast
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to the findings in Wang and You (2012), who document that a high level of corruption
promotes the growth of firms in China.
Table 3.3 also shows that—in line with (H3)—the interaction between financial
development and corruption (IC) has a significantly negative impact on the growth
rate of sales per worker in all the specifications. Hence, we conclude that province-level
financial development and corruption control (low corruption) are complementary in
promoting the growth rate of sales per worker. These results are in contrast to the cross-
country results in Ahlin and Pang (2008), but similar to the firm-level evidence in Wang
and You (2012). Our results are also in line with the macro-level evidence by Law et al.
(2013), who document that better institutions (of which lower corruption is one) increase
the growth-promoting role of financial development.
Results in specifications (4) and (5) of Table 3.3 show that the negative effect of
the interaction between local financial development and corruption on the growth of
sales per worker weakens in magnitude but remains statistically significant when non-
linearities in the impacts of financial development and corruption are taken into account.
The non-linear effects are also interesting in their own right. As shown in column (4)
the square of province-level financial development has a significantly negative impact on
the growth of sales per worker. This supports the findings in Arcand et al. (2015) that
the effect of financial development on economic growth could become negative once the
level of financial development reaches a certain threshold level. Results in column (5)
of Table 3.3 show that the level of corruption exerts a significantly negative non-linear
effect on firm growth. This implies that a unit change in the level of corruption has a
more pronounced negative effect on firm growth when the level of corruption is high.
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Table 3.3: The effects on growth rate of sales per worker
heteroscedasticity-based identification
Endogeneity Endogeneity and non-linearity
FD IC FD and IC FD IC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
FD1 0.337∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗ 0.344∗∗∗ 0.204∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.014) (0.019) (0.011) (0.010)
Informal charges (IC) −0.081∗∗∗ −0.058∗∗∗ −0.052∗∗∗ −0.084∗∗∗ −0.070∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.018) (0.014) (0.004) (0.008)
FD1*IC −0.202∗∗∗ −0.058∗∗∗ −0.096∗∗∗ −0.161∗∗∗ −0.139∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.017) (0.014) (0.010) (0.018)
Initial −1.039∗∗∗ −1.040∗∗∗ −1.040∗∗∗ −1.039∗∗∗ −1.039∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Labour 0.060∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Asset 0.002∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.001 0.003∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Private −0.035 −0.054∗∗∗ −0.057∗∗∗ −0.047∗∗∗ −0.044∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.020) (0.017) (0.010) (0.015)
Provincial per capita income 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Year2010 0.057∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗ 0.099∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.016) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011)
Year2011 −0.063∗∗∗ −0.023 −0.072∗∗∗ −0.052∗∗∗ −0.020∗
(0.014) (0.024) (0.014) (0.011) (0.012)
Year2012 −0.083∗∗∗ −0.024 −0.110∗∗∗ −0.053∗∗∗ −0.027∗∗
(0.015) (0.020) (0.010) (0.014) (0.012)
FD12 −0.029∗∗∗
(0.010)
IC2 −0.039∗∗∗
(0.006)
Constant −0.008∗∗∗ −0.000 −0.001 −0.005∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 135321 135321 135321 135321 135321
R-squared 0.577 0.578 0.577 0.578 0.578
Overidentification 0.149 0.071 0.116 0.235 0.325
Weak identification 80.475 68.141 84.407 367.925 128.992
Differentials in growth rates
IC at 25th, FD increases −0.428 −0.077 −0.030 −0.182 −0.407
IC at 75th, FD increases −0.661 −0.144 −0.141 −0.368 −0.568
Difference 0.234 0.067 0.111 0.186 0.161
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered at the province level, are given in parentheses. Significance at
the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent is indicated by ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗, respectively. The dependent variable
is annual growth rate of sales per worker and measured from 2010 to 2013. All explanatory variables are
measured from 2009 to 2012. ‘IC2’ and ‘FD12’ denote the squares of informal charges and province-level
financial development, respectively. The overidentification test is based on the Hansen J test with the null
hypothesis being all instruments are valid. Reported values for overidentification are p-values. For weak
identification, Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistics are reported. ‘FD increases’ in the bottom panel
refers to the change in the level of local financial development from the 25th to the 75th percentile.
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The bottom panel of Table 3.3 documents the differentials in growth rates that arise
if either local financial development or the corruption index changes from the 25th to the
75th percentile. Owing to the large negative interaction effects, the positive contribution
of financial development to firm growth is often offset by its role in exacerbating the
negative effect of corruption in firm growth. In general, consistent with H3, the effect of
increasing financial development has larger growth effects (or smaller negative effects)
when the level of corruption is low (at the 25th percentile) than when it is high (75th
percentile). For instance, in specification (3), increasing financial development from the
25th to the 75th percentile decreases the growth rate of sales per worker by 3.0 and 14.1
percentage points when province-level corruption is at the 75th and the 25th percentiles,
respectively, which yields a growth differential of 11.1 percentage points.15
Table 3.4 documents results on the effects of financial development and corruption
on the growth rates of total sales. In particular, province-level financial development
promotes the growth of sales in all but one of the specifications (supporting H1). On
the other hand, corruption (IC) shows a significantly negative impact on sales growth
(supporting H2). Moreover, we find that the interaction between province-level financial
development and corruption has a negative impact on the growth rate of sales. However,
this impact is not statistically significant when financial development is not treated as an
endogeneous variable (specifications (2) and (5)). Supporting H3, the negative coefficient
on the interaction term between financial development and corruption implies that the
two determinants have substitution effects on sales growth (i.e., financial development
and corruption control have complementary effects). Again, as in the case of sales
per worker (3.3), the interaction effect weakens when non-linearities in the impacts
of financial development and corruption are taken into account. Unlike the evidence
in Table 3.3, however, results in specification (4) and (5) of Table 3.4 show that the
non-linear impacts of local financial development and corruption on firm growth are not
statistically significant.
15Note that the same growth differential of 11.1 percentage points is obtained if we reverse the roles
of financial development and corruption, i.e., decrease the level of corruption while holding financial
development, first at the 75th and then at the 25th percentile.
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Table 3.4: The effects on growth rate of sales
heteroscedasticity-based identification
Endogeneity Endogeneity and non-linearity
FD IC FD and IC FD IC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
FD1 0.143∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗ 0.010
(0.023) (0.016) (0.025) (0.010) (0.008)
Informal charges (IC) −0.053∗∗∗ −0.032∗ −0.029∗ −0.052∗∗∗ −0.036∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.017) (0.015) (0.004) (0.006)
FD1*IC −0.129∗∗∗ −0.033 −0.047∗∗ −0.114∗∗∗ −0.009
(0.028) (0.022) (0.020) (0.017) (0.029)
Initial −0.978∗∗∗ −0.978∗∗∗ −0.977∗∗∗ −0.978∗∗∗ −0.975∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Labour 0.118∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Asset −0.001 0.002∗∗∗ 0.000 0.001 0.002∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Private 0.003 −0.001 0.002 0.003 −0.021
(0.020) (0.015) (0.014) (0.016) (0.015)
Provincial per capita income −0.001∗∗ −0.001 −0.001∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Year2010 0.143∗∗∗ 0.170∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗ 0.160∗∗∗ 0.170∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.016) (0.011) (0.007) (0.008)
Year2011 0.045∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.018) (0.012) (0.007) (0.009)
Year2012 −0.012 0.029∗∗ −0.012 0.005 0.030∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.010) (0.009)
FD12 −0.019
(0.012)
IC2 0.001
(0.005)
Constant −0.002 0.003∗∗ 0.003∗∗ −0.001 0.005∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Observations 135368 135368 135368 135368 135368
R-squared 0.543 0.543 0.543 0.543 0.543
Overidentification 0.094 0.269 0.159 0.222 0.397
Weak identification 117.231 59.017 51.187 564.794 110.739
Differentials in growth rates
IC at 25th, FD increases −0.341 −0.085 −0.028 −0.197 −0.024
IC at 75th, FD increases −0.490 −0.123 −0.083 −0.329 −0.034
Difference 0.149 0.038 0.054 0.132 0.010
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered at the province level, are given in parentheses. Significance at the
1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent is indicated by ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗, respectively. The dependent variables
are annual growth rates of investment and sales, which are measured from 2010 to 2013. ‘Initial’ denotes
the level of sales in the previous year. For further notes see Table 3.3.
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Table 3.5: The effects on growth rate of investment
heteroscedasticity-based identification
Endogeneity Endogeneity and non-linearity
FD IC FD and IC FD IC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
FD1 0.148∗∗∗ 0.028∗ 0.125∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.014
(0.021) (0.016) (0.024) (0.011) (0.010)
Informal charges (IC) −0.043∗∗∗ −0.026∗ −0.030∗∗ −0.048∗∗∗ −0.036∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.015) (0.013) (0.005) (0.006)
FD1*IC −0.152∗∗∗ −0.083∗∗∗ −0.072∗∗∗ −0.132∗∗∗ −0.074∗∗
(0.025) (0.021) (0.020) (0.018) (0.029)
Initial −0.986∗∗∗ −0.985∗∗∗ −0.985∗∗∗ −0.984∗∗∗ −0.982∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Labour 0.137∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Asset −0.000 0.003∗∗ 0.002∗ 0.001∗ 0.004∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Private 0.038∗ 0.030∗ 0.029 0.051∗∗∗ 0.025∗
(0.020) (0.018) (0.018) (0.014) (0.013)
Provincial per capita income −0.000 0.000 −0.000 −0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Year2010 0.075∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.017) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009)
Year2011 0.053∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.018) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
Year2012 0.139∗∗∗ 0.187∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗ 0.177∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.016) (0.010) (0.012) (0.009)
FD12 −0.048∗∗∗
(0.011)
IC2 −0.005
(0.005)
Constant −0.008∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ −0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Observations 132108 132108 132108 132108 132108
R-squared 0.523 0.524 0.523 0.524 0.524
Overidentification 0.109 0.144 0.131 0.154 0.280
Weak identification 109.542 58.417 53.774 585.939 126.983
Differentials in growth rates
IC at 25th, FD increases −0.421 −0.280 −0.148 −0.054 −0.260
IC at 75th, FD increases −0.597 −0.375 −0.231 −0.207 −0.345
Difference 0.176 0.096 0.083 0.153 0.086
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered at the province level, are given in parentheses. Significance at the
1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent is indicated by ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗, respectively. The dependent variables
are annual growth rates of investment and sales, which are measured from 2010 to 2013. ‘Initial’ denotes
the level of investment in the previous year. For further notes see Table 3.3.
Table 3.5 documents estimation results on the effects of financial development
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and corruption on investment growth. These results are qualitatively similar to those
in Tables 3.3 and 3.4. In particular, province-level financial development promotes
investment growth in all but one of the specifications (supporting H1) while corruption
(IC) shows a significantly negative impact on investment growth throughout the
specifications. Moreover, (supportingH3) the interaction between province-level financial
development and corruption has a significantly negative impact on investment growth.
However, as in Tables 3.3 and 3.4, the negative effect of the interaction between financial
development and corruption on investment growth—albeit being marginally weaker—
remains statistically significant even after accounting for the non-linear impacts of
financial development and corruption.
In sum, empirical evidence documented in Tables 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5 support our three
hypotheses. The results imply that either promoting province-level financial development
or reducing the prevalence of paying informal charges is associated with firm growth
in terms of the growth rates of investment, sales and sales per worker. Moreover, the
marginal impact of improving along one dimension (say, financial development) is bigger
when the other dimension (say, corruption control) is at a higher level.
3.5.3 An alternative measure of local financial development
To further check the robustness of our baseline results, which are obtained using
the number of financial suppliers per 1000 capita as an indicator of local financial
development, we alternatively measure province-level financial development by means
of the number of financial suppliers per square kilometre. These results are provided
in Appendix 3.7 and are qualitatively similar to our baseline results.16 In particular,
the results reveal that province-level financial development promotes firm growth while
corruption hinders it (H1, H2). Moreover, financial development and corruption control
are complementary to each other in their effects on firm growth (H3). These robustness
check results also confirm the non-linear effect of province-level financial development
on firm growth.
16Note that these two financial development indicators have a positive correlation coefficient of more
than 0.8, which is significant at the 1 percent level.
70
Chapter 3 Local financial development, corruption and firm growth
3.6 Conclusions
In this paper, we examined the effects of province-level financial development, corruption
and their interaction on firm growth in terms of the growth rates of sales per worker,
investment and sales. Employing a large firm level data of more than 40,000 firms
spanning the period 2009—2013 and applying a heteroscedasticity-based identification
strategy, we find that province-level financial development has a positive effect on firm
growth while corruption has a negative impact. Moreover, financial development and
corruption control are complementary to each other in their effects on firm growth. The
complementary effect shows that the marginal effect of financial development is stronger
when the level of corruption control is high, and vice versa. This result also implies
that firms in provinces with a higher level of financial development suffer more from the
difficulties posed by corruption than firms in provinces with a lower level of financial
development. This evidence is in line with the view that corruption in the financial
system may divert credit to unproductive or even wasteful projects (Ghirmay, 2004).
This study also provides a micro-level empirical support for the ‘too much finance’
hypothesis in Arcand et al. (2015). In particular, our results show that the effect of local
financial development on firm growth is non-linear even after controlling for the level of
corruption. This implies that the marginal effect of province-level financial development
on firm growth diminishes with increasing local financial development. With respect to
the non-linear effect of corruption on firm growth, our results imply that a unit change
in the level of corruption has a more pronounced negative effect on firm growth when
the level of corruption is high.
In our robustness checks, we find that our results remain qualitatively unchanged
and robust to measuring local financial development by means of the number of financial
suppliers per square kilometre instead of using the number of financial suppliers per 1000
capita.
One of the province-level factors that potentially affect firm growth is the level of
infrastructural development. Hence, in a future study, it is worthwhile examining if
province-level infrastructural development, financial development and corruption control
are substitutes in their roles in firm growth.
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3.7 Appendix for study 2
3.7.1 A brief description of heteroscedasticity-based identification strategy
To provide a brief description of the heteroscedasticity-based identification strategy
proposed by Lewbel (2012), we begin by re-writing our model of interest in (5.3) as
Y1 = Xβ1 + Y2γ1 + U, (3.2)
where Y1 is the dependent variable, vectors X and Y2 denote, respectively, the set of
endogeneous and exogeneous explanatory variables, and U is the error term. Assume
also that the endogeneous variable Y2 is given by
Y2 = Xβ2 + Y1γ2 + V. (3.3)
As usual, the structural error terms in models (3.2) and (3.3) are assumed to
be independent from each other and from the explanatory variables X. The
heteroscedasticity-based identification strategy, however, assumes additionally that there
exists heteroscedasticity in V (and hence Y2). Hence, while the usual assumptions are
Cov(X,U) = Cov(X, V ) = Cov(X,UV ) = 0,
heteroscedasticity-based identification additionally assumes that
Cov(X, V 2) 6= 0.
To perform a heteroscedasticity-based instrumental variable estimation of (3.2),
Lewbel (2012) suggests to instrument Y2 by [X−E(X)]Vˆ , where Vˆ denotes the residuals
obtained by estimating equation (3.3) excluding Y1 on the right-hand side. This is a
potentially valid instrument because [X −E(X)]Vˆ is exogeneous in (3.2) as it is already
assumed that Cov(X,UV ) = 0 and it is correlated with Y2 through V . It is worth noting
here that the condition Cov(X, V 2) 6= 0 need to hold only for a subset Z of the vector
X.
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3.7.2 Alternative measure of local financial development
Table B.1: The effects on growth rate of sales per worker
heteroscedasticity-based identification
Endogeneity Endogeneity and non-linearity
FD IC FD and IC FD IC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
FD2 0.362∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗ 0.222∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.008)
Informal charges (IC) −0.079∗∗∗ −0.068∗∗∗ −0.068∗∗∗ −0.082∗∗∗ −0.072∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.017) (0.017) (0.004) (0.008)
FD2*IC −0.187∗∗∗ −0.063∗∗∗ −0.063∗∗∗ −0.148∗∗∗ −0.140∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.015) (0.015) (0.010) (0.018)
Initial −1.039∗∗∗ −1.040∗∗∗ −1.040∗∗∗ −1.039∗∗∗ −1.039∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Labour 0.060∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Asset 0.002 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Private −0.036∗ −0.057∗∗∗ −0.057∗∗∗ −0.046∗∗∗ −0.045∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.010) (0.015)
Provincial per capita income 0.002∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Year2010 0.045∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗ 0.099∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.008) (0.011)
Year2011 −0.072∗∗∗ −0.034 −0.034 −0.058∗∗∗ −0.021∗
(0.013) (0.022) (0.022) (0.010) (0.011)
Year2012 −0.099∗∗∗ −0.030∗ −0.030∗ −0.065∗∗∗ −0.029∗∗
(0.015) (0.018) (0.018) (0.013) (0.012)
FD22 −0.009
(0.010)
IC2 −0.042∗∗∗
(0.006)
Constant −0.009∗∗∗ −0.001 −0.001 −0.006∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 135321 135321 135321 135321 135321
R-squared 0.577 0.578 0.578 0.578 0.578
Overidentification 0.147 0.064 0.064 0.239 0.318
Weak identification 87.312 87.363 87.363 413.110 106.836
Differentials in growth rates
IC at 25th, FD increases −0.649 −0.184 −0.184 −0.467 −0.773
IC at 75th, FD increases −1.052 −0.319 −0.319 −0.785 −1.075
Difference 0.403 0.136 0.136 0.319 0.301
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered at the province level, are given in parentheses. Significance at
the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent is indicated by ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗, respectively. The dependent variable
is annual growth rate of sales per worker and measured from 2010 to 2013. ‘FD increases’ in the bottom
panel refer to the change of level of province-level financial development (‘FD2’) from the 25th to the
75th percentile. For further notes see Table 3.3.
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Table B.2: The effects on growth rate of sales
heteroscedasticity-based identification
Endogeneity Endogeneity and non-linearity
FD IC FD and IC FD IC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
FD2 0.165∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗ 0.035∗∗ 0.092∗∗∗ 0.004
(0.024) (0.016) (0.016) (0.010) (0.008)
Informal charges (IC) −0.053∗∗∗ −0.038∗∗ −0.038∗∗ −0.051∗∗∗ −0.039∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.015) (0.015) (0.004) (0.006)
FD2*IC −0.129∗∗∗ −0.036∗ −0.036∗ −0.112∗∗∗ −0.015
(0.024) (0.019) (0.019) (0.016) (0.026)
Initial −0.978∗∗∗ −0.978∗∗∗ −0.978∗∗∗ −0.978∗∗∗ −0.975∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002)
Labour 0.118∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Asset −0.001 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.001 0.002∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Private 0.005 −0.001 −0.001 0.003 −0.020
(0.020) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Provincial per capita income −0.002∗∗∗ −0.001∗ −0.001∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Year2010 0.136∗∗∗ 0.168∗∗∗ 0.168∗∗∗ 0.159∗∗∗ 0.171∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.007) (0.008)
Year2011 0.040∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.017) (0.017) (0.008) (0.009)
Year2012 −0.021∗ 0.028∗∗ 0.028∗∗ 0.003 0.030∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.010) (0.009)
FD22 −0.012
(0.011)
IC2 −0.001
(0.006)
Constant −0.003∗ 0.003∗ 0.003∗ −0.002 0.005∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Observations 135368 135368 135368 135368 135368
R-squared 0.543 0.543 0.543 0.543 0.543
Overidentification 0.117 0.227 0.227 0.242 0.367
Weak identification 110.951 79.596 79.596 552.701 98.353
Differentials in growth rates
IC at 25th, FD increases −0.596 −0.186 −0.186 −0.394 −0.096
IC at 75th, FD increases −0.874 −0.263 −0.263 −0.635 −0.128
Difference 0.278 0.077 0.077 0.241 0.032
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered at the province level, are given in parentheses. Significance at
the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent is indicated by ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗, respectively. The dependent variable
is annual growth rate of sales and measured from 2010 to 2013. ‘FD increases’ in the bottom panel refer
to the change of level of province-level financial development (‘FD2’) from the 25th to the 75th percentile.
For further notes see Table 3.4.
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Table B.3: The effects on growth rate of investment
heteroscedasticity-based identification
Endogeneity Endogeneity and non-linearity
FD IC FD and IC FD IC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
FD2 0.163∗∗∗ 0.028∗ 0.028∗ 0.080∗∗∗ 0.011
(0.022) (0.016) (0.016) (0.011) (0.009)
Informal charges (IC) −0.043∗∗∗ −0.032∗∗ −0.032∗∗ −0.050∗∗∗ −0.037∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.012) (0.012) (0.005) (0.005)
FD2*IC −0.150∗∗∗ −0.082∗∗∗ −0.082∗∗∗ −0.137∗∗∗ −0.073∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.028)
Initial −0.986∗∗∗ −0.985∗∗∗ −0.985∗∗∗ −0.985∗∗∗ −0.982∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Labour 0.137∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002)
Asset −0.000 0.003∗∗ 0.003∗∗ 0.001∗ 0.003∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Private 0.037∗ 0.031∗ 0.031∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗
(0.020) (0.018) (0.018) (0.014) (0.013)
Provincial per capita income −0.000 0.000 0.000 −0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Year2010 0.071∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.017) (0.017) (0.008) (0.009)
Year2011 0.049∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.017) (0.017) (0.008) (0.009)
Year2012 0.131∗∗∗ 0.184∗∗∗ 0.184∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗ 0.176∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.016) (0.016) (0.012) (0.010)
FD22 −0.037∗∗∗
(0.011)
IC2 −0.006
(0.006)
Constant −0.009∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ −0.006∗∗∗ −0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Observations 132108 132108 132108 132108 132108
R-squared 0.523 0.524 0.524 0.524 0.524
Overidentification 0.093 0.130 0.130 0.151 0.256
Weak identification 108.446 80.221 80.221 493.703 105.763
Differentials in growth rates
IC at 25th, FD increases −0.744 −0.514 −0.514 −0.141 −0.482
IC at 75th, FD increases −1.067 −0.690 −0.690 −0.436 −0.639
Difference 0.323 0.177 0.177 0.295 0.157
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered at the province level, are given in parentheses. Significance
at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent is indicated by ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗, respectively. The dependent
variable is annual growth rate of investment and measured from 2010 to 2013. ‘FD increases’ in the
bottom panel refer to the change of level of province-level financial development (‘FD2’) from the 25th
to the 75th percentile. For further notes see Table 3.5.
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4 Does local financial development matter for the
gender gap in promoting firm growth in Vietnam?
Viet Tuan Tran
Abstract. Whether local financial development could reduce the constraints for women
to promote economic growth is an important question that has received little attention.
In this paper, we use data of more than 40,000 firms collected in Vietnam from 2009
to 2013 to examine the effects of local financial development, male ownership and the
joint effects of these factors on firm growth. To address endogeneity issues which might
arise by the causality from firm growth to local financial development, we employ a
heteroscedasticity-based identification strategy. The results show that local financial
development promotes firm growth in terms of the growth rates of sales, investment,
return on assets (ROA), and return on equity (ROE). The results also document
that male-owned firms perform better than female-owned firms in terms of the growth
rates of sales, investment, ROA, and ROE. Moreover, the joint effect of local financial
development and male ownership is significantly negative through all specifications. This
implies that local financial development could help reduce the gender gap in promoting
firm growth.
4.1 Introduction
As one of the most debated and still growing literature in economics, the relationship
between financial development and economic growth has been studied at both macro
and micro levels. Most studies show that financial development facilitates economic
growth (e.g., King and Levine, 1993; Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Levine et al., 2000).
On the contrary, a sizable number of studies document that the causality from financial
development to economic growth is weak and fragile (Andersen and Tarp, 2003), or
the resultant financial development stems from economic growth (Ang and McKibbin,
2007). In addition, Arcand et al. (2015) find that if the ratio of credit to private
sector over the Gross Domestic Products (GDP) reaches a certain high level (80% of
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GDP), the effect of financial development on economic growth becomes negative. This
finding implies that ‘too much finance’ may hinder economic growth. Accounting for
other potential determinants, a number of studies show that the finance-growth nexus
depends on various factors such as institutional quality, level of economic development,
trade openness and financial globalization (e.g., Ahlin and Pang, 2008; Law et al., 2013;
Herwartz and Walle, 2014a).
One important dimension in the finance-growth debate, which has received less
attention so far at both the macro and micro levels, is the gender difference in taking
advantage of financial development. In particular, existing studies often show that lack
of access to finance hinders entrepreneurship and impedes women from participating
in the market economy. A cross-country study by Muravyev et al. (2009) documents
that female-managed firms are less likely to get credit from formal financial suppliers or
have to pay a higher interest rate than their male-managed counterparts. Moreover,
Richardson et al. (2004) show that female-owned enterprises in Sub-Saharan Africa
tend to rely more on internal and informal financing than male entrepreneurs. This
implies higher financial constraints for women in accessing credit, especially in developing
countries. As documented in extensive and growing literature, finance plays an important
role in promoting firm growth, especially for small firms (Beck et al., 2005; Fafchamps
and Schu¨ndeln, 2013), and enhancing entry and performance of new firms (Guiso et al.,
2004; Klapper and Parker, 2010; Rajan and Zingales, 1998). However, to the best of our
knowledge, there is no study investigating whether local financial development matters
for the gender gap in promoting firm growth.
In this study, we analyse gender differences in exploiting the benefit of province-level
financial development to promote firm growth in Vietnam. Specifically, we use firm-
level panel data from Vietnamese Enterprise Survey (VES), which is a representative
survey conducted by the Vietnam General Statistics Office (VGSO) and covers more
than 40,000 firms spanning from 2009 to 2013. We first investigate the effect of local
financial development and male ownership on firm growth. Furthermore, we examine
whether female-owned firms could exploit the advance of local financial development
to reduce their constraints compared with male-owned firms in fostering firm growth.
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To measure firm growth, we consider two aspects including firm performance, which
is based on the growth rates of investment and sales, and firm productivity using the
growth rates of return on assets (ROA) and returns on equity (ROE). In addition, we
measure province-level financial development using the number of financial suppliers per
1000 people in each province and consider the number of financial suppliers per square
kilometer in each province as a robustness check.
Vietnam represents an appropriate case for study for four main reasons. First, as an
emerging economy, Vietnam has shown rapid growth rates in both the economic and
financial sectors. Keeping the growth rate of GDP at more than 6 percent over the
past three decades, Vietnam has transformed itself from one of the poorest economies
into a lower middle-income economy despite the uncertainties of the global economy
(World Bank, 2016). Similarly, the financial sector has exhibited steady growth since
implementing the renovation policy, which was launched in the 1980s. For a lower
middle-income country, the Vietnamese financial sector is considered to be large with the
share of total assets at the end of 2011 constituting about 200 percent of GDP (World
Bank, 2014). However, despite this fact, a number of small and medium-sized enterprises
(SMEs) are constrained by external finance, and access to finance is one of the most
difficult obstacles for firms (World Bank, 2014). Second, as reported by the World Bank
(2016), although gender inequality has been decreased in Vietnam, social discrimination
in gender is still present in society and in the economy. Therefore, the issue of financial
constraints with respect to gender still needs to be examined in the Vietnamese context.
Moreover, while extant studies on Vietnamese firms examine the relationship between
finance and growth (e.g., O’Toole and Newman, 2017; Anwar and Nguyen, 2011; Rand
and Tarp, 2012; Nguyen and Van Dijk, 2012), none of them has considered the joint
impacts of local financial development and entrepreneurs’ gender on firm growth. Finally,
our study is closely related to the recent study by Pham and Talavera (2018), which
does not find the evidence of discrimination between males and females by Vietnamese
financial suppliers and this finding is different from previous studies (e.g., Blanchflower
et al., 2003; Cavalluzzo and Cavalluzzo, 1998; Madill et al., 2006). While previous studies
on Vietnam focus separately on the effect of finance or gender on economic growth, our
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study provides further empirical evidence on the relationship between local financial
development, entrepreneurs’ gender and firm growth and additionally, examines the
joint effects of local financial development and entrepreneurs’ gender on firm growth
in Vietnam.
Employing the recently suggested methodology of identification through heterosceda-
sticity (Lewbel, 2012), our results are consistent with the use of different local financial
development indicators and the use of external instruments complementing the use
of heteroscedasticity-based instruments. Our results show that province-level financial
development has a positive impact on firm growth. In particular, province-level financial
development fosters the growth rates of investment, sales, ROA and ROE. Moreover,
while male-owned firms have more advantage in promoting firm growth, controlling for
the interaction between local financial development and male ownership, the results
document that female-owned firms are less constrained in enhancing firm growth by
exploiting the local financial development.
In Section 4.2, we briefly review the extant literature on the relationship between
financial development and growth, entrepreneurs’ gender and firm growth. We provide
the descriptive statistics of the data in Section 4.3. The methodology and model
specifications are provided in Section 4.4. In Section 4.5, we discuss the main results
and provide the robustness check by using an alternative measure of local financial
development. Section 4.6 concludes the main findings and provides policy implications.
4.2 Literature and hypotheses
In this section, we first provide a brief review of the literature on the relationship between
finance and growth at distinct levels: country-level financial development and economic
growth, within country heterogeneity on financial development and local economic
development. Next, we discuss the literature on the gender gap in access to finance and
in effects on firm performance. We conclude this section by introducing some studies
related to Vietnam and discuss the gap in the literature.
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4.2.1 The finance-growth nexus
A large number of studies have been carried out at both the micro and macro level on the
relationship between financial development and economic growth. At the macro level,
one of the earliest works is Goldsmith (1969), which documents a positive correlation
between finance and economic growth but does not show in which direction the effect
appears. Using data from countries after the Second World War, McKinnon (1973) finds
that faster economic growth is caused by better financial systems. Similarly, King and
Levine (1993) show a strong impact of finance on economic growth based on data covering
80 countries from 1960 to 1989. However, there might be concerns about the endogeneity
issue which may stem from the fact that economic growth causes financial development
and not vice versa (Robinson, 1952). Accounting for this issue, Levine et al. (2000)
and Levine (2005) use a wide range of instrumental variables and examine the effect of
financial development on economic growth using cross-country data from 1960 to 1995.
Their results show that financial development fosters economic growth.
Although most of the above-mentioned studies document an important role of
financial development in promoting economic development, there are still a number
of existing studies that provide different or opposite conclusions. Lucas (1988) and
Andersen and Tarp (2003) doubt the existence of a meaningful relationship between
financial development and economic growth. In addition, Robinson (1952) and Ang and
McKibbin (2007) even conclude that economic growth causes the development of finance
and not vice versa. Recently, Herwartz and Walle (2014a) report that the finance-growth
nexus could depend on the level of economic, institutional and financial development.
Moreover, Arcand et al. (2015) show that the effect of financial development on
economic growth depends on the level of financial development. Specifically, at an
intermediate level, financial development fosters economic growth; however, the effect
becomes negative if the level of financial development reaches a certain high level (e.g.,
the ratio of credit to the private sector reaches 80 to 100% of GDP).
There are also studies investigating the impact of country-level financial development
on the level of economic development at the micro level including regional, sector,
industry, firm and household levels. Using firm-level data covering 30 countries,
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Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Maksimovic (1996) show that the development of stock markets
and legal systems increases the growth rate of firms and the possibility for firms to get
external finance. Beck et al. (2000) document that financial-activity, which measures
financial development as a combination of bank indicators (private credit) and stock
market operation (total shares’ traded value), enhances long-term growth rates of firms
with demand for credit and industries with relatively high dependence on external
finance. Moreover, accounting for the financial, legal and corruption constraints on
the growth of firms, Beck et al. (2005) report that financial development reduces the
constraints on firms differently depending on their size. In particular, the smallest
firms benefit the most from financial development. Adeniyi et al. (2015) re-examine
the relationship between financial development and economic growth in Nigeria from
1960 to 2010 and find that the effect of finance on growth has some turning points. In
particular, financial development has a negative impact on growth, but it changes the
effect at a threshold level.
Accounting for the effect of external financial dependence in each sector, which could
affect the finance-growth nexus, Rajan and Zingales (1998) report that in economies
with better financial development, industries relying on external finance grow faster
than industries that do not rely on external finance. Revisiting the study of Rajan and
Zingales (1998), Fisman and Love (2007) argue that financial suppliers might finance
the sectors with better growth opportunities and therefore, instead of using external
financial dependence in each sector, they suggest the use of growth opportunities in
each sector to address this concern. Using the same data as in Rajan and Zingales
(1998), they report that in countries with higher financial development, sectors with
better growth opportunities grow faster than sectors with lower growth opportunities.
Moreover, accounting for the external financial dependence indicator, they suggest that
the effect of growth opportunities encompasses the effect of external finance dependence.
Compared with the cross-country and country levels, less attention has been paid
to the within country heterogeneity in financial development and its effect on economic
growth. To name a few, Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) show that the reform in the
banking branch at the intrastate level, which is associated with the change in bank
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lending quality, has a positive effect on per capita growth in the US. Examining the
relationship between regional financial development and performance of firms in Italy,
Guiso et al. (2004) find that regional financial development enhances firm performance
in terms of increasing firm growth rates, promoting competition and favoring the entry
of new firms. Based on a panel data on Vietnamese provinces spanning from 1997 to
2006, Anwar and Nguyen (2011) find evidence that provincial financial development,
which is measured as the ratio of credit to private sector over gross provincial products,
fosters economic growth at the province level. Exploiting an extensive firm-level survey in
Vietnam, O’Toole and Newman (2017) show that province-level financial development
mitigates the external financing constraints faced by firms and promotes investment
activity. Studying at a more aggregated level of financial development, Kendall (2012)
finds that district-level financial development, which is measured by the ratio of bank
credit to net domestic product in districts in India, has a positive impact on district-level
economic growth. Further extending the research of Fisman and Love (2007), Fafchamps
and Schu¨ndeln (2013) document that the availability of bank branches at the commune
level in Morocco promotes the growth rates of small and medium-sized firms that operate
in sectors with growth opportunities. Employing the method of identification through
heteroscedasticity, Tran et al. (2018) find that local financial development, which is
measured at three distinct levels (district, sub-district and village), has a positive impact
on Vietnamese household welfare including consumption, income, and consumption
smoothing.
4.2.2 Gender, credit access and economic growth
The gender gap in access to finance is one of the increasing concerns to policy makers,
especially in developing countries. It is often argued that women have less advantage
than men in access to finance, therefore impeding them from entrepreneurship. However,
still many studies show different conclusions. For instance, on the one hand, based on
a cross-country study, Muravyev et al. (2009) find that women have more constraints
in accessing finance from formal financial suppliers and have to pay higher interest
rate than men. Focusing on Sub-Saharan Africa, Richardson et al. (2004) show that
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female-owned enterprises are more likely to rely on internal or informal credit than
male-owned enterprises. On the other hand, Bruhn (2009) does not find a gender gap
in access to credit by enterprises in Latin America. Additionally, Aterido et al. (2011)
study on Sub-Saharan Africa and across the world and show evidence that firms owned
by females do not have worse access to credit than firms owned by males. Brown et al.
(2011) suggest that such controversial findings may depend on country-specific factors
such as institutional and market elements, which influence the credit demand and credit
rationing of firms.
A number of studies have explored the reasons behind the gender gap in access to
finance. While Buvinic and Berger (1990) argue that female-owned firms struggle more
with credit applications than male-owned firms, Lusardi and Tufano (2009) document
the lack of financial literacy among females. Moreover, Beck et al. (2011) find that the
difference in behaviour might be important and leads to a taste-based rather than a
statistical bias. Similarly, Cavalluzzo et al. (2002) find that observed gender gaps might
be the result of discrimination from the supply-side; for instance, financial suppliers
could treat applications from male and female-owned enterprises differently. On the other
hand, Drakos and Giannakopoulos (2011) document that gender gaps in credit access
may stem from the demand-side that could affect actual loan application preparation.
While showing the lack of difference in access to finance in Sub-Saharan Africa and the
world, Aterido et al. (2011) propose the reasons which might come from the fact that
female-owned firms have less proprietorship, more regulatory burden, smaller size, and
operated in sectors that are less reliant on external finance. Moreover, some studies also
argue that the reasons may come from a different measurement of credit constraints
(Hansen and Rand, 2014) and the definition of gender structure in firms (Presbitero
et al., 2014). Results from empirical studies on the gender gap in access to finance,
therefore, are not consistent and generalizable.
The relationship between financial development, entrepreneurs’ gender and economic
development has been paid very little attention to within empirical studies for Vietnam.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no study on the gender gap in taking advantage
of financial development to promote firm growth in Vietnam. To name a few related
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studies on this issue, Greig et al. (2006) implement a survey of about 500 larger
and formal women business owners in Vietnam. They find that while women business
owners confirm the sufficient level of capital for their demand, most of them indicate
the shortage of financial management skills. This survey also suggests that national
policymakers should set up special loan funds or guarantee schemes for small, women-
owned enterprises. Exploring the impact of governmental policies and socio-cultural
factors on female entrepreneurship in rural Vietnam, Nguyen et al. (2014) conclude that
women are constrained by financial limitations, educational opportunities, and societal
prejudices. Pham and Talavera (2018) examine the relationship among gender, social
capital, and access to finance of manufacturing firms in Vietnam. They do not find
evidence of discrimination in the formal lending market against female-owned firms.
In particular, female-owned firms have a higher possibility of access to finance and
paying lower interest rates than male-owned firms. Moreover, firms would benefit from
a relationship with government officials in terms of increasing the duration of loans.
However, these studies still do not account for the difference between firms owned by
males and females in exploiting the development of the financial sector at the local level.
Specifically, there appears to be a lack of evidence in empirical studies on whether local
financial development could help reduce women’s constraints in promoting firm growth.
4.3 Data
In this section, we briefly provide the discussion on data collection and then deliver
summary statistics for variables including the indicators to measure firm growth and
province-level financial development used in this study. We also summarize firm-and
province-level characteristics.
Data collection
The data sets used in this study originate from two different sources: Vietnamese
firm-level and province-level data. The firm-level data is annually surveyed by the VGSO
and includes more than 40,000 firms in the periods spanning from 2009 to 2013. The
data is collected from the survey on Vietnamese firms, which were selected based on
the number of employees. It included the population of firms with more than thirty
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employees and a representative sample of firms, which had less than thirty employees.
The data is collected annually in all 63 provinces and covers all sectors or industries of the
Vietnamese economy. The questionnaire was mailed out to firms and required to fill by
the finance manager or the equivalent of the firms depending on the size under the Law
on Statistics. The questionnaire captures all related information on firms’ balance sheets
and other firm characteristics. The province-level data is the combination of aggregated
data from the firm-level survey and provincial data from the VGSO. In Table 4.1, we
briefly provide the characteristics of firms and provinces in this study. Panels A and B
of Table 4.1 document firm-level and province-level characteristics, respectively.
Measuring firm growth
To measure firm growth, this study uses the annual nominal growth rates of
investment, sales, returns on assets (ROA), and returns on equity (ROE) from 2010 to
2013. These indicators characterize the output and productivity of firm performance and
are treated as dependent variables in this study. In the dataset, investment is measured
by the annual costs for manufacturing firms and sales are based on the total revenue the
firm received from providing all products and services. On average, the growth rates of
investment and sales are 20.2% and 17.4%, respectively. ROA and ROE indicators are,
respectively, measured by dividing total net income of the firm by the firm’s asset and
equity. These indicators are expected to show the effectiveness of the firm’s management
of asset and equity. The average annual growth rates of ROA and ROE are 12.8% and
-5.8%, respectively.
Explanatory variables
To minimize the possibility of endogeneity, this study uses explanatory variables from
2009 to 2012, which are lagged one period compared with the dependent variables. As
can be seen from panel A of Table 4.1, a firm invests an average of 6.6 billion Vietnamese
Dong (VND) for operations and gains about 7.5 billion VND from sales, on average.17
The average of ROA and ROE are 124.8% and 303.2%, respectively. Each firm also
has about eight employees and possesses assets worth of more than 10.5 billion VND,
17In 2009, one US dollar equaled to 17,065 Vietnamese Dong (World Bank, 2009). The average inflation
rate during the period 2009-2013 was about 8.4% according to the VGSO.
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on average. The rate of purely private ownership is more than 33.8%, which indicates
that 66.2% of firms are fully or partially owned by foreigners or the government. The
education index measures the education level of the firm owners, which ranges from one
to eight, where the higher number represents a higher level of education. The average
education level is about four, showing that most of the owners obtaining a vocational
certificate. Firm age is measured by using the number of years that a firm has operated
up to the current year. On average, firm age is about 4.4 years and ranges from 0 to 24,
which shows that most of the firms in Vietnam are new establishments.18 In addition,
there is about 71.8% of firms that are owned by males. More details of firm characteristics
by gender are provided in Table 4.2.
Measuring local financial development
Panel B of Table 4.1 provides information about province-level characteristics. On
average, per capita income at the province level is about 29 million VND, which is
in accordance with the fact that Vietnam is a lower-middle income economy. The
population density by province is about 567 people per square kilometre. Moreover,
local financial development is measured by using the number of credit suppliers per
capita (FD1) and per square kilometre (FD2). On average, there are more than two
financial suppliers per 100,000 people and per 100 square kilometres. The first indicator
(FD1) of financial development will be used as our baseline indicator, representing the
province-level financial development. The second indicator (FD2) is used as a robustness
check. The two indicators have a correlation of more than 0.81.
18We exclude the outliers of firm age at less than 0.05 percentile of the firm age distribution.
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Table 4.1: Summary statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Panel A: Firm-level characteristics
Investment annual growth 137926 0.202 1.501 -11.777 12.848
Sales annual growth 141022 0.174 1.427 -10.303 12.968
ROA annual growth 140935 0.123 1.829 -11.199 15.409
ROE annual growth 137284 0.128 1.815 -10.948 14.357
Investment(a) 136705 6.618 23.008 0 802.035
Sales(a) 134887 7.516 25.290 0 870.854
ROA 132780 1.248 3.105 0 99.321
ROE 128953 3.032 6.748 0 99.520
Labour 136861 8.148 7.106 1 335.000
Asset(a) 136861 10.577 39.560 0 3714.134
Private ownership 151336 0.338 0.473 0 1
Education 151335 4.041 1.882 1 8
Firm age 151336 4.378 3.459 0 24
Male 151335 0.718 0.450 0 1
Panel B: Provincial characteristics
Provincial per capita income (GDPP)(b) 164 29.292 38.616 9.329 327.194
Population density (1000 per km2) 164 0.567 0.624 0.082 3.656
Number of credit suppliers per 1000 capita (FD1) 162 0.025 0.025 0.001 0.127
Number of credit suppliers per km2 (FD2) 162 0.025 0.061 0.000 0.429
Notes: All growth rates are computed as differences in natural logarithms of annual sales, investment, ROA and ROE
for the years 2010 to 2013. The remaining firm level and province level characteristics are lagged values, i.e., measured
from 2009 to 2012. The superscripts (a) and (b) indicate that the variable is measured in billion and million VND,
respectively.
Table 4.2: Firm level characteristics by gender
Male ownership Female ownership
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Investment annual growth 98916 0.201 1.511 38958 0.205 1.474
Sales annual growth 101005 0.174 1.441 39965 0.175 1.390
ROA annual growth 100942 0.119 1.831 39941 0.135 1.824
ROE annual growth 98518 0.126 1.817 38714 0.133 1.808
Investment 98177 6.241 21.304 38528 7.579 26.843
Sales 96845 7.114 23.631 38042 8.540 29.064
ROA 95238 1.185 2.968 37490 1.408 3.423
ROE 92697 2.875 6.466 36204 3.437 7.409
Labour 98245 8.297 7.237 38557 7.770 6.751
Asset 98245 10.317 38.093 38557 11.247 43.093
Private ownership 108548 0.339 0.474 42727 0.335 0.472
Education 108548 3.990 1.837 42727 4.171 1.987
Firm age 108548 4.283 3.358 42727 4.622 3.695
Notes: All growth rates are computed as differences in natural logarithms of annual
sales, investment, ROA and ROE for the years 2010 to 2013. The remaining firm-level
characteristics are lagged values, i.e., measured from 2009 to 2012.
4.4 Model specification
Studies on the finance-growth nexus at both the macro and the micro level might
suffer from the potential reverse causality as economic development may cause financial
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development (e.g. Ang and McKibbin, 2007). Therefore, the problem of endogeneity
in the finance-growth nexus has been considered as a serious challenge. Obviously, the
problem of endogeneity is less serious at the micro level research since individual firm
growth is less likely to affect the development of the financial sector at a local level such
as the regional and provincial level. In order to address the endogeneity issue, the use
of standard instruments is widely suggested even though the appropriate instruments
are very difficult to find in practice due to strict conditions. Alternatively, Arellano and
Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998) proposed the use of Generalized Method of
Moments (GMM) for dynamic panel data, however, these methods are not suitable to
the nature of our data with limited time span.
To deal with endogeneity problems in estimating the model, we apply the
heteroscedasticity-based identification strategy (Lewbel, 2012), which is built based on a
previous work by Rigobon (2003). Lewbel (2012) suggests the use of internal instruments,
which are generated by exploiting the correlation between heteroscedastic disturbance
of the model and exogenous variables, without imposing any exclusion restriction.
We briefly provide the description of the heteroscedasticity-based identification
strategy by starting the simultaneous model as follows:
Y1 = Xα1 + Y2α2 +  (4.1)
Y2 = Xβ1 + Y1β2 + σ (4.2)
where Y1 is the response variable (for example, firm growth indicators), vector X
includes the set of exogenous explanatory variables, Y2 is the endogenous variable (e.g.,
local financial development indicator),  and σ are the error terms of each model.
As standard assumption, the structural error terms in model (4.1) and (4.2) are
assumed to be independent from each other and from the explanatory variables X.
Lewbel (2012) additionally assumes the model suffer from heteroscedasticity in σ (and
hence Y2). Therefore, we have the standard conditions
Cov(X, ) = Cov(X, σ) = Cov(X, σ) = 0 (4.3)
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and the heteroscedasticity in σ
Cov(X, σ2) 6= 0 (4.4)
To get the instrumental variable estimation of (4.1), Lewbel (2012) suggests to
instrument Y2 by using [X −E(X)]σˆ , where σˆ denotes the predicted residual obtained
from estimating the model (4.2) excluding Y1 on the right-hand side. This is a potential
valid instrument because [X − E(X)]σˆ is exogenous in (4.1) as it is already assumed
that Cov(X, σ) = 0 and it is correlated with Y2 through σ as in (4.2).
Applying the above strategy to identify the effects of local financial development,
male ownership and their interaction on firm performance, we estimate the following
model:
∆Yfit = α0 + α1FDi,t−1 + α2Malefi,t−1 + α3FDi,t−1 ∗Malefi,t−1+
+α4Yfi,t−1 +Xfi,t−1β + fit,
(4.5)
∆Yfit = ln(Yfit)− ln(Yfi,t−1) (4.6)
where Yfit represents firm performance including investment, sales, ROA and ROE of
firm f at province i in year t. ∆Yfit, which is calculated as in equation (4.6), represents a
measure of performance (e.g., annual growth rates of investment, sales, ROA and ROE)
of firm f at province i from year t−1 to year t. FDi,t−1 indicates province-level financial
development at province i in time t − 1. Malefi,t−1 denotes the male ownership of the
firm f at province i in time t − 1. The lagged dependent variable (in level) Yfi,t−1 is
included to control for the effects of initial conditions. The vector Xfi,t−1 stacks all other
firm and local characteristics at time t− 1 and fit is the error term.
Following the procedure suggested by Baum and Schaffer (2012) for panel data, we
use within transformation on our panel data to eliminate firm-specific fixed effects and
applying the method suggested by Lewbel (2012) on the transformed data. Moreover,
Lewbel (2012) suggest the use of external instruments to augment heteroscedasticity-
based instruments to improve the efficiency of estimation. In particular, while our main
identification strategy is based on the heteroscedasticity-based instruments, we also use
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population density at the province level as a standard instrument for province-level
financial development to complement heteroscedasticity-based instruments.
The model as in (4.5) is expected to show the effects of local financial development,
male ownership on firm performance and especially find the difference between firms
owned by males and females in exploiting the advantage of financial development at
the local level. In accordance with literature and previous studies, we expect that local
financial development fosters firm growth (α1 is expected to be positive), firms owned
by males would have more advantage than firms owned by females in enhancing firm
growth (α2 is expected to be positive). However, local financial development would help
female-owned firms reduce their constraints in promoting firm growth (α3 is expected
to be negative).
4.5 Empirical results
In this section, we provide the empirical results on the effects of province-level financial
development, male ownership and the joint effects of these indicators on firm growth.
We first examine the effects on firm growth including the growth rates of investment
and sales and then further investigate the effects on firm productivity or performance in
terms of the growth rates of ROA and ROE. Finally, we provide some robustness check
results using an alternative measure of province-level financial development to show the
consistency of our main findings.
4.5.1 The effects on the growth rates of investment and sales
Table 4.3 shows the results of examining the effects of local financial development,
male ownership, joint effects of local financial development and male ownership, and
other determinants on the growth rates of investment and sales. Employing the
heteroscedasticity-based identification, for each dependent variable, the results are
reported using heteroscedasticity-based instrument (hetero IV) and the augmented
heteroscedasticity-based instrument with external instruments (all IV). The model
diagnostics include the tests of underidentification, overidentification and weak
identification, which are provided in the last three rows of the table. The
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underidentification is based on Kleibergen and Paap (2006), which is an LM test with
the null hypothesis that the model is underidentified. The overidentification test is the
Hansen J test, which examines the null hypothesis that all instruments are invalid.
The reported statistics of underidentification and overidentification tests are p-values.
Finally, weak identification test is a Wald F test based on Kleibergen-Paap rk statistics
with the null hypothesis is that the instruments are weak or have low correlation with
the corresponding variables. As can be seen from the bottom rows of Table 4.3, the
model diagnostics support our estimation strategy.
With respect to the growth rate of investment, the results are provided in the first
four columns of Table 4.3. Specifications 1 and 2 provide the results obtained without
accounting for year dummies, which might be associated with any aggregate shock to
nominal investment growth such as inflation and policy, while specifications 3 and 4
account for this effect by using a full set of calendar year dummies from 2009 to 2012.
We use 2009 as the based year, and therefore it is omitted from our tables. While
specifications 1 and 3 use only heteroscedasticity-based instruments (hetero IV), the
specifications 2 and 4 complement heteroscedasticity-based instruments with external
instruments (all IV). Additionally, we use population density at the province level as
a standard instrument for the local financial development. This instrument has been
previously suggested in Kendall (2012) based on the fact that it might be easier to find a
credit supplier in more densely populated areas. Similar to previous studies on the effects
of local financial development on economic growth (e.g., Fafchamps and Schu¨ndeln, 2013;
Tran et al., 2018), our results show that province-level financial development fosters firm
growth in terms of the growth rate of investment. As shown in the first column, a 1%
increase in province-level financial development would lead to a 0.135% increase in the
growth rates of investment. The effect does not change much (0.118%) if we use the
external instrument complementing the heteroscedasticity-based instrument, which is
shown in specification 2. Although the effect of province-level financial development on
the growth rate of investment is still significantly positive, the magnitude is lower when
accounting for the effect of factors that change from year to year, especially price indices.
In particular, the effect of local financial development decreases to 0.082% and 0.034%
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Table 4.3: The growth rates of investment and sales
Investment Sales
Hetero IV all IV hetero IV all IV hetero IV all IV hetero IV all IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
FD1 0.135∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ 0.034∗ 0.441∗∗∗ 0.389∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗ 0.056∗∗
(0.011) (0.010) (0.025) (0.020) (0.012) (0.007) (0.034) (0.024)
Male 0.028∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.008 0.004 0.016∗∗∗ 0.007
(0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
FD1*Male −0.125∗∗ −0.110∗∗∗ −0.142∗∗∗ −0.120∗∗∗ −0.078∗∗ −0.055∗∗∗ −0.089∗∗∗ −0.075∗∗∗
(0.050) (0.027) (0.024) (0.019) (0.036) (0.015) (0.021) (0.016)
Initial −0.971∗∗∗ −0.970∗∗∗ −0.968∗∗∗ −0.969∗∗∗ −0.953∗∗∗ −0.953∗∗∗ −0.957∗∗∗ −0.957∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Labour 0.129∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Asset 0.008∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.000 −0.000 −0.009∗∗∗ −0.008∗∗∗ 0.002 0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Private ownership 0.011 0.015 0.004 0.007 −0.019 −0.013 −0.035∗∗ −0.019
(0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.018) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013)
GDPP −0.001 −0.001 0.000 0.001∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗ −0.005∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗ 0.000∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Education −0.003∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗ −0.002∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Firm age 0.048∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ −0.008 −0.001 0.021∗∗ 0.008∗∗
(0.014) (0.013) (0.009) (0.004) (0.023) (0.016) (0.009) (0.004)
Year2010 −0.009∗∗ −0.012∗∗∗ 0.010 0.013∗∗
(0.004) (0.003) (0.007) (0.006)
Year2011 0.033∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.159∗∗∗ 0.169∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005)
Year2012 −0.031∗∗∗ −0.031∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Constant 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.001 −0.001 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ −0.056∗∗∗ −0.059∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.003)
Observations 137782 137782 137782 137782 140874 140874 140874 140874
R-squared 0.550 0.550 0.550 0.551 0.571 0.571 0.573 0.573
Underidentification 0.025 0.033 0.069 0.112 0.059 0.023 0.070 0.114
Overidenfication 0.197 0.252 0.412 0.360 0.119 0.220 0.368 0.114
Weak identification 300.044 759.698 239.507 352.181 359.561 1143.550 257.441 362.473
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered at the province level, are given in parentheses. Significance at the
1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent is indicated by ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗, respectively. The dependent variables are
annual growth rates of sales and investment, which are measured from 2010 to 2013. All explanatory variables
are measured from 2009 to 2012. ‘FD12’ denotes the squares of province-level financial development. ‘Initial’
denotes the lag level value of dependent variable. The underidentification test is an LM test, which is based on
Kleibergen and Paap (2006) rk LM statistics with the null hypothesis that the model is underidentified. The
overidentification test is based on the Hansen J test with the null hypothesis being all instruments are valid.
Reported number of overidentification is p-values. For weak identification, Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistics
is reported.
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in specifications 3 and 4, respectively.
Male ownership shows significantly positive effects on the growth rate of investment
through all specifications. This implies that firms owned by males are more likely to have
a higher annual growth of investment than firms owned by females, about 2.5% to 3.1%.
More interestingly, the interaction term between province-level financial development
and male ownership is significantly negative through all specifications and it is not
affected by including the effects of year dummies. This implies that female owners are less
constrained in promoting firm growth if they operate in provinces with higher financial
development.
Regarding the other explanatory variables, the lagged value (initial) of investment
has significant and negative effects on the growth rate of investment through all
specifications. This is in accordance with the literature that proposes that the bigger
firms would obtain lower growth rates than smaller firms or the higher initial values
would hinder firms from obtaining high growth rates (e.g., Almus and Nerlinger, 1999;
Evans, 1987; Hall, 1987; Wagner, 1995; Yang and Huang, 2005). Results also show that
labour, assets (in specifications 1 and 2) and firm age have significant and positive
impacts on the growth rate of investment. However, the education level of the owners
does not matter for the growth rate of investment. This might be the case for developing
countries as suggested in the study of Alvarez and Crespi (2003), which finds that higher
education does not increase efficiency19. Moreover, it might be due to the fact that most
of the Vietnamese firms are new establishments with an average of about four years in
operation and therefore they are more likely owned by young people who are supposed to
have higher levels of education. However, it would be reasonable that the young people
are less likely to have higher investment for reasons such as limited business networks
and lack experience in finding financial support. The effect of provincial income lacks
significance except in specification 4; however the magnitude is very small.
The results for the effects on the growth rate of sales are qualitatively similar as shown
in the specifications from 5 to 8. While the effects of province-level financial development
are significantly positive through all specifications, the effect of male ownership is still
19For more details of discussion on this, see Nichter and Goldmark (2009)
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positive but lacks significance in specifications 5, 6 and 8. Consistent with the previous
findings on the growth rate of investment, the joint effect of province-level financial
development and male ownership is significantly negative. This implies that female-
owned firms could exploit the local financial development to reduce their constraints
in promoting sales growth. The effect is unchanged when adding the year dummies as
shown in specifications 7 and 8.
While the effects of the other explanatory variables on the growth rate of sales are
similar to the effects on the growth rate of investment, assets and provincial income have
opposite effects on the growth rate of sales. In particular, the level of assets negatively
affects the growth rates of sales even though the magnitude is very small. This might be
due to the fact that the larger firms would have lower growth rates, which is similar to
the effect of the initial value as discussed above (e.g., Almus and Nerlinger, 1999; Evans,
1987; Wagner, 1995; Yang and Huang, 2005). Moreover, in provinces with a higher level
of provincial per capita income, it would attract more firms to operate in the area and
hence increasing the competition among firms and eventually resulting in lower sales
growth.
4.5.2 The effects on firm productivity growth
As alternative measurements of firm performance, we consider firm productivities in
using their resources including assets and equity. Accordingly, Table 4.4 provides the
results on the effects of local financial development, male ownership, the joint effects of
local financial development and male ownership, and other determinants on the growth
rates of ROA and ROE. As expected, province-level financial development fosters the
growth rates of ROA and ROE. Similar to the previous findings for the growth rates of
investment and sales, the effect of local financial development is qualitatively unchanged
when we account for the effects of year dummies. Moreover, the positive effect of male
ownership on the growth rates of ROA and ROE suggests that male owners are more
capable than female owners with respect to assets and equity management. However,
the negative impact of the interaction term between local financial development and
male ownership shows a consistent story: female-owned firms are less constrained in
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promoting their firm performance when they operate in provinces with a better local
financial system.
Regarding the other explanatory variables, while lagged values of dependent variables
(initial condition) confirm the negative impact on the growth rates of ROA and ROE,
the effect of labour is now negative compared to the effect on growth rates of sales and
investment. This suggests that the more workers firms employ, the more they have to
pay for labour and the less available funds they invest in improving assets and equity.
As a result, that could reduce the productivity of using assets and equity. In addition,
the positive effect of assets on the growth rate of ROA and ROE also confirms that the
more they invest in assets, the more returns they get from it. Similar to the level of
owner’s education, it is obvious that a firm owner with a higher level of education will
be more capable of managing assets and equity resulting in higher growth rates of ROA
and ROE.
Similar to previous results, private ownership mostly shows an insignificant effect on
firm performance. However, the significance in specifications 3, 4 and 8 show that firms
owned by the government or foreigners perform better than private firms in terms of
growth rates of ROA and ROE. However, the province-level per capita income shows
mixed effects on the growth rates of ROA and ROE when we control for the effects of
year dummies. The positive effects obtained in specifications 3, 4, 7 and 8 show that
in provinces with better infrastructure (in accordance with higher per capita income),
firms are more likely to be productive.
Moreover, firm age has a significantly negative effect on the growth rates of ROA and
ROE, which is opposite to its effects on growth rates of sales and investment. As firm age
represents the length of time since firms start their businesses, it would be reasonable
that younger firms would be more innovative not only in production technology but
also in the way of selling their products (Huergo and Jaumandreu, 2004; Rogers, 2004).
Taking advantage of technology development and marketing would help them to have
better opportunities than older firms to increase the growth rate of sales. In addition,
operating in a longer time, older firms would have a higher volume of output and reach
their maximum potential in selling products or exhausting their abilities of innovation
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and resources. These would reduce their growth rates and competitive advantage in
comparison with the newly established firms.
Table 4.4: The growth rates of return on asset and return on equity
Return on asset Return on equity
Hetero IV all IV hetero IV all IV hetero IV all IV hetero IV all IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
FD1 2.648∗∗∗ 2.488∗∗∗ 0.651∗∗∗ 0.556∗∗∗ 2.284∗∗∗ 2.062∗∗∗ 0.640∗∗∗ 0.489∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.029) (0.025) (0.024) (0.027) (0.024) (0.037) (0.033)
Male 0.044∗∗ 0.017 0.020∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗ 0.034∗ 0.017 0.013∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗
(0.020) (0.018) (0.003) (0.003) (0.018) (0.014) (0.003) (0.003)
FD1*Male −0.694∗∗∗ −0.387∗∗∗ −0.344∗∗∗ −0.264∗∗∗ −0.363∗∗∗ −0.201∗∗∗ −0.198∗∗∗ −0.153∗∗∗
(0.089) (0.064) (0.024) (0.008) (0.088) (0.041) (0.022) (0.008)
Initial −0.989∗∗∗ −0.988∗∗∗ −1.012∗∗∗ −1.011∗∗∗ −1.023∗∗∗ −1.020∗∗∗ −1.042∗∗∗ −1.041∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Labour −0.130∗∗∗ −0.130∗∗∗ −0.131∗∗∗ −0.131∗∗∗ −0.074∗∗∗ −0.081∗∗∗ −0.096∗∗∗ −0.095∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.009) (0.003) (0.002) (0.014) (0.013) (0.003) (0.002)
Asset 0.165∗∗∗ 0.170∗∗∗ 0.173∗∗∗ 0.173∗∗∗ 0.095∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Private ownership −0.011 −0.026 −0.072∗∗∗ −0.084∗∗∗ 0.022 0.015 −0.035 −0.040∗
(0.030) (0.025) (0.021) (0.020) (0.028) (0.025) (0.021) (0.020)
GDPP −0.014∗∗∗ −0.014∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ −0.015∗∗∗ −0.016∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001)
Education 0.009∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ −0.000 0.000 0.009∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.002∗ 0.002∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Firm age −0.336∗∗∗ −0.319∗∗∗ −0.235∗∗∗ −0.223∗∗∗ −0.252∗∗∗ −0.215∗∗∗ −0.189∗∗∗ −0.171∗∗∗
(0.058) (0.050) (0.009) (0.008) (0.052) (0.046) (0.008) (0.007)
Year2010 −0.162∗∗∗ −0.168∗∗∗ −0.132∗∗∗ −0.144∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
Year2011 0.671∗∗∗ 0.693∗∗∗ 0.535∗∗∗ 0.562∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.006) (0.011) (0.009)
Year2012 0.129∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
Constant 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ −0.173∗∗∗ −0.177∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000 −0.134∗∗∗ −0.137∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.002)
Observations 140751 140751 140751 140751 136816 136816 136816 136816
R-squared 0.627 0.630 0.662 0.662 0.615 0.618 0.641 0.641
Underidentification 0.037 0.023 0.135 0.138 0.022 0.019 0.145 0.134
Overidenfication 0.049 0.083 0.134 0.096 0.174 0.303 0.191 0.103
Weak identification 531.787 969.515 371.620 364.136 1110.058 1188.608 277.946 273.203
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered at the province level, are given in parentheses. Significance at the 1
percent, 5 percent and 10 percent is indicated by ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗, respectively. The dependent variables are annual
growth rate of ROA and ROE, which are measured from 2010 to 2013. All explanatory variables are measured
from 2009 to 2012. For more details see notes to Table 4.3
4.5.3 Robustness checks
To check for the robustness of our results, we use the number of financial suppliers
per square kilometre as an alternative measure for local financial development. Similar
to the baseline estimation, we apply the heteroscedasticity-based identification strategy
(Lewbel, 2012) and use external instruments to complement heteroscedasticity-based
instruments. We also take into account the effects of initial conditions, year dummies,
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and other determinants. Robustness check results are documented in Tables 4.5 and 4.6
and are qualitatively similar to our baseline results. In particular, the results show that
province-level financial development fosters firm growth in terms of the growth rates of
sales, investment, ROA and ROE. The results also confirm that while male-owned firms
are more capable than female-owned firms in enhancing firm growth, local financial
development could help reduce the gender gap in promoting firm growth.
Table 4.5: The growth rates of investment and sales
Investment Sales
Hetero IV all IV hetero IV all IV hetero IV all IV hetero IV all IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
FD2 0.124∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗ 0.018 0.427∗∗∗ 0.365∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗ 0.036
(0.010) (0.008) (0.028) (0.022) (0.012) (0.007) (0.035) (0.027)
Male 0.034∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.007 0.020∗∗∗ 0.007
(0.007) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
FD2*Male −0.148∗∗∗ −0.117∗∗∗ −0.155∗∗∗ −0.125∗∗∗ −0.114∗∗∗ −0.068∗∗∗ −0.098∗∗∗ −0.075∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.021) (0.020) (0.015) (0.035) (0.013) (0.017) (0.013)
Initial −0.971∗∗∗ −0.969∗∗∗ −0.968∗∗∗ −0.969∗∗∗ −0.953∗∗∗ −0.953∗∗∗ −0.957∗∗∗ −0.957∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Labour 0.129∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Asset 0.008∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.000 −0.000 −0.009∗∗∗ −0.008∗∗∗ 0.002 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Private ownership 0.009 0.012 0.004 0.007 −0.022 −0.015 −0.033∗∗ −0.020
(0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.017) (0.014) (0.015) (0.013)
GDPP −0.001 −0.002 0.000 0.001∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗ −0.005∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗ 0.000∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Education −0.003∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗ −0.002∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Firm age 0.049∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ −0.010 −0.001 0.021∗∗ 0.009∗
(0.014) (0.013) (0.009) (0.006) (0.025) (0.016) (0.010) (0.005)
Year2010 −0.009∗∗ −0.013∗∗∗ 0.011 0.011∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.006)
Year2011 0.034∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.160∗∗∗ 0.172∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006)
Year2012 −0.031∗∗∗ −0.031∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Constant 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000 −0.001 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ −0.057∗∗∗ −0.060∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.003)
Observations 137782 137782 137782 137782 140874 140874 140874 140874
R-squared 0.550 0.550 0.550 0.551 0.571 0.571 0.573 0.573
Underidentification 0.018 0.028 0.067 0.108 0.033 0.017 0.069 0.109
Overidenfication 0.194 0.261 0.429 0.367 0.113 0.222 0.326 0.109
Weak identification 231.723 461.467 215.795 302.505 234.341 572.860 247.032 340.020
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered at the province level, are given in parentheses. Significance at the 1
percent, 5 percent and 10 percent is indicated by ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗, respectively. ‘FD2’ and ‘FD22’ denotes the level
and square of province-level financial development, respectively. For more details see notes to Table 4.3.
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Table 4.6: The growth rates of return on asset and return on equity
Return on asset Return on equity
Hetero IV all IV hetero IV all IV hetero IV all IV hetero IV all IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
FD2 2.599∗∗∗ 2.388∗∗∗ 0.656∗∗∗ 0.541∗∗∗ 2.244∗∗∗ 1.971∗∗∗ 0.642∗∗∗ 0.462∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.031) (0.026) (0.025) (0.029) (0.025) (0.039) (0.035)
Male 0.053∗∗ 0.021 0.022∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗ 0.017 0.016∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.017) (0.003) (0.003) (0.018) (0.013) (0.003) (0.003)
FD2*Male −0.638∗∗∗ −0.330∗∗∗ −0.324∗∗∗ −0.238∗∗∗ −0.328∗∗∗ −0.161∗∗∗ −0.195∗∗∗ −0.145∗∗∗
(0.087) (0.051) (0.023) (0.006) (0.081) (0.031) (0.019) (0.006)
Initial −0.990∗∗∗ −0.988∗∗∗ −1.012∗∗∗ −1.011∗∗∗ −1.023∗∗∗ −1.020∗∗∗ −1.042∗∗∗ −1.041∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Labour −0.127∗∗∗ −0.129∗∗∗ −0.132∗∗∗ −0.131∗∗∗ −0.072∗∗∗ −0.082∗∗∗ −0.097∗∗∗ −0.095∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.011) (0.003) (0.002) (0.014) (0.013) (0.003) (0.002)
Asset 0.164∗∗∗ 0.172∗∗∗ 0.173∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Private ownership −0.009 −0.025 −0.071∗∗∗ −0.080∗∗∗ 0.021 0.012 −0.036∗ −0.038∗
(0.030) (0.025) (0.021) (0.020) (0.029) (0.025) (0.022) (0.021)
GDPP −0.019∗∗∗ −0.017∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ −0.019∗∗∗ −0.019∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.004) (0.001) (0.000)
Education 0.009∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ −0.000 0.000 0.009∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.002 0.002∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Firm age −0.331∗∗∗ −0.317∗∗∗ −0.242∗∗∗ −0.226∗∗∗ −0.253∗∗∗ −0.213∗∗∗ −0.197∗∗∗ −0.175∗∗∗
(0.063) (0.052) (0.010) (0.009) (0.054) (0.047) (0.008) (0.007)
Year2010 −0.160∗∗∗ −0.168∗∗∗ −0.132∗∗∗ −0.147∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
Year2011 0.669∗∗∗ 0.693∗∗∗ 0.533∗∗∗ 0.564∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.007) (0.011) (0.009)
Year2012 0.129∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
Constant 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ −0.172∗∗∗ −0.177∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000 −0.134∗∗∗ −0.137∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.002)
Observations 140751 140751 140751 140751 136816 136816 136816 136816 D
R-squared 0.628 0.631 0.662 0.662 0.615 0.618 0.641 0.641
Underidentification 0.025 0.029 0.159 0.137 0.017 0.015 0.185 0.131
Overidenfication 0.056 0.086 0.116 0.096 0.156 0.275 0.176 0.108
Weak identification 310.614 515.359 346.461 317.926 661.131 570.196 230.329 243.058
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered at the province level, are given in parentheses. Significance at the 1
percent, 5 percent and 10 percent is indicated by ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗, respectively. For more details see notes to Table
4.4.
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4.6 Conclusions and policy implications
In this paper, we examine the gender gap in exploiting the local financial development
at the province level in promoting firm growth in Vietnam. The results are robust to
the use of different measures of province-level financial development and when applying
the recently suggested method of identification through heteroscedasticity. This study
contributes to the literature as, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to
clarify the difference between male-owned and female-owned firms in exploiting the level
of province-level financial development to promote firm growth.
Applying a heteroscedasticity-based identification strategy on large Vietnamese firm-
level data covering the period 2009-2013, our results reveal that: First, similar to previous
findings, province-level financial development significantly fosters firm growth in terms
of growth rates of sales, investment, ROA and ROE. Second, male-owned firms are
more capable than female-owned firms in terms of promoting the growth rates of sales,
investment, ROA and ROE. However, in terms of exploiting the growth-promoting role
of local financial development, the results imply that firms owned by females are less
constrained in promoting firm performance if they operate in provinces with higher
financial development. Our results are unchanged if we control for the effects of year
dummies and use the standard instruments to complement heteroscedasticity-based
instruments. Moreover, the results are qualitatively similar and robust to the use of
alternative measures of province-level financial development.
Our findings have several policy implications. We suggest that policy makers should
exploit the development of province-level finance such as facilitating the availability of
local financial suppliers. As a result, this would benefit firms in terms of increasing their
growth. Moreover, policy makers should create appropriate environments to encourage
the start-up or leadership of women in business. This would not only reduce the
discrimination between male and female in business and society but also foster economic
growth as taking advantage of women’s ability in exploiting the growth-promoting role
of local finance.
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5 Local financial development and firm growth:
Evidence from Vietnam
Viet T. Tran, Yabibal M. Walle and Helmut Herwartz
Abstract. This paper examines whether heterogeneities in financial development
among Vietnamese provinces matters for firm growth in Vietnam. Using a nationally
representative panel survey that covers about 41,000 firms for the period 2009—2013,
we estimate the causal impact of province-level financial development on firm growth by
accounting for sectoral differences in growth opportunities. We find that local financial
development promotes the growth rates of sales, investment and sales per worker of small
firms, and reduces the growth rate of wage per sales. Our results imply that, in sectors
with growth opportunities, firms operating in a financially developed locality grow faster
than firms located in provinces with a lower level of financial development. Moreover, the
difference in growth rates of firms operating in sectors with stronger growth opportunities
and firms in sectors with lower growth opportunities is larger if these firms are located
in localities with higher financial development.
5.1 Introduction
The impact of financial development on economic growth has been intensively discussed
in the past three decades. While a large body of empirical research suggests that financial
development is growth promoting (e.g., Goldsmith, 1969; King and Levine, 1993; Levine
et al., 2000), there are studies which show that either causality runs from economic
growth to financial development (e.g. Ang and McKibbin, 2007 ), or the link between
finance and growth is fragile (Andersen and Tarp, 2003). More recent studies document
that the finance-growth link depends on other economic and institutional factors (e.g.
Arestis and Demetriades, 1997; Herwartz and Walle, 2014a). Likewise, Arcand et al.
(2015) suggest that the impact of finance on growth could be negative if the ratio of
credit to the private sector to GDP exceeds a threshold of 80 to 100%.20
20For more details on the finance-growth debate, see Levine (2005) and Panizza (2014).
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While several studies have intensively investigated the impact of financial
development on economic growth in cross-country frameworks, recent contributions to
this literature have focused on examining the effects of local financial development on
sub-national economic development. Extant studies have generally shown that local
financial development matters for local economic growth. For instance, Guiso et al.
(2004) report a positive impact of region-level financial development on firm growth in
Italy. Kendall (2012) finds a positive effect of district-level banking sector development
on regional economic growth in India. Likewise, Gloede and Rungruxsirivorn (2013)
and Tran et al. (2018) document that local financial development promotes household
welfare in Thailand and Vietnam, respectively. At a more disaggregated level, Fafchamps
and Schu¨ndeln (2013) find a positive impact of commune-level financial development on
the performance of small and medium-sized firms in Morocco. Due to the peculiarities
of financial systems across countries, however, many more country-specific studies
are needed to generalise that local financial development is good for local economic
development in most, if not all, countries.
In this paper, we examine whether local (province-level) financial development
improves the growth of small firms in Vietnam. The study covers more than 41,000
Vietnamese firms for the period 2009-2013. The data are obtained from the Vietnamese
Enterprise Survey (VES), which is a representative firm level survey administered
annually by the General Statistics Office of Vietnam. We measure local financial
development by the number of financial suppliers per 1000 people in a given province.
As a robustness check, we also consider the number of financial suppliers per square
kilometre.
Our paper is related to the study by O’Toole and Newman (2017), who employ VES
data to examine if provincial financial development eases Vietnamese firms’ constraints
in accessing external finance. They report that financial development reduces external
financing constraints and therefore facilitates investment. While O’Toole and Newman
(2017) focus on showing the channel though which local financial development promotes
investment (i.e., by alleviating financial constraints), we examine the overall impact of
local financial development in firm growth in terms of sales, investment and productivity.
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The other difference between the present paper and that of O’Toole and Newman (2017)
is that while O’Toole and Newman (2017) drop firms with negative growth opportunities,
our approach fully accounts for sectoral differences in growth opportunities. Fisman
and Love (2007) have shown that, anticipating growth in sectors with better growth
opportunities, financial institutions extend more credit for firms in those sectors and
the high correlation between credit extended to those firms and their growth rates may
not reflect a causal impact of financial development on firm growth. Instead, it may
simply proxy the effect of other confounding factors that created growth opportunities
in those sectors. Hence, Fisman and Love (2007) suggest that studies examining the
impact of financial development on firm growth should control for sectoral differences
in growth opportunities. This methodological advance is introduced into the micro-level
finance-growth literature by Fafchamps and Schu¨ndeln (2013), who examine the impact
of commune-level financial development on the growth of small and medium-sized firms
in Morocco by accounting for sectoral differences in growth opportunities. Unlike O’Toole
and Newman (2017), but similar to Fafchamps and Schu¨ndeln (2013), the present study
estimates the causal impact of local financial development on firm growth in Vietnam
by explicitly accounting for growth opportunities of each sector and interacting it with
our local financial development indicator.
Our results show that province-level financial development has positive impacts
on the growth of small firms in Vietnam. In particular, while province-level financial
development promotes the growth rates of sales, sales per worker and investment,
it reduces the growth rates of wage per sales. As we have controlled for growth
opportunities, our results imply that small firms operating in a financially developed
locality grow faster than those firms in sectors with the same level of growth
opportunities but located in localities with a lower level of financial development.
Moreover, the difference in growth rates of firms operating in sectors with stronger
growth opportunities and firms in sectors with lower growth opportunities is larger if
these firms are located in localities with higher financial development.
In Section 5.2, we briefly review the literature on the finance-growth nexus and
provide a brief overview of the Vietnamese financial system. We outline the estimation
102
Chapter 5 Local financial development and firm growth
methodology in Section 5.3 and provide the descriptive statistics of the data in Section
5.4. The main results and robustness checks are discussed in Section 5.5. Section 5.6
concludes with the main findings. Robustness check results are provided in Appendix
5.7.
5.2 Literature review
In this section, we first provide a brief review of the literature on the impact of
country-level financial development on macro- and micro-level economic development.
Subsequently, we review empirical studies that examine the relationship between local
financial development and economic growth. As our focus is on Vietnam, we conclude
this section with an overview of the Vietnamese financial system.
5.2.1 Country-level financial development and economic growth
At the macro level, a large number of studies have examined the relationship between
financial development and economic growth. Although Goldsmith (1969) does not
explore the causal direction between finance and growth, he documents a positive
correlation between financial development and economic growth. Based on empirical
evidence from many countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Germany, Korea, Indonesia and
Taiwan after the Second World War), McKinnon (1973) concludes that better financial
systems contribute to faster economic growth. King and Levine (1993) examine the same
issue as Goldsmith (1969) with more careful control for other determinants of economic
development. Using data covering 80 countries from 1960 to 1989, they document a
strong impact of financial development on the growth rates of GDP per capita, physical
capital accumulation and efficiency.
Many studies use the ratio of credit to the private sector to GDP or the ratio of
credit to the private sector plus total value traded in stock market to GDP as a main
measure of financial development. Measuring financial development by means of total
share’s value traded in stock market, Levine and Zervos (1998) confirm that, in the long-
run, stock market liquidity enhances economic growth. Moreover, Levine et al. (2000)
exploit a range of instrumental variables approaches to address endogeneity issues in
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investigating the causal impact of finance on growth. Estimation results using data from
71 countries for the period 1960–1995 show that financial development fosters economic
growth.
Although most empirical studies report that financial development plays an
important role in improving economic growth, there are some studies which contradict
this conclusion. For instance, Ang and McKibbin (2007) document that economic growth
causes financial development and not vice versa. There are also some studies that
question the existence of a meaningful finance-growth nexus (e.g. Lucas, 1988; Andersen
and Tarp, 2003). Moreover, Herwartz and Walle (2014a) show that the finance-growth
nexus could depend on certain economic and institutional factors, such as the level of
economic and financial development. Similarly, a recent study by Arcand et al. (2015)
shows the positive effect of intermediate levels of financial development on economic
growth, but the impact becomes negative when the ratio of credit to the private sector
to GDP reaches a threshold level of 80–100%.
Studies have also examined the impact of country-level financial development on
micro (industry and firm) level economic development. For instance, Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt
and Maksimovic (1996) investigate the effect of country-level financial development on
firm growth using firm-level data from 30 countries. They report that access to stock
market and well-developed legal systems could increase the likelihood of firms to get
external fund and grow faster. Rajan and Zingales (1998) suggest a way of dealing with
the finance-growth causality by means of an indicator of external financial dependence.
They argue that industries that depend heavily on external finance should benefit
disproportionately more from higher financial development than industries that do not
rely on external finance. Using data from US industries to measure the need for external
finance in each industry, results based on a large sample of countries in the 1980’s show
that industries relying on external finance grow faster in economies with better financial
development.
Beck et al. (2000) investigate the effect of financial structure on economic
development at the firm, industry and country levels. Measuring financial development
by means of finance-activity, which is the combination of bank indicators (private credit)
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and stock market indicators (total shares’ value traded), they document that financial
development enhances long-term growth rates, promotes industries with relatively high
dependence on external finance and improves the performance of firms with demand
for credit. Moreover, exploring the effects of financial, legal and corruption problems
on growth of firms with different sizes, Beck et al. (2005) conclude that financial
development alleviates the firms’ constraints, with the smallest firms benefiting the most
from financial development.
To address the endogeneity between finance and growth more carefully, Fisman and
Love (2007) revisit the evidence in Rajan and Zingales (1998) by proposing the concept of
growth opportunities. They argue that, as financial institutions might direct more finance
to sectors with better growth opportunities, a strong correlation between finance and
growth might not indicate a causal impact of finance on growth. To address this concern,
they suggest controlling for growth opportunities, i.e., comparing firms with similar
growth opportunities but being located in countries with different levels of financial
development. Using the same data set as in Rajan and Zingales (1998), and employing
the growth rates of US sectors as a proxy for global growth opportunities, Fisman and
Love (2007) conclude that industries with better growth opportunities grow faster in
countries with well-developed financial systems. Moreover, they document that the effect
of growth opportunities encompasses the effect of external finance dependence, which
was used in Rajan and Zingales (1998).
5.2.2 Local financial development and economic growth
While most empirical studies in the finance-growth literature focus on cross-country
variations in financial development, a few works investigate the effect of within-
country heterogeneity in financial development on economic growth. Focusing on
regional heterogeneity in financial development, Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) study
the relationship between intrastate branch banking reform and per capita growth in
the US over the period 1970s and 1980s. They document that changes in the banking
system, especially bank lending quality, is responsible for faster economic growth. Guiso
et al. (2004) examine the relationship between regional financial development and firm
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performance in Italy. They find that local financial development enhances firm growth,
promotes competition and favours the entry of new firms. Similarly, Dehejia and Lleras-
Muney (2007) examine the effects of the state-level banking regulation and financial
development on the state-level economic growth in the US using data from 1900 to
1940. The results show that financial expansion, which is induced by bank branching,
fosters mechanization in agriculture and spurs growth in the manufacturing sector.
Using panel data on Vietnamese provinces over the period 1997 to 2006, Anwar
and Nguyen (2011) examine the impact of provincial financial development, which is
measured by the ratio of credit to the private sector to gross provincial products,
on provincial economic growth. They document that provincial financial development
accelerates economic growth at the province level. Similarly, O’Toole and Newman (2017)
exploit an extensive firm-level data set in Vietnam to investigate the role of provincial
financial development in reducing external financing constraints faced by firms. The
results show that provincial financial development mitigates the financing constraints of
firms and facilitates investment activity.
At the sub-province levels, Kendall (2012) examine the effects of banking sector
development and human capital at the district-level on economic growth in India. They
document that district-level financial development, which is measured by the percentage
of bank credit to net domestic product (NDP), positively affects economic growth at
the district level. Furthermore, banking depth has a non-linear effect on growth and
the effect is more than double if the ratio of bank credit/NDP in the district is below
the median. Similarly, Gloede and Rungruxsirivorn (2013) study the impact of district-
level financial development on household welfare in Thailand in 2007. They find that
local financial development has positive effects on productive investment, agricultural
revenue and household consumption. Tran et al. (2018) study the role of local financial
development in household welfare in Vietnam. Employing the recently suggested method
of identification through heteroscedasticity to address endogeneity concerns, they find
that district, sub-district and village level financial development has a positive impact
on household annual income, consumption and consumption smoothing.
Fafchamps and Schu¨ndeln (2013) consider the impact of commune-level financial
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development on firm performance in Morocco from 1998 to 2003. Their findings show
that, at the commune level, bank availability robustly enhances growth rates of small
and medium-sized firms in sectors with growth opportunities. Moreover, the availability
of bank branches at the commune level reduces the likelihood of firm exit, encourages
entry of new firms and promotes investments.
5.2.3 The Vietnamese financial sector
Prior to the commencement of the renovation period (1986), known as Doi Moi, the
Vietnamese government dominated the whole banking system in the centrally planned
economy. Established in 1951, the State Bank of Vietnam (SBV) acted as a single-
tier bank. The SBV provided almost all domestic banking services including issuing
money as a central bank and raising and lending funds as a commercial bank. The
state also controlled two specialized banks, namely, State Owned Commercial Banks
(SOCBs) including the Bank for Investment and Development of Vietnam (BIDV) and
the Bank of Foreign Trade of Vietnam (Vietcombank or VCB). Established in 1957,
the BIDV was in charge of providing long-term capital to the public expenditure and
infrastructure projects. The Vietcombank was founded in 1963 and was responsible for
financing foreign trade, managing financial exchange and supporting the State Owned
Enterprises (SOEs) (Tran et al., 2015).
In 1986, Vietnam initiated a renovation period, implementing major reforms in the
economy and the financial sector. Accordingly, the banking system was separated into
two: the central bank (SBV) and SOCBs. Moreover, the government established two
more SOCBs, namely, Vietnam Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (VBARD)
and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of Vietnam (formerly Incombank or CTG, now
Vietinbank). The reform policy also allowed private entities to borrow and raise funds
from the public, which led to the establishment of credit funds and credit cooperatives,
which is later renamed as People’s Credit Funds after the crisis in 1990 (Tran et al.,
2015).
Currently, the Vietnamese financial sector is large by lower middle-income economy
standards, with total assets amounting to 200% of GDP in 2011 (World Bank, 2014). The
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sector is still dominated by a large banking sector, with non-bank financial institutions
accounting for only 8% of financial institution assets. As of 2014, the banking sector
in Vietnam comprises five SOCBs, 33 joint stock commercial banks (JSCBs), five joint
venture banks and five wholly foreign-owned banks (Tran et al., 2015). The total asset
of the banking sector is 183% of GDP and accounts for 92% of financial institutions’
assets (World Bank, 2014). Among SOCBs, Agribank has the largest operating networks
with around 2,400 branches and units nationwide. Vietinbank, BIDV, and VCB have,
respectively, about 1123, 725 and 328 branches and units (Tran et al., 2015). Despite
subsequent reforms to liberalise the financial sector, there is still a large state presence
in the banking sector. The five SOCBs accounted for almost 40 percent of the banking
sector’s assets and 48 percent of deposits in 2011. The state has also shares in several of
JSCBs and owns large SOEs (World Bank, 2014).
As Figure 5.1 shows, Vietnam’s banking sector development as measured by the
percentage of domestic credit to the private sector, which is around 100%, is at a lower
than that of China, Malaysia and Thailand but better than that of Cambodia and
Laos. With slightly more than three bank branches per 100, 000 adults, however, access
to finance lags significantly behind regional levels, where, for instance, Malaysia and
Thailand have more than 10 bank branches per 100, 000 adults.
Vietnam has a small but growing equity market, with a capitalization rate of about
19% of GDP in 2011 (World Bank, 2014). The two stock exchanges, the Ho Chi Minh
Stock Exchange (HSX) and Hanoi Stock Exchange (HNX) are established in 2000 and
2005, respectively. They have more than 700 listed companies by the middle of 2016.
Still, SOEs account for about one-third of all companies listed in the stock exchanges.
Finance companies are the largest non-bank financial institutions in Vietnam. In 2014,
they accounted for about 6% of GDP and 3% of all financial institutions’ asset. The
other notable non-bank financial institutions include insurance companies and mutual
funds, each constituting 4% and less than 1% of GDP (World Bank, 2014), respectively.
In sum, although existing studies confirm that local financial development matters
for local economic development, they are few in number and may only reflect the
particularities of the economies under study. As the Vietnamese financial system has
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Figure 5.1: Financial development indicators of Vietnam and other Asian economies.
Notes: Data of Lao PDR from 2011 and China before 2011 are not available.
Source: Global Financial Development, The World Bank (2018)
passed through its own development path with a markedly high degree of government
intervention, a separate study based on Vietnamese data is needed to establish the
impact of local financial development on firm performance in Vietnam.
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5.3 Estimation strategy
As the appearance of financial suppliers partly depends on the performance of firms in
the region, endogeneity is a serious concern in estimating the impact of local financial
development on firm growth. To address this problem, we follow the strategy first
suggested in Fisman and Love (2007) and later adopted to the local financial development
research by Fafchamps and Schu¨ndeln (2013). As in Fafchamps and Schu¨ndeln (2013),
we take into account the fact that large firms should react to growth opportunities better
than small firms as they are less likely to be constrained by access to credit (Beck et al.,
2005).
There are several reasons why being a large firm could bring more advantages in
accessing finance than being a small firm. Firstly, large firms are more likely to operate
in a broader area which could cover several districts and provinces. This would bring
them more opportunities to access finance because they will have better relationships
and more connections with financial suppliers operating not only in their own locality
but also in other localities (Fafchamps and Schu¨ndeln, 2013). Secondly, from the side of
financial suppliers, it is often easier to obtain information about large firms than small
firms. Thus, financial suppliers can better evaluate the loan applications of large firms
than small firms (Petersen and Rajan, 2002). Thirdly, in comparison with small firms,
large firms have more assets and hence could provide more collateral, which is often very
crucial in obtaining loans from financial suppliers.
Using data for financially less constrained firms, i.e firms with more than 50
employees, we calculate growth opportunities based on sales growth from 2009 to 2013
for 18 sectors in Vietnam. The classification of sectors or industries is obtained from the
Vietnam Standard Industrial Classification 2007 (VSIC2007), which in turn is based on
the classification of the United Nation’s Statistical Division. While our preferred group of
‘large firms’ is the group of firms with more than 50 employees, we also use the group of
firms with more than 100 employees as an alternative ‘large firms’ group.21 We calculate
21For the latest survey on Vietnamese firms in 2015, the World Bank classified Vietnamese firms with
more than 100 employees as large firms. However, noting the fact that the majority of firms in Vietnam
are small firms with less than 20 employees, using the firms with more than 50 employees as a reference
group could be more appropriate.
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growth opportunities (GO) for each sector s as
GOs = ln(
Ns,t1∑
f=1
Salesf,t1)− ln(
Ns,t0∑
f=1
Salesf,t0), (5.1)
where f denotes large firms, Ns refers to the number of large firms in sector s, ln
represents the natural logarithmic transformation, and the time indices t0 and t1 denote
the years 2009 and 2013, respectively. In order to avoid spurious results driven by firms
moving across size and sectors between 2009 and 2013, we use those firms that were
classified as ‘large firms’ (more than 50 or 100 employees, alternatively) in 2009 and still
existing in the same sector until 2013. In other words, we do not consider firms that
have changed sectors during this period or that are new in 2013.
Growth rates of small firms (firms with less than 20 employees, which account for
more than 90% of Vietnamese firms) from period t0 to t1 are defined as
∆yfis = yfis,t1 − yfis,t0, (5.2)
where yfis refers to either sales, investment, sales per worker or wage per sales (in natural
logarithms) of firm f in locality i and sector s.
Accordingly, our estimation model is of the following form
∆yfis = β1FDi,t0GOs + β2yfis,t0 + β3FDi,t0yfis,t0+
Xfis,t0γ + µi + vs + efis,
(5.3)
where FDi,t0 is local financial development in locality i in 2009; GOs is the growth
opportunities of sector s from 2009 to 2013; Xfis,t0 is a vector of explanatory variables
for firm, sector and local characteristics in 2009; µi is a vector of local dummies; vs is a
vector of sector dummies; and efis is the error term.
Following Fisman and Love (2007) and Fafchamps and Schu¨ndeln (2013), we
hypothesise that small firms will grow faster in locations with higher financial
development when they operate in sectors with growth opportunities. Similarly, as
the demand for external credit is low in sectors with low growth opportunities, local
financial development may not affect firm performance in those sectors. Thus, when firm
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performance is measured by means of the growth rates of sales, investment and sales per
worker, we expect a positive β1 which implies that local financial development promotes
firm performance in the presence of strong growth opportunities. It also implies that, in a
location with better financial development, the difference in growth rates between firms
in a sector with higher growth opportunities and firms in a sector with lower growth
opportunities is larger than the difference in growth rates between the firms of these
same sectors located in a location with lower financial development. With regard to the
growth rate of wage per sales, the coefficient β1 is expected to be negative as we expect
local financial development to increase efficiency of using labour.
5.4 Summary statistics
This section provides summary statistics for the data used in this study, including the
measures for local financial development and growth opportunities.
5.4.1 Data description
Table 5.1 documents summary statistics for the sample used for estimation (small firms
only). Panel A of Table 5.1 gives information about firm level characteristics for small
firms with less than 20 employees in 2009. On average, each firm has about 4.6 billion
Vietnamese Dong (VND)22 of sales and sales range from 0 to more than 785 billion
VND. The average value of total assets per firm is about 8.3 billion VND. The average
unit of labour employed by each firm is about 6 people while the average wage is 35.6
million VND. Moreover, investment for producing goods and services ranges from 0
million to 674 billion VND, with the average investment per firm being about 4 billion
VND. Among the total of 41,398 firms in 2009, 34.3% are purely private firms that are
not even partially owned by the government or foreigners.
Panel A of Table 5.1 also documents summary statistics for our dependent variables:
real growth rates over the period 2009–2013 of sales, investment, sales per worker and
wage per sales. The average growth rate of sales per firm is about 23% while the average
growth rate of sales per worker, which proxies productivity of labour, is about 26.9%.
22In 2009, one US dollar equals to 17,065 Vietnamese Dong (World Bank, 2009).
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Similarly, the average growth rates of investment and wage per sales are 24.9% and
-17.3%, respectively.
Table 5.1: Summary statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Panel A: Firm-level characteristics (Small
firms)
Total sales(a) 39,617 4.674 18.527 0 785.530
Asset(a) 41,398 8.309 22.695 0 861.886
Wage(b) 41,398 35.661 43.183 1 4,158.000
Investment(a) 41,398 4.053 16.538 0 673.985
Labour 41,398 6.573 3.610 1 19
Private 41,398 0.343 0.475 0 1
Growth of Sales 33,117 0.230 2.038 -13.127 11.710
Growth of Investment 34,792 0.249 2.261 -11.631 11.726
Growth of Sales per worker 33,117 0.269 1.947 -14.845 11.869
Growth of Wage per Sales 33,117 -0.173 1.979 -11.808 15.117
Panel B: Province and sector-level characte-
ristics
Province-level GDP(a) 39 40,394.890 62,716.910 7,531.937 347,480.700
Province-level income per capita(b) 39 21.981 27.056 9.329 180.439
Population of province 39 1,722.131 1,330.854 598.600 7,196.100
Size of province in km2 39 4,787.426 3,517.391 926.000 16,490.000
Population density 39 0.576 0.622 0.105 3.434
Sector VA(a) 39 310.321 1,659.707 -4,630.442 8,111.745
Sector employment 39 27.227 72.082 0.510 329.166
Labour employed in province 39 195.660 374.022 30.045 1,920.796
Average wage in province by sector(b) 39 24.568 9.052 17.403 68.749
VA sector/local 39 0.495 2.390 -0.092 15.010
Province labour/province population 39 0.010 0.013 0.000 0.051
Sector labour/province labour 39 0.018 0.024 0.001 0.096
Note: The values for all variables except the growth rates of sales, investment, sales per worker and wage per sales
refer to the year 2009. The superscripts (a) and (b) indicate that variables are measured in billion and million VND
respectively. All monetary values are in constant 2009 prices.
Panel B of Table 5.1 presents province- and sector-level characteristics, which will
be used as proxies for provincial economic development. Provincial income per capita
in 2009 varies from 9.3 million to 180 million VND, with the average being about 22
million VND. The average provincial total population, total area and population density
are about 1.7 million, 4787 km2 and 576 people per square kilometre, respectively. The
table also provides the sector-level characteristics and their roles in each province. On
average, total sector value added per province is about 310 billion VND and each sector
has about 27 workers. The average wage is 24.6 million VND per year. In terms of the
contribution of sectors to the economic development of provinces, the share of total value
added by firms in a sector to the total value added of province is about 49.5% while the
share of workers employed by a sector to the total number of workers in a province is
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1.8%.
5.4.2 Financial development indicators
Following Fafchamps and Schu¨ndeln (2013) we measure local financial development by
means of the availability of financial suppliers at the province level. Seeking external
credit from financial suppliers available in the province where the firms are located
is often easier than seeking credit from suppliers in farther localities. This is because
applying for credit from financial suppliers in remote areas would not only cause
transaction costs but also increase the likelihood of their applications getting rejected by
financial suppliers who would have less information about these firms than about firms
in their localities.
Table 5.2: Financial development indicators
Panel A: Summary statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Number of financial supplier per 1000 capita (FDP1) 39 0.021 0.021 0.001 0.107
Number of financial supplier per 1 km2 (FDP2) 39 0.020 0.043 0.000 0.224
Panel B: Correlation
FDP1
FDP2 0.805*
Note: (*) indicates the significant at 1% level.
Panel A of Table 5.2 documents the descriptive statistics for our two financial
development indicators: the number of financial suppliers per 1000 people and the
number of financial suppliers per square kilometre in localities, in 2009. The former one
is our main local financial development indicator while the latter is used for a robustness
check. Local financial development measured by the number of financial suppliers per
1000 people is used to show the possible congestion in accessing finance at the local
level. It is presumable that a larger number of financial suppliers per capita at localities
is associated with a lower level of competition for credit among small firms in the locality,
and hence reflects a higher degree of access to finance for small firms.
Table 5.2 shows that on average there are about 2.1 financial suppliers per 100,000
people at the province level. Similarly, measuring local financial development by the
number of financial suppliers per kilometre square would control for transaction costs in
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visiting financial suppliers. It would be easier for firms to apply for credit if the density
of financial suppliers in the locality is higher. We can see that there are about 2 financial
suppliers per 100 square kilometre at the province level. Moreover, the two measures of
financial development are positively correlated as shown in Panel B of Table 5.2.
5.4.3 Growth opportunities
Table 5.3 provides a summary of growth opportunities for each sector in Vietnam from
2009 to 2013 as defined in (1) and shows growth opportunities of 18 sectors based on
our reference group of firms with more than 50 and 100 employees. We can see that
15 out of 18 sectors have positive growth opportunities if we use GO50 while there are
four sectors showing negative growth opportunities if we use GO100 (sector F, H, L
and sector S), which is expected for an emerging economy like Vietnam, where sectors
have not grown to their full capacity. The growth opportunities (GO50) of all sectors
ranges from -0.371 to 0.439, with manufacturing having the highest growth opportunities
while other service activities has the least growth opportunities. The similarity is found
with GO100 when manufacturing gets the highest growth opportunities at 0.451 and the
lowest growth opportunities is belong to other service activities at -0.452. Moreover, the
manufacturing sector also has the largest number of firms and the other service activities
get the lowest number of firms in both years 2009 and 2013.
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Table 5.3: Growth opportunities
Code Industry name Number of firms GO50 Number of firms GO100
A Agriculture, forestry and fishing 614 0.121 270 0.104
B Mining and quarrying 325 0.149 176 0.149
C Manufacturing 8,530 0.439 5,636 0.451
D Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply 57 0.360 35 0.377
E Water supply, sewerage and waste management 169 0.326 137 0.322
F Construction 3,949 -0.050 2,154 -0.057
G Wholesale, retail trade and repair vehicles 1,887 0.064 761 0.089
H Transportation and storage 1,012 0.066 523 -0.006
I Accommodation and food service activities 478 0.034 236 0.011
J Information and communication 151 0.087 68 0.043
K Financial and insurance activities 142 0.149 96 0.139
L Real estate activities 170 -0.338 73 -0.433
M Professional, scientific and technical activities 427 0.089 165 0.075
N Administrative and support service activities 365 0.185 215 0.206
P Education 63 0.257 35 0.266
Q Human health and social work activities 82 0.405 44 0.385
R Arts, entertainment and recreation 95 0.065 49 0.020
S Other service activities 18 -0.371 10 -0.452
Total number of firms 18,534 10,683
Notes: With GO50, the 25th and 75th percentile are belong to sector G and sector P with growth opportunities of 0.064
and 0.257, respectively. Similarly, with GO100, the 25th and 75th percentile are belong to sector I and sector P with
growth opportunities of 0.011 and 0.266, respectively.
5.5 Empirical results
In this section, we discuss estimation results on the impact of province-level financial
development on the performance of firms as measured by the growth rates of total sales,
investment, sales per worker and wage per sales. Noting that the majority of Vietnamese
enterprises are small (more than 90% of the firms have less than 20 employees), we
focus on firms with less than 20 employees and GO50 might be more appropriate to
proxy growth opportunities than GO100. Our variable of interest is the interaction
term between local financial development and growth opportunities. Moreover, all
specifications include province and sector fixed effects.
5.5.1 Sales growth
In our data, sales is measured by the total revenue from all products and services
received by the firm. Table 5.4 documents the results on the effect of provincial financial
development on sales growth of small firms. Specifications (1), (2), (3) and (4) are
based on growth opportunities of firms with more than 50 employees (GO50), while
specifications from (5) to (8) use growth opportunities based on firms with more than
100 employees (GO100). We begin with parsimonious specifications and subsequently
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add more explanatory variables at the firm, sector and province levels. Our discussions
will be based on the full model specifications in columns (4) and (8) of Table 5.4.
Table 5.4: The effect of local financial development on sales growth
GO50 GO100
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
FD*GO 0.569*** 0.364** 0.364** 0.364** 0.448*** 0.258* 0.254* 0.254*
(0.163) (0.163) (0.169) (0.169) (0.133) (0.135) (0.139) (0.139)
Sales -0.373 -0.390 -0.389 -0.389 -0.379 -0.397 -0.397 -0.397
(0.277) (0.273) (0.273) (0.273) (0.276) (0.272) (0.272) (0.272)
Sales*FD 0.064 0.062 0.062 0.062 0.061 0.060 0.060 0.060
(0.062) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.062) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060)
Private*FD -0.025** -0.025** -0.025** -0.027** -0.027*** -0.027***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Private*GO -0.374*** -0.380*** -0.380*** -0.367*** -0.374*** -0.374***
(0.109) (0.106) (0.106) (0.096) (0.092) (0.092)
Labour*GO 1.010*** 1.013*** 1.013*** 0.979*** 0.982*** 0.982***
(0.158) (0.155) (0.155) (0.168) (0.165) (0.165)
VA sector/province 0.001 0.001 0.005 0.005
(0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013)
Sector labour/province -0.393* -0.393* -0.418** -0.418**
population (0.215) (0.215) (0.193) (0.193)
Average wage in province 0.027*** 0.028***
by sector (0.004) (0.004)
Province-level income -0.367*** -0.397***
per capita (0.100) (0.105)
Population density -0.155*** -0.156***
(0.057) (0.057)
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.648* 0.277 0.291 0.589 0.567 0.244 0.255 0.617
(0.365) (0.375) (0.374) (0.513) (0.360) (0.366) (0.364) (0.518)
Observations 34537 34537 34537 34537 34537 34537 34537 34537
R-squared 0.311 0.314 0.314 0.314 0.311 0.314 0.314 0.314
Adjusted R-squared 0.310 0.313 0.313 0.313 0.310 0.313 0.313 0.313
Differential in growth rates 0.136 0.087 0.087 0.087 0.141 0.081 0.080 0.080
Notes: FD refers to local (province-level) financial development. The variables Sales, Labour and Province-level income
per capita are in natural logarithms. GO denotes GO50 for specifications (1)-(4) and GO100 for specifications (5)-
(8). The differential in growth rates shows the difference in growth rates between firms in sector P (Education), at
the 75th percentile of the growth opportunities GO50 (GO100) distribution, and firms in sector G (whole sales, retail
trade and repair vehicles) or sector I (Accommodation and food service activities), at the 25th percentile of the growth
opportunities GO50 (GO100) distribution, if these firms are located in Nam Dinh province instead of Thua Thien Hue,
which are at the 75th and 25th percentiles of financial development distribution, respectively. The sample for estimation
includes small firms with less than 20 employees. Robust standard errors, clustered at the province level, are given in
parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.
The results show that provincial financial development promotes the sales growth of
small firms that are operating in sectors with strong growth opportunities. This finding
is similar to the result in Fafchamps and Schu¨ndeln (2013) who investigate the effect
of commune-level financial development on growth rates of value added of firms. The
positive sign of the interaction term between provincial financial development and growth
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opportunities confirms that the difference between growth in sectors with higher growth
opportunities and growth in sectors with lower growth opportunities is larger in provinces
with higher financial development than in provinces with lower financial development.
For instance, as shown in the last row of Table 5.4, we compare the differences in growth
rates between a firm in sector P at the 75th percentile of the GO50 distribution (which
is the education sector with GO50 = 0.257) and a firm in sector G at the 25th percentile
of GO50 distribution (which is the wholesale, retail trade and repair vehicles sector with
GO50 = 0.064) when these firms are located in different localities (Nam Dinh instead of
Thua Thien Hue). The difference in growth rates of sales is about 8.7% larger if these
firms are located in Nam Dinh province, which is at the 75th percentile of the financial
development distribution, instead of Thua Thien Hue, which is at the 25th percentile of
the financial development distribution.23 With regard to GO100, the difference in growth
rates between firms in sector P and sector I (accommodation and food service activities)
becomes 8.0% larger if they are located in Nam Dinh instead of Thua Thien Hue.
Adding more control variables, the effect of the interaction between financial
development and growth opportunities on sales growth does not change. As a result,
the differentials in sales growth rates are stable and positive at about 8%. Moreover, the
effect of the initial value of sales (sales in 2009) is negative but insignificant when using
GO50 and GO100, which is theoretically expected to control for the convergence effect,
and is consistent with the findings in Fafchamps and Schu¨ndeln (2013). In addition, the
interaction between financial development and the initial value of sales does not show
significant impact on sales growth. In specifications (2) and (6), we include firm-level
explanatory variables, interacting them with growth opportunities and province-level
financial development. The results show that the more labour a firm employs, the faster
its sales grow. Moreover, we find that government- or foreign-owned firms are better in
taking advantage of financial development and growth opportunities.
To control for the impact of sector-specific characteristics, we include the share of
value added of each sector to the total value added of the province and the share of labour
23We calculate growth differentials as β1*(FD2-FD1)(GO2 -GO1), where FD1 and FD2 represent
financial development in Thua Thien Hue and Nam Dinh province, and GO1 and GO2 denote growth
opportunities of sectors at the 25th and 75th percentiles of the growth opportunities distribution.
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in each sector to the total population of the province. The results in specifications (3),
(4), (7) and (8) reveal that while former does not show a significant impact on sales
growth, the latter has significantly negative impact on sales growth. To account for
province-level development, we include the average wage rate in province by each sector,
the province-level income per capita and population density. The results in specifications
(4) and (8) show that average wage in province by sector has a positive effect on sales
growth. This implies that in sectors with a higher average wage, firms would pay more for
labour. Province-level income per capita exerts a significant and negative impact on sales
growth. The result likely reflects that higher province-level income per capita attracts
more firms to operate in the area and it increases the competition, which eventually
results in lower sales growth per firm. Moreover, richer provinces could have better
infrastructure that encourages new entrants and start-ups, which could further increase
competition and reduce sales growth. Similarly, the negative impact of population density
on sales growth could be attributed to higher competition among firms as more firms
enter the market aiming at meeting the higher demand for goods and services in more
densely populated provinces.
5.5.2 Investment growth
As an alternative measure of firm performance, we consider the effect of local financial
development on the investment growth of small firms. Results in Table 5.5 show that
provincial financial development promotes investment growth of firms irrespective of
using GO50 or GO100 as proxies for growth opportunities. This result is similar to
the findings by O’Toole and Newman (2017) although they do not control for growth
opportunities and their measures of financial development are different from ours. Similar
to results in Table 5.4, the differential in growth rates is positive. In particular, the
difference between growth rates of firms in the education sector and firms in the
whole sale, retail trade and repair vehicle sector (when using GO50) or firms in the
accommodation and food service activities sector (when using GO100) is, respectively,
12.0% or 11.0% larger if firms in these sectors are located in Nam Dinh instead of Thua
Thien Hue province.
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Adding more control variables, we can see that the effects of the interaction term
between local financial development and growth opportunities are qualitatively the same
as in specifications (4) and (8) (with full control for local and sector development).
Moreover, the interaction term between the initial value of investment and provincial
financial development has a positive impact on investment growth. This shows that in
provinces with higher financial development, firms with higher initial investment would
have faster investment growth than firms with lower initial investment. However, the
coefficient on the initial value of investment is not statistically significant.
Table 5.5: The effect of local financial development on investment growth
GO50 GO100
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
FD*GO 0.689*** 0.493*** 0.502*** 0.502*** 0.538*** 0.346** 0.350* 0.350*
(0.179) (0.165) (0.185) (0.185) (0.171) (0.154) (0.178) (0.178)
Investment 0.016 0.011 0.010 0.010 0.015 0.009 0.008 0.008
(0.026) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.026) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024)
Investment*FD 0.150*** 0.153*** 0.152*** 0.152*** 0.150*** 0.152*** 0.152*** 0.152***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Private*FD -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.032*** -0.032*** -0.032***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Private*GO -0.442** -0.451** -0.451** -0.472** -0.483** -0.483**
(0.182) (0.176) (0.176) (0.198) (0.193) (0.193)
Labour*GO 0.964*** 0.974*** 0.974*** 0.937*** 0.947*** 0.947***
(0.068) (0.065) (0.065) (0.059) (0.057) (0.057)
VA sector/province -0.005 -0.005 0.008 0.008
(0.042) (0.042) (0.045) (0.045)
Sector labour/province -0.913** -0.913** -0.950** -0.950**
population (0.388) (0.388) (0.382) (0.382)
Average wage in province 0.003 0.004**
by sector (0.002) (0.002)
Province-level income -0.403*** -0.447***
per capita (0.102) (0.104)
Population density -0.080** -0.080**
(0.030) (0.032)
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.187 -0.171 -0.133 1.161 0.081 -0.247 -0.210 1.177
(0.547) (0.548) (0.550) (0.705) (0.547) (0.549) (0.550) (0.718)
Observations 22769 22769 22769 22769 22769 22769 22769 22769
R-squared 0.174 0.177 0.177 0.177 0.174 0.177 0.177 0.177
Adjusted R-squared 0.172 0.174 0.175 0.175 0.172 0.174 0.174 0.174
Differential in growth rates 0.164 0.118 0.120 0.120 0.169 0.109 0.110 0.110
Notes: Investment is in natural logarithms. For further notes see Table 5.4.
Furthermore, the more labour a firm employs, the higher is its investment growth. We
also find that firms owned by the government or foreigners are better in taking advantage
of provincial financial development and growth opportunities than private firms. This
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might be related to the fact that the majority of financial institutions are owned by the
government, and hence could favour government owned firms over private firms. The
result that foreign-owned firms tend to grow faster than private firms is consistent with
the results in Beck et al. (2005).
Regarding the province and sector level characteristics, we do not find significant
effects of the share of sector value added to total value added of the province on
investment growth. However, firms in sectors with higher labour intensity and in sectors
with higher average wages are more likely to have lower investment growth. This could
reflect the associated cost of production which in turn reduces firms’ profitability and
financial resources available for investment. Similar to sales growth, investment growth
is lower in provinces with higher provincial per capita income and population density.
5.5.3 Productivity growth
As an alternative measure of firm performance, we evaluate the productivity of labour,
which is proxied by sales per worker and wage per sales. In the following, we examine the
impact of provincial financial development on the productivity of labour for the period
2009–2013.
Sales per worker
Results on the effect of provincial financial development on the growth rate of sales per
worker are documented in Table 5.6. The results reveal that the difference in growth
rate of sales per worker between firms in sector P and firms in sector G (if using GO50)
is about 6.8% larger if these firms are located in Nam Dinh province instead of Thua
Thien Hue province. The corresponding growth differential is about 5.8% between firms
in sector P and firms in sector I when we use GO100. These effects barely change when
we control for firm, sector and provincial characteristics. This finding is similar to the
results in Fafchamps and Schu¨ndeln (2013).
Wage per sales
Table 5.7 provides results on the determinants of the growth rate of wage per sales.
The coefficient on the interaction between local financial development and growth
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Table 5.6: The effect of local financial development on growth of sales per worker
GO50 GO100
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
FD*GO 0.435*** 0.277** 0.287** 0.287** 0.316*** 0.179* 0.184* 0.184*
(0.121) (0.120) (0.126) (0.126) (0.096) (0.096) (0.100) (0.100)
Salepw -0.656** -0.651** -0.651*** -0.651*** -0.662*** -0.658*** -0.658*** -0.658***
(0.243) (0.240) (0.240) (0.240) (0.242) (0.240) (0.239) (0.239)
Salepw*FD 0.005 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.003 0.005 0.005 0.005
(0.053) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.053) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052)
Private*FD -0.037*** -0.037*** -0.037*** -0.037*** -0.037*** -0.037***
(0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Private*GO -0.278* -0.282* -0.282* -0.227* -0.232** -0.232**
(0.147) (0.142) (0.142) (0.113) (0.108) (0.108)
Labour*GO 0.806*** 0.809*** 0.809*** 0.766*** 0.768*** 0.768***
(0.035) (0.033) (0.033) (0.036) (0.034) (0.034)
VA sector/province -0.006 -0.006 -0.003 -0.003
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Sector labour/province -0.448* -0.448* -0.458* -0.458*
population (0.236) (0.236) (0.237) (0.237)
Average wage in province -0.002 0.001
by sector (0.041) (0.041)
Province-level income -0.306 -0.385
per capita (1.142) (1.127)
Population density -0.210 -0.188
(0.513) (0.508)
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 8.089*** 7.804*** 7.832*** 9.061*** 8.019*** 7.780*** 7.803*** 9.176***
(1.142) (1.125) (1.131) (2.835) (1.148) (1.130) (1.136) (2.824)
Observations 34537 34537 34537 34537 34537 34537 34537 34537
R-squared 0.409 0.411 0.411 0.411 0.409 0.411 0.411 0.411
Adjusted R-squared 0.408 0.410 0.410 0.410 0.408 0.410 0.410 0.410
Differential in growth rates 0.104 0.066 0.068 0.068 0.100 0.056 0.058 0.058
Notes: Salespw refers to Sales per worker, in natural logarithms. For further notes see Table 5.4.
opportunities is negative and statistically significant in all but one of the specifications.
This shows that provincial financial development helps firms to reduce the cost of labour
per unit of sales. The last row of Table 5.7 reports the difference in growth rates of
wage per sales between firms in sectors at the 25th and 75th percentiles of the growth
opportunities distribution when these firms operate in the same sectors but are located
in provinces with higher financial development. The differential growth rate is -5.5%
(using GO50) and -3.4% (using GO100), showing that operating in localities with higher
financial development helps firms to reduce further labour cost per unit of sales.
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Table 5.7: The effect of local financial development on growth of wage per sales
GO50 GO100
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
FD*GO -0.353*** -0.212** -0.229* -0.229* -0.217** -0.096 -0.109 -0.109
(0.095) (0.104) (0.114) (0.114) (0.084) (0.090) (0.095) (0.095)
Wageps -0.672*** -0.666*** -0.662*** -0.662*** -0.677*** -0.671*** -0.667*** -0.667***
(0.238) (0.234) (0.234) (0.234) (0.238) (0.235) (0.234) (0.234)
Wageps*FD 0.002 0.005 0.007 0.007 0.000 0.003 0.005 0.005
(0.052) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.052) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051)
Private*FD 0.042*** 0.042*** 0.042*** 0.042*** 0.042*** 0.042***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Private*GO 0.216 0.237 0.237 0.178 0.198* 0.198*
(0.158) (0.149) (0.149) (0.121) (0.112) (0.112)
Labour*GO -0.751*** -0.760*** -0.760*** -0.711*** -0.720*** -0.720***
(0.043) (0.033) (0.033) (0.041) (0.033) (0.033)
VA sector/province 0.010 0.010 0.005 0.005
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Sector labour/province 1.685*** 1.685*** 1.691*** 1.691***
population (0.397) (0.397) (0.367) (0.367)
Average wage in province 0.020 0.018
by sector (0.025) (0.025)
Province-level income 0.618 0.680
per capita (0.817) (0.809)
Population density 0.131 0.115
(0.398) (0.396)
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant -6.416*** -6.131*** -6.208*** -9.132*** -6.346*** -6.104*** -6.176*** -9.217***
(0.803) (0.795) (0.795) (2.126) (0.802) (0.794) (0.794) (2.120)
Observations 34537 34537 34537 34537 34537 34537 34537 34537
R-squared 0.416 0.418 0.419 0.419 0.416 0.418 0.419 0.419
Adjusted R-squared 0.415 0.417 0.418 0.418 0.415 0.417 0.417 0.417
Differential in growth rates -0.084 -0.051 -0.055 -0.055 -0.068 -0.030 -0.034 -0.034
Notes: Wageps represents Wage per sales, in natural logarithms. For further notes see Table 5.4.
5.5.4 Robustness checks: an alternative measure of local financial
development
As a robustness check, we employ the number of financial suppliers per kilometre square
at each province as an alternative measure of local financial development. As shown
in Table 5.2, these financial development indicators are positively correlated with the
baseline indicators (number of financial suppliers per 1000 people), with the correlation
coefficient of 0.805. Robustness check results documented in Appendix 5.7 largely confirm
our baseline results. In particular, the results show that provincial financial development
enhances the performance of small firms in terms of increasing the growth rates of sales
and investment. Local financial development also promotes productivity of labour as
shown by its positive impact on the growth rate of sales per worker and its negative
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effect on the growth rates of wage per sales.
5.6 Conclusions
In this paper we examined whether local financial development promotes the
performance of small firms in Vietnam using an extensive firm-level survey from
2009 to 2013. Following Fisman and Love (2007) and Fafchamps and Schu¨ndeln
(2013), we calculate growth opportunities in each sector based on the performance
of large firms in order to address the potential endogeneity problem that financial
suppliers extend more credit to sectors with better growth opportunities. We measure
local financial development at the province level based on the number of financial
suppliers per 1000 people in each province. Interacting local financial development with
growth opportunities, we investigate the effects of local financial development on the
performance of small firms, which is measured by means of the growth rates of sales,
investment, sales per worker and wage per sales.
Our results show that at the province level, in sectors with growth opportunities,
provincial financial development has a significantly positive impact on the growth rates of
small firms in terms of sales, investment, and sales per worker while it has a significantly
negative impact on the growth rates of wage per sales. Moreover, small firms tend to
improve their performance better when they operate in sectors with stronger growth
opportunities and in locations with higher level of financial development. Our results
suggest that policy makers should promote local financial development so as to enhance
firm performance.
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5.7.1 Sales growth
Table C.1: The effect of local financial development on sales growth
GO50 GO100
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
FD*GO 0.322*** 0.220** 0.220** 0.220** 0.255*** 0.160** 0.160** 0.160**
(0.085) (0.090) (0.092) (0.092) (0.070) (0.075) (0.077) (0.077)
Sales -0.474*** -0.487*** -0.487*** -0.487*** -0.477*** -0.490*** -0.490*** -0.490***
(0.156) (0.155) (0.155) (0.155) (0.156) (0.155) (0.155) (0.155)
Sales*FD 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.039
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
Private*FD -0.030** -0.031** -0.031** -0.032** -0.033** -0.033**
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Private*GO -0.341** -0.347** -0.347** -0.339*** -0.346*** -0.346***
(0.133) (0.130) (0.130) (0.117) (0.114) (0.114)
Labour*GO 0.986*** 0.989*** 0.989*** 0.958*** 0.961*** 0.961***
(0.154) (0.151) (0.151) (0.165) (0.161) (0.161)
VA sector/province 0.003 0.003 0.006 0.006
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Sector labour/province -0.468** -0.468** -0.485** -0.485**
population (0.222) (0.222) (0.197) (0.197)
Average wage in province 0.027*** 0.028***
by sector (0.003) (0.004)
Province-level income -0.411*** -0.435***
per capita (0.121) (0.126)
Population density -0.129*** -0.128***
(0.046) (0.045)
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.484 0.162 0.178 0.590 0.438 0.154 0.169 0.638
(0.343) (0.344) (0.343) (0.535) (0.343) (0.343) (0.341) (0.544)
Observations 34537 34537 34537 34537 34537 34537 34537 34537
R-squared 0.313 0.316 0.316 0.316 0.312 0.316 0.316 0.316
Adjusted R-squared 0.311 0.314 0.314 0.314 0.311 0.314 0.314 0.314
Differential in growth rates 0.212 0.145 0.145 0.145 0.222 0.139 0.139 0.139
Notes: FD is the number of financial suppliers per kilometre square at the province level and measured in natural
logarithms. For further notes see Table 4.
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5.7.2 Investment growth
Table C.2: The effect of local financial development on investment growth
GO50 GO100
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
FD*GO 0.393*** 0.305*** 0.317*** 0.317*** 0.286*** 0.200** 0.211** 0.211**
(0.097) (0.092) (0.098) (0.098) (0.083) (0.076) (0.082) (0.082)
Investment -0.106*** -0.111*** -0.112*** -0.112*** -0.108*** -0.113*** -0.115*** -0.115***
(0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023)
Investment*FD 0.127*** 0.129*** 0.129*** 0.129*** 0.126*** 0.128*** 0.128*** 0.128***
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Private*FD -0.050*** -0.050*** -0.050*** -0.054*** -0.054*** -0.054***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Private*GO -0.532*** -0.545*** -0.545*** -0.581*** -0.596*** -0.596***
(0.165) (0.158) (0.158) (0.196) (0.190) (0.190)
Labour*GO 0.686*** 0.707*** 0.707*** 0.685*** 0.705*** 0.705***
(0.072) (0.068) (0.068) (0.067) (0.066) (0.066)
VA sector/province -0.007 -0.007 0.004 0.004
(0.036) (0.036) (0.040) (0.040)
Sector labour/province -1.807*** -1.807*** -1.818*** -1.818***
population (0.449) (0.449) (0.430) (0.430)
Average wage in province 0.004 0.005
by sector (0.004) (0.004)
Province-level income -0.752*** -0.792***
per capita (0.204) (0.214)
Population density 0.043 0.054*
(0.027) (0.027)
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant -0.550 -0.827 -0.752 1.612 -0.619 -0.886* -0.812 1.647
(0.533) (0.524) (0.528) (0.975) (0.532) (0.525) (0.529) (0.997)
Observations 22769 22769 22769 22769 22769 22769 22769 22769
R-squared 0.154 0.155 0.156 0.156 0.153 0.155 0.156 0.156
Adjusted R-squared 0.151 0.153 0.154 0.154 0.151 0.153 0.153 0.153
Differential in growth rates 0.259 0.201 0.209 0.209 0.249 0.174 0.184 0.184
Notes: FD is the number of financial suppliers per kilometre square at the province level and measured in natural
logarithms. For further notes see Table 5.
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5.7.3 Productivity growth
Table C.3: The effect of local financial development on growth of sales per worker
GO50 GO100
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
FD*GO 0.238*** 0.161** 0.164** 0.164** 0.173*** 0.106* 0.109* 0.109*
(0.061) (0.066) (0.068) (0.068) (0.050) (0.053) (0.055) (0.055)
Salepw -0.649*** -0.647*** -0.647*** -0.647*** -0.652*** -0.650*** -0.650*** -0.650***
(0.144) (0.142) (0.142) (0.142) (0.144) (0.143) (0.142) (0.142)
Salepw*FD 0.009 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.008 0.010 0.011 0.011
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Private*FD -0.046*** -0.046*** -0.046*** -0.046*** -0.046*** -0.046***
(0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Private*GO -0.257* -0.262** -0.262** -0.216** -0.222** -0.222**
(0.127) (0.122) (0.122) (0.099) (0.094) (0.094)
Labour*GO 0.799*** 0.801*** 0.801*** 0.760*** 0.762*** 0.762***
(0.034) (0.032) (0.032) (0.036) (0.034) (0.034)
VA sector/province -0.003 -0.003 -0.000 -0.000
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Sector labour/province -0.506* -0.506* -0.508* -0.508*
population (0.254) (0.254) (0.251) (0.251)
Average wage in province -0.004 -0.002
by sector (0.020) (0.020)
Province-level income -0.237 -0.286
per capita (0.573) (0.563)
Population density -0.362 -0.332
(0.624) (0.618)
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 7.986*** 7.736*** 7.762*** 8.950*** 7.946*** 7.734*** 7.757*** 9.033***
(1.122) (1.100) (1.107) (1.768) (1.127) (1.105) (1.112) (1.764)
Observations 34537 34537 34537 34537 34537 34537 34537 34537
R-squared 0.409 0.412 0.412 0.412 0.409 0.412 0.412 0.412
Adjusted R-squared 0.408 0.411 0.411 0.411 0.408 0.411 0.411 0.411
Differential in growth rates 0.157 0.106 0.108 0.108 0.151 0.092 0.095 0.095
Notes: FD is the number of financial suppliers per kilometre square at the province level and measured in natural
logarithms. For further notes see Table 6.
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Table C.4: The effect of local financial development on growth of wage per sales
GO50 GO100
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
FD*GO -0.181*** -0.111** -0.121* -0.121* -0.109** -0.049 -0.058 -0.058
(0.050) (0.055) (0.061) (0.061) (0.045) (0.047) (0.051) (0.051)
Wageps -0.662*** -0.659*** -0.657*** -0.657*** -0.664*** -0.661*** -0.659*** -0.659***
(0.140) (0.139) (0.138) (0.138) (0.141) (0.139) (0.139) (0.139)
Wageps*FD 0.007 0.010 0.011 0.011 0.006 0.009 0.010 0.010
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Private*FD 0.053*** 0.054*** 0.054*** 0.054*** 0.054*** 0.054***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Private*GO 0.210 0.231* 0.231* 0.181* 0.201** 0.201**
(0.134) (0.126) (0.126) (0.103) (0.095) (0.095)
Labour*GO -0.748*** -0.757*** -0.757*** -0.709*** -0.717*** -0.717***
(0.045) (0.034) (0.034) (0.043) (0.034) (0.034)
VA sector/province 0.006 0.006 0.003 0.003
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012)
Sector labour/province 1.748*** 1.748*** 1.743*** 1.743***
population (0.405) (0.405) (0.371) (0.371)
Average wage in province 0.021** 0.020*
by sector (0.010) (0.010)
Province-level income 0.568 0.608
per capita (0.394) (0.388)
Population density 0.217 0.196
(0.467) (0.464)
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant -6.329*** -6.072*** -6.146*** -9.027*** -6.293*** -6.071*** -6.142*** -9.101***
(0.789) (0.777) (0.778) (1.396) (0.789) (0.779) (0.780) (1.394)
Observations 34537 34537 34537 34537 34537 34537 34537 34537
R-squared 0.416 0.419 0.419 0.419 0.416 0.418 0.419 0.419
Adjusted R-squared 0.415 0.418 0.418 0.418 0.415 0.417 0.418 0.418
Differential in growth rates -0.119 -0.073 -0.080 -0.080 -0.095 -0.043 -0.050 -0.050
Notes: FD is the number of financial suppliers per kilometre square at the province level and measured in natural
logarithms. For further notes see Table 7.
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6 Concluding remarks
This thesis contributes to the literature on the finance-growth nexus, especially the
effect of local financial development on economic growth in developing countries. This
accumulates four self-contained studies which analyse the relationship between local
financial development and economic growth in Vietnam by considering local economic
growth at different levels. While the first study focuses on household welfare by using
annual consumption, income and consumption smoothing, the other three studies
consider firm growth including sales, investment and firm productivity (e.g., return
on assets, return on equity, sales per worker and wage per sales). In the first study,
we measure local financial development at three distinct levels including district, sub-
district and village. In the other three studies, we consider the development of local
finance at the province level. In order to address the endogeneity in analyse the local
finance-growth nexus, we apply the identification through heteroscedasticy in first three
studies and using the growth opportunities to account for this problem in the fourth
study. Our studies contribute to the empirical research as follows.
In the first contribution, we analyse how local financial development (at district,
sub-district and village level) affect household welfare. Using a household level survey
in Thailand - Vietnam Social Economics Panel from 2007 to 2013, our results document
that local financial development promotes household welfare in terms of annual income
and consumption. Moreover, households with demand for credit consume more in
financially more developed localities and local financial development significantly reduces
the probability of cutting consumption by negative income shocks. This reflects the
role of local financial development in consumption smoothing. Therefore, policy makers
should consider enhancing access to finance at the local level as an important policy
option for promoting household welfare in rural Vietnam.
In the second contribution, we further examine the effects of province-level financial
development, corruption and the joint impact of these factors on the performance
of Vietnamese firms in terms of the growth rates of sales, investment and sales per
worker. Using a nationally representative panel survey that covers over 40,000 firms
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for the period 2009-2013, we find that province-level financial development promotes
firm growth while corruption hinders it. Moreover, financial development and corruption
control are complementary to each other in their effects on firm growth. This implies
that policy makers could promote firm growth by improving financial development or
reducing corruption at the province level. Furthermore, the marginal effect of financial
development is stronger when the level of corruption is low, and vice versa. This suggests
that controlling the corruption at the province level would bring benefits to the growth
of firms.
In the third study, we contribute to literature by providing evidence on the effect of
local financial development on the gender gap in promoting firm growth. We investigate
the effect of provincial financial development and entrepreneurs’ gender on firm growth
in Vietnam. Using the same data set and method of identification as in the second
study, our results show that local financial development promotes firm growth. The
results also reveal the gender gap that male-owned firms perform better in terms of
improving the growth rates of sales, investment, ROA and ROE. However, the joint
effect of local financial development and male ownership is significantly negative through
all specifications. This suggests that by improving local financial development at the
province level, policy makers could help female-owned firms reduce their constraints in
promoting firm growth.
The fourth study contributes to the literature by re-examining the relationship
between local financial development and firm growth based on an identification strategy
that uses growth opportunities. We find that local financial development promotes the
growth rates of sales, investment and sales per worker while reducing the growth rate
of wage per sales of small firms. This implies that firms grow faster in a financially
developed province if they operate in sectors with growth opportunities. Moreover,
locating in localities with higher financial development, the difference in growth rates of
firms operating in sectors with stronger growth opportunities and firms in sectors with
lower growth opportunities is larger.
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